MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY INDEX 2015

Thomas Huddleston with Özge Bilgili, Anne-Linde Joki and Zvezda Vankova

With the vision of Jan Niessen, the scientific review of Anna Bardolet, Francesc Fàbregues, J. David Ingleby and Elena Sánchez-Montijano and the support of Karina Shklyan

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Extensive collaboration: The fourth edition of the MIPEX (MIPEX2015) rests on the extensive and long-term collaboration of trusted partners, experts and supporters of the project.

We are extremely grateful to our network of partners for their energy and commitment to the MIPEX:

Australia: Australian National University - College of Law Migration Law Program; Austria: Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen (Counselling Centre for Migrants); Belgium: Group for Research on Ethnic Relations, Migration and Equality (GERME) - University Libre de Bruxelles (ULB); Bulgaria: Open Society Institute – Sofia; Canada: Global Diversity Exchange and The Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS); Croatia: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies; Cyprus: Centre for the Advancement of Research and Development in Educational Technology (CARDET); Czech Republic: Multicultural Center Prague; Estonia: Institute of Baltic Studies; Finland: Institute of Migration; France: France Terre d’Asile; Germany: Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin Institute for Empirical Research on Integration and Migration, and Der Rat für Migration; Greece: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP); Hungary: ICCR - Budapest Foundation; Iceland: Icelandic Human Rights Centre; Ireland: Immigrant Council of Ireland; Italy: Fondazione Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity (ISMU); Japan: Meijo University; Latvia: Center for Public Policy-Providus; Lithuania: Lithuanian Social Research Centre (LSRC); Luxembourg: Association de Soutien des Travailleurs Immigrés (ASTI); Malta: The People for Change Foundation; Netherlands: Maastricht University - Faculty of Law; Poland: Institute for Public Affairs (IPA); Portugal: Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning - University of Lisbon (IGOT) and Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian; Romania: The Foundation for an Open Society; Slovakia: Institute for Public Affairs (IVO); Slovenia: The peace Institute; South Korea: Sookmyung Women’s University; Spain: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB); Sweden: Swedish Red Cross; Switzerland: Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts – Social Work and SFM – Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies; Turkey: Istanbul Bilgi University and Istanbul Kemerburgaz University; United Kingdom: Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS); United States of America: Boston College School of Social Work’s (BCSSW)
Finally, we extend our full and heartfelt appreciation to the networks of experts, peer reviewers, and country profile contributors, who shared their detailed knowledge to produce the comparative data on which the MIPEX depends. Their names are listed below and more detailed information is available on the website at http://www.mipex.eu.

INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS THE “INTEGRATION POLICIES: WHO BENEFITS?” PROJECT?
"Integration Policies: Who Benefits? The development and use of indicators in integration debates" is a project co-funded by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. The project identifies and measures integration outcomes, integration policies, and other contextual factors that can impact policy effectiveness; describes the real and potential beneficiaries of policies; and collects and analyses high-quality evaluations of integration policy effects.

Three are the main aims of the project:
1) LATEST POLICY COMPARISONS (MIPEX 2015): What are the trends and differences in integration policies in eight areas across Europe and the developed world?
2) MONITORING STATISTICS: Which integration outcomes can and do different integration policies affect? Which immigrants can and do benefit from these policies?
3) ROBUST EVALUATIONS: Which countries have robust evaluations of their policies’ effects on integration? Which policies are found to be most effective for improving integration outcomes?

1. LATEST POLICY COMPARISONS (MIPEX2015)
What is the Migrant Integration Policy Index?
Migrant Integration Policy Index is a unique tool which measures policies to integrate migrants. 167 policy indicators have been developed to create a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in society. The index is a useful tool to evaluate and compare what governments are doing to promote the integration of migrants in all the countries analysed. The new edition (MIPEX2015) includes information on 38 countries: all EU Member States, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA. It analyses 8 policies areas of integration: labour market mobility, education of children, political participation, family reunion, access to nationality, health (new policy area), permanent residence and anti-discrimination. Thanks to the relevance and rigor of its indicators, the MIPEX has been recognised as a common quick reference guide across Europe. Policymakers, NGOs, researchers, and European and international institutions are using its data not only to understand and compare national integration policies, but also to improve standards for equal treatment. MIPEX2015 covers more countries and more policies than the previous edition. Moreover, the project informs and engages key policy actors about how to use indicators to improve integration governance and policy effectiveness. http://www.mipex.eu/whatismipex

Why use MIPEX?
MIPEX promotes transparency by increasing public knowledge and visibility of national policies, changes and international trends. Integration actors can struggle to find up-to-date, comprehensive research data and analysis on which to base policies, proposals for change and projects to achieve equality in their country. Instead they may find anecdotal, out-dated information and piecemeal statistics that are too disconnected from the real impact on people’s lives to assist in formulating improvements.

The MIPEX aims to address this by providing a comprehensive tool which can be used to assess, compare and improve integration policy. The MIPEX includes 38 countries in order to provide a view of integration policies across a broad range of differing environments. The tool allows you to dig deep into the multiple factors that influence the integration of migrants into society and allows you to use the full MIPEX results to analyse and assess past and future changes in policy.

Who produces MIPEX?
MIPEX is a key element of the project “Integration policies: Who benefits? The development and use of indicators in integration debates”, led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), and the Migration Policy Group (MPG). MIPEX2015 rests on the extensive and long-term collaboration of trusted partners, experts and supporters of the project. We thank those who gave their valuable input at the stakeholder and expert consultations on each of the MIPEX issues as well as at the usability seminar.

We are extremely grateful to our network of partners for their energy and commitment to the MIPEX. Finally, we extend our full and heartfelt appreciation to the networks of experts, peer reviewers, and country profile contributors, who shared their detailed knowledge to produce the comparative data on which the MIPEX depends. The research is designed, coordinated and undertaken by the Migration Policy Group in cooperation with the research partners. The publication, including the results and country profiles, were written by the Migration Policy Group. The national partners, in coordination with the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), held a series of events in 2015 to launch debates across Europe,
North America, Oceania and Asia. For the full and interactive results please go to: www.mipex.eu.

The project “Integration policies: Who benefits?” is co-funded by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals. The research for the health strand was co-funded by the International Organization for Migration IOM, and the DG SANTE (Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety) and CHAFEA (Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency) of the European Commission.

For the other countries, funding was obtained on a case by case basis. http://www.mipex.eu/who-produces-mipex

What are the highest standards used by MIPEX?
For each of the 8 policy areas MIPEX identifies the highest European and international standards aimed at achieving equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all residents. The highest standards are drawn from Council of Europe Conventions, European Union Directives and international conventions (for more information see: http://mipex.eu/methodology). Where there are only minimum standards, European-wide policy recommendations are used.

How does MIPEX decide the scores?
There are 167 policy indicators on migrant integration in the MIPEX. These have been designed to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest standards through consultations with top scholars and institutions using and conducting comparative research in their area of expertise. A policy indicator is a question relating to a specific policy component of one of the 8 policy areas. For each answer, there are 3 options. The maximum of 3 points is awarded when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment. Within each of the 8 policy areas, the indicator scores are averaged together to give one of 4 dimension scores which examine the same aspect of policy. The 4 dimension scores are then averaged together to give the policy area score for each of the 8 policy areas per country which, averaged together one more time, lead to the overall scores for each country. In order to make rankings and comparisons, the initial 1, 2, 3 scale is converted into a 0, 50, 100 scale for dimensions and policy areas, where 100 is the top score.

The MIPEX research process
The scientific partners for each strand reviewed the previous MIPEX III indicators to guarantee that they were clearly worded, policy-relevant, and sustainable for future updating. With the final review of the indicators among the scientific partners, MPG approved the final list of 167 indicators. The indicators were completed by the national experts and anonymously double-checked by peer reviewers. The new health strand was completed by a separate set of migrant health policy experts and only for 2014. MPG’s central research staff checked both the experts’ and peer reviewers’ responses to guarantee that they properly understood the questions and answered them in a consistent manner as in other countries.

In each country there were a handful of questions where expert and peer reviewer disagreed. The MPG central research team mediated an anonymous discussion between the two in order to obtain the correct response based on publically-available data and legal texts. The finalised data for the 38 countries was inputted and analysed centrally by the CIDOB and MPG team. The CIDOB and MPG team were able to write up national country profiles. They focused on recent policy changes and investigated the justifications and potential impact of these changes. The results were also written up for each of the eight policy strands as well as for the overall score.

2. MONITORING STATISTICS
The project also identifies and measures integration outcomes, other contextual factors that can impact policy effectiveness and describes the real and potential beneficiaries of policies. In order to monitor policy outcomes, the research team designed a set of international indicators of immigrant integration. The EU integration indicators were taken as the starting point for this and adapted accordingly in order to determine the key outcome indicators in the 7 policy areas (health is not included), with a focus on the various specific target groups of the policies being measure by MIPEX. In the same way, real and potential beneficiary indicators were designed to quantify the share of immigrants potentially eligible or affected by a given policy for the 7 areas of integration.

A discussion meeting was organised with EU-level stakeholders to discuss the use of integration indicators in policy debates and solicit their views on the MIPEX Outcome and Beneficiary indicators for their work. The indicators were calculated using harmonised microdata sets allowing for cross-country comparisons across all 7 strands.

3. ROBUST EVALUATIONS
Finally, the project collects and analyses high-quality evaluations of integration policy effects. The evaluation research consists of an extensive and systematic literature review on integration policy effectiveness research regarding different policy areas in the EU as well as some other major immigration countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia. In cooperation with evaluation experts in each country, we accessed impact evaluations that applied high quality quantitative research methods.

We developed a database giving a thorough summary of the studies with a focus on labour market mobility as this turned out to be the policy dimension that received the most attention in the literature. Based on this database, we analysed which active labour market policies and programs benefit migrants the most under what conditions and concluded with recommendations for future research.
## INTERNATIONAL KEY FINDINGS

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* Without health
CONTEXT

CAN INTEGRATION POLICIES RESPOND TO THE NEEDS?

Within the EU, nearly 20 million residents (or 4%) are non-EU citizens. The number of non-EU newcomers was relatively stable from 2008-2013, due to fewer labour migrants and more recognised beneficiaries of international protection.

Since 2008 and crisis/austerity, non-EU citizens' employment rates (aged 20-64) dropped 6 points on average in the EU to 56.5% in 2014, while their risk of poverty or social exclusion increased 4 points to 49%, twice the level for EU citizens.

The low-educated make up 37% of working-age non-EU immigrants in EU (aged 18-64); a growing share are university-educated (around 1/4), compared to 45% of immigrants in traditional countries.

Immigration should be a top item on the EU agenda, according to an increasing number of EU residents (24% in autumn 2014, up +16% since 2012, esp. BG, DK, DE, IT, MT, SE, UK), ranked just after the economy (33%), unemployment (29%) and public financing (25%).

This agenda comes at a time of major government changes and close elections in several major nations (e.g. between 2010-2014 in AU, BE, FR, GR, IT, PT, ES, UK, Nordics).

Far-right parties have never done better in recent European history, threatened mainstream parties and even entered into government/kingmaker positions (unthinkable in 2000 with EU boycott threat of AT over FPÖ); e.g. 2014 European Parliament elections saw vote shares of ±25% in DK, FR, UK, 20% in AT, 15% in FI, HU, LV, LT and NL and 10% in GR and SE.

Public opinion on immigration is divergent across the EU and generally uninformed. In 2012, 2/3 thought that immigrants should have equal rights, from 30-40% in CY, HU, LV to 80-90% in Nordics, NL, PT and ES. In 2014, non-EU immigration evoke 'negative feelings' in 57% EU residents, especially in Baltic, Central and Southeast Europe.

While the public is grossly over-estimates the number of immigrants and correcting this improves their attitudes, few think that their public immigration debates are based on facts.

KEY FINDINGS

POLICY INDICATORS

Integration policies in the 38 MIPEX policies are, on average, ambivalent about equal rights and opportunities for immigrants. Scoring 52/100, integration policies in these developed democracies create slightly more obstacles than obstacles for immigrants to fully participate in economic, social and democratic life.

Immigrants generally face greater obstacles in emerging destination countries with small numbers of immigrants and high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (the Baltics, JP, Central and Southeast Europe; EU13 average is 41/100). Immigrants usually benefit from more equal rights and opportunities in wealthier, older and larger countries of immigration, for example in Western Europe (EU15 average is 60/100) and traditional countries of immigration (67/100 on average for AU, CA, NZ, US). But political will may matter more than a country's tradition of immigration, since more inclusive integration policies may both encourage more immigrants to settle permanently and the public to trust immigrants more.

For example, integration policies differ significantly between DE and AT/CH, DK and SE, BE and FR, PT and ES, JP and KR or between EE, LV and LT.

The greatest areas of strength are that migrant workers, reunited families and permanent residents enjoy basic security, rights and protection from discrimination. Within Europe, national policies are more strong and similar in these areas covered by EU law.

The greatest obstacles are for foreign citizens to become citizens or politically active and for mainstream services to guarantee equal access and opportunities for immigrants (targeted employment, education and health support). In Europe, policies are generally weaker and divergent in these areas of national policy.
CHANGES

POLICY INDICATORS

1. Integration policies continue to improve little-by-little, sometimes with great effects on specific aspects of people’s lives
2. +1 point on average on the MIPEX 100-point-scale from 2010-2014 (similar to +1 point trend from 2007-2010)
3. 13 countries made these +1 average improvements by reinforcing current programmes (PT, US), improving procedures (FR, IE, JP, CH, TU) or implementing EU law (HU, IT, LT, RO)
4. 10 countries passed more major reforms (DK's several reforms catching up with policies in Nordics, DE and international trends; more targeted support in AT and DE and dual nationality for 2nd generation in DE; CZ and PL adopt EU-required anti-discrimination laws and domestic citizenship reforms; BG implements EU law)
5. 7 countries lost -1 point (or more for GR, NL, UK) due to restrictions and cuts: GR on citizenship and voting rights (-2); NO on national consultative body; AU, CA and KR on family reunion; major drops in only NL (-8) and UK (-6) in nearly all areas with residence restrictions and targeted support cuts
6. 6 countries receive the same score due to small improvements (SE) or restrictions (NZ, SI, ES) or none at all (CY, SK)
7. Between 2007-2010, major reforms were passed in just a handful of countries (+11 in LU on all areas, +10 in GR on citizenship & voting rights, +5 in AT on targeted employment support, +4 in CZ on anti-discrimination, +3 in LV on access to education and training)

BENEFICIARIES

WHO COULD BENEFIT FROM INTEGRATION POLICIES?

The need for ambitious integration policies is clear across European countries, according to the latest comparable data (mostly from 2013). 5-7% of non-EU citizen adults in the EU were not living with their spouse or partner in 2011/2 and thus may be potential sponsors for family reunion. On average, 1/3 of working-age non-EU citizens were not in employment, education or training, especially women and the low-educated. Discrimination was reportedly experienced by 27% of people belonging to ethnic minorities and 13% belonging to religious minorities. While the public often talks about immigrants as newcomers, on average 3/4 of non-EU citizens were settled for 5+ years in most European countries, including Southern and Central Europe. More than half lived there long enough to apply for citizenship across the EU.

WHO REALLY BENEFITS?

The links between integration policies and outcomes are not always clear. Some countries actively improve their policies to respond to problems on the ground, while others ignore them. Some policies are reaching many eligible immigrants, while others are poorly implemented or limited to small-scale projects and best practices. The MIPEX review of statistics and evaluations (Bilgili 2015) suggest that ambitious policies are helping immigrants and their children in practice to reunite together, get basic training, become permanent residents, voters and citizens and use their rights as victims of discrimination. This can benefit everyone in society.

Researchers using MIPEX around the world find that the countries with inclusive integration policies also tend to be more developed, competitive and happier places for immigrants and everyone to live in. Inclusive policies may also help us trust immigrants and see the benefits of immigration to our society, while restrictive policies harden distrust and xenophobic attitudes among the public. A drop in a country’s MIPEX score usually signals a rise in anti-immigrant attitudes and the success of far-right parties. The MIPEX network hopes to continue monitoring whether integration policies become more ambitious and effective, learning from the latest research and improving its indicators. We aim to bring a greater level of maturity and evidence to the often politicised debates about the successes and failures of integration policies around the world.
BEST CASE
WORST CASE

A COMPOSITE OF NATIONAL POLICIES FOUND IN 2014 IN AT LEAST ONE OF THE 38 COUNTRIES

best___Almost all non-EU immigrants enjoy a secure status and equal rights to participate in the country's economic, social and democratic life—and should not take this for granted.

best___They choose to permanent residents, voters and/or citizens after a few years and their children automatically become citizens, all as a normal part of the integration process.

best___Separated families are able to reunite when their sponsor has the basic legal income and housing expected of all families in the country, with clear exemptions and protections for vulnerable families.

best___Large numbers of newcomers and their children can and do participate in effective training and support to get the right professional skills, degree or job.

best___All residents are or have been learning the language to the best of their abilities through free and flexible courses and materials.

best___Nearly all non-EU citizens are guaranteed equal healthcare coverage in law and in practice, accessible information and equal quality care.

best___Most people in the country know their rights as potential victims of discrimination and more and more are reporting these incidents, thanks to the strong and well-resourced anti-discrimination laws and equality bodies, policies and NGOs.

worst___Immigrants have almost no prospects for long-term integration. Non-EU workers are tied to their jobs, required to leave after a few years and not able to access social security or any general or targeted support.

worst___People in the country are uninformed about discrimination and unable to bring forward a case alone, without a dedicated anti-discrimination law, procedure or equality body.

worst___Non-EU citizens are discouraged from becoming politically active because all are seen as potential 'threats' and denied even basic political liberties.

worst___The education and health system are excluding legally and socially vulnerable groups and are non-responsive to immigrants' specific needs.

worst___Hardly any non-EU citizens are allowed to reunite with their family or become long-term residents or citizens, under the country's policies.

worst___The only exceptions are made for people with 'high skills', high incomes or special personal or ethnic ties.

worst___The few others eligible must prove their 'integration' through discretionary interviews and prove unrealistically high language proficiency, all without enough free course and materials to succeed.

worst___Overall, immigration is turning the country into one of the most exclusive democracies in the world, with a growing democratic deficit of adults denied the right to vote and citizenship, even for the 2nd or 3rd generation born and educated there.
Key findings

Final Remarks

Key Findings on Integration Policies and their Beneficiaries

Most labour market policies focus on helping immigrants to find jobs – and most do after 10+ years, but often lower quality jobs below their qualifications or below the poverty line. Policies tend to provide basic information and access to most types of jobs, self-employment and trainings. Traditional countries of immigration and most Western European countries are increasingly investing in more effective general and targeted programmes, but many may be too new or small to reach the many non-EU men and women in need, who rarely access trainings or unemployment benefits.

For the small number of transnational families, family reunion policies are one major factor determining whether or not they reunite in the country. Non-EU families of all types are more likely to reunite in countries with inclusive family reunion policies, like Scandinavia, Spain and Portugal. However, several countries are becoming more restrictive, given the influence of populist parties, and expecting transnational families to live up standards that many national families could not.

As countries become more diverse, schools and health services are slow to adapt to immigrants’ specific needs. Few staff are trained, equipped or required to respond. Immigrants’ basic access to these services depends a lot on their legal status. Traditional countries of immigration and a few in Northern Europe are offering more personalised general and targeted support, which seems to reach larger number of immigrants in need and may help explain their progress over time.

Policies largely determine whether immigrants are settling down permanently, becoming voters and becoming equal citizens. Restricting permanent residence and citizenship (e.g. AT, CY, GR) leads to large numbers of ‘permanently temporary’ foreigners who are legally precarious and socially excluded. Facilitating permanent residence but restricting citizenship (e.g. DK, IT, CH, EE, LV) means most immigrants are secure in their status but treated like ‘second-class citizens’ in national politics and several areas of life. Equal rights are not guaranteed in practice in countries whose policies privilege certain national or ethnic groups over others (e.g. HU, JP, KR and ES). In contrast, confident countries of immigration like New Zealand, Sweden, Norway, Belgium and Portugal opened up these opportunities, so that most immigrants enjoy equal and secure rights that boost their integration outcomes in many areas of life.

Strong anti-discrimination laws have spread across Europe, thanks to the EU, but remain relatively new and under-resourced. Potential victims are often uninformed and poorly supported to access justice because equality policies, bodies and NGOs have few powers and little reach. The time has come for enforcement. Most victims are not coming forward with complaints, so countries still have to take the 1st steps in the long path to justice.
LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Key Findings

Labour market integration happens over time and depends on the general policies, context, immigrants' skills and reason for migration. Certain effective employment policies may be too new and small to reach the many non-EU citizen men and women in need, who rarely access any training or benefits.

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**POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES**

**How many immigrants could be employed?**

In the average European country, 1/3 of working-age non-EU citizens are not in employment, education or training. The number of non-EU citizens not in employment, education or training are highest in countries such as BE, FR, GR, ES and lowest (around 20-25%) in Nordics, CY, CZ, PT, NL, CH, UK. This is less common among men & high-educated (1/4) than among women & low-educated (40%).

**POLICY INDICATORS**

**Do immigrants have equal rights and opportunities to access jobs and improve their skills?**

Labour market mobility policies would barely qualify as slightly favourable in most countries. Most family and long-term residents can immediately access the private labour market, public employment services and training. But immigrants looking for the right job or a new degree will have to find one without the help of the social safety net or strong targeted programmes to recognise their skills or foreign diplomas and orient them to jobs and mainstream services.

Immigrants have better access and targeted support in traditional countries of immigration, Western Europe and JP/KR, with the weakest rights and opportunities in CY, IE, TU and most Central European countries. Access, support and rights differ significantly across countries, even between the traditional countries of immigration. Immigrant workers enjoy greater access and rights as workers in CA and, to some extent, the US, but greater targeted support in NZ and, to some extent, AU. Whereas in Europe, BE, EE, FR, and LU are wasting the economic potential of many of their non-EU citizens by providing some targeted support but closing many sectors to them. Countries recently dependent on migrant workers (CZ, GR, IT, PL, ES) may treat them equally as workers under the law, but often ignore the specific challenges of the foreign-born. PT emerges as the only new country of immigration with a favourable framework for labour market mobility, both for immigrant and emigrant workers.

Labour market mobility is one of the few areas of integration policy where the majority of countries are continuing to invest in reform, with improvements in 20 countries since 2010 (on average +6 points). Only NL undermined its support to target the specific needs of immigrant workers, due to the new government's approach to mainstreaming and austerity. Major legal reforms in new countries of immigration use EU law to improve their legislation (e.g. GR,
HU, LV) and catch up with basic access and information for immigrant workers and entrepreneurs. More established countries of immigration continued to pilot and expand targeted support, which is relatively new and weak in most countries. Immigrants in AT, BE, EE, FI, FR, DE, PT, SE, US will see several new targeted support measures, and qualifications may be better recognised in CA, CY, DE, LU, PT.

**DIMENSIONS**

**Access to labour market**

- Not all foreign residents with the right to work have equal access to the full labour market. 24 MIPEX countries now grant immediate access for family migrants, but still delay full access for labour migrants.
- Often only nationals (or EU nationals) enjoy equal opportunities for public sector jobs (equal access in 15 countries, but very limited in 10: FR, LU, mostly Central and Southeast Europe).
- Greater access to labour market and public sector in longstanding destinations & major countries of labour migration.
- New countries of immigration have granted equal access under EU law (recently IT, GR, PL) and opened to immigrant entrepreneurs (recently GR, HU, PL), but others have also restricted access for workers and family (e.g. CZ, IE, NL, SK).

**Access to general support**

- Most immigrants can access public employment offices, higher education & vocational training, often thanks to EU law (e.g. CY, CZ, GR, LV).
- However many immigrants as temporary residents or workers cannot equally access grants and scholarships to obtain these new degrees (equal access granted in 10: NO & several in Southern and Central Europe).
- Procedures to recognise skills and foreign qualifications are also very new (e.g. CA, DE) and only facilitated in 9 countries: AU, CA, CY, DE, EE, IS, NL, SE, UK, with some positive elements in 8 more (e.g. BE, DK, NO, NZ, PT).
- Few countries have a clear procedure to recognise skills and experience from work abroad.

**Targeted support**

- Targeted support is the major area of weakness in most countries. Rarely are general services able to address the
specific needs of the foreign-trained, very low-educated, young arrivals or migrant women

- Immigrants in most countries only receive targeted information on their rights and recognition procedures (e.g. most recently, AT, CA, CY, EE, FR, IS)
- Most targeted policies are very new and limited to Western Europe, often in response to immigrant employment statistics, but requiring political will (e.g. cuts due to NL mainstreaming and UK austerity)
- Targeted work-related trainings in 10 (mostly job-specific language training in Western Europe, EE, JP/KR, recently US)
- Specific bridging/work placement programmes for high or low-skilled in 8 (Nordics, DE, AU/CA/NZ). Employment mentors/coaches for newcomers in 12 (recently Nordics, AT, BE, FR, DE, JP/KR, PT)

**Workers’ rights**

- Once migrants find jobs, they generally enjoy the same working conditions and access to unions as nationals
- These workers, who pay full taxes, are nevertheless excluded from parts of the social security system in half the MIPEX countries (e.g. AU/NZ/US/UK and new countries of immigration), with full access in 14 countries (CA, Northern & Southern Europe)

**Best case**
A migrant with the right to work and live in the country has the same chances as everyone else in the labour market. From day one in the country, she and her family members can start applying for any job in the private or public sector. She gets her qualifications from abroad recognised. She can then improve her skills through training and study grants. The state encourages her by targeting her specific needs - for example, she can take language courses focused on her profession. Job mentors and trained staff help her assess skills and use public employment services. Once employed, she has the same rights as all workers in the country.

**Worst Case**
Where a migrant cannot fully contribute to the country’s economic life, his skills and ambitions go to waste. He must wait 5 years to have the same right as nationals to work, study or start his own business. Even then, he is barred from working in many sectors and professions. In the meantime, he has to look for work on his own, without any general or targeted support. Because his foreign qualifications are not recognised, he may have to give up his career to take whatever job he finds. Employers do not have to provide him with the same working conditions or social security as his co-workers.
REAL BENEFICIARIES

Are immigrants acquiring new skills?

The uptake of education and training seems to be higher among non-EU men and women, including the low-educated, in countries facilitating labour market mobility and lower in those restricting job and training opportunities. Only 17% of working-age non-EU citizens were recently enrolled in education or training, according to EU-wide estimates from 2011/2. Uptake of education and training was much higher (around 1/3) and more equitable for men/women and high/low-educated in NL and Nordics (up to 42% in SE). Hardly any non-EU adults (<9%) were accessing education and training in several parts of Central and Southern Europe (e.g. EE/LV, HU, SI, CY, GR, IT). Overall, uptake of education and training was only slightly higher among women, but much higher among high-educated men and women in most Western European countries (esp. AT/DE/CH, FR, IT).

Most unemployed non-EU citizens must find a new job without the support of unemployment benefits. According to 2011/2 rough estimates from a selection of EU countries, only around 1/3 of non-EU citizen men and women who were unemployed last year received any unemployment benefit. These numbers appear slightly lower for women. Access to unemployment benefits seemed to be possible for the majority of unemployed non-EU citizens in AT, BE, FI, CH, around half in FR, but only for small numbers in HR, CY, DE, GR, UK.
**CONTEXTUAL FACTORS**

What other factors explain whether immigrants find skilled and well-paid jobs?

- High employment rates (≥70%) in Nordics, AT/DE/NL/CH, AU/CA/NZ/US, JP vs. lower rates (≤60%) in HR, GR, IT, ES, TU
- Most flexible employment protection legislation in English-speaking countries, Nordics, HU, JP, NL, CH & most rigid in TU, BE/FR/LU, EE, NO, Southern Europe (GR/IT/SI/ES/PT)
- Majority of recent migrants coming with temporary work or study permits in English-speaking countries, Southern Europe, JP/KR, CZ, IS, MT, PL, CH
- Large numbers coming with some exposure to the language in English-speaking countries (except US), BE, FR, PT, ES

**OUTCOME INDICATORS**

Are immigrants employed in qualified and well-paid jobs?

The long-settled non-EU-born (10+ years' stay) are on average only slightly less likely to have a job than non-immigrants with the same gender and level of education, though the gaps are greater for the high-educated and for women. Data on employment rates from 2011/2 suggest that, on average, non-immigrants are just 10% more likely to be employed than long-settled non-EU immigrants. No major employment gaps emerged for long-settled low or high-educated immigrants in IE, IT, ES, PT, UK or for low-educated immigrants in FI, CH, CY, GR, SI. Employment rates for the low-educated are similar for immigrant and non-immigrant men in the majority of countries, but 20% lower for immigrant women on average. In contrast, the gaps in employment rates are higher among the high-educated, especially for high-educated immigrant women and especially in BE/NL, DK/FI, CY/GR/SL. Employment gaps are generally similar for immigrant men vs. women in the Nordics, Southern and Central Europe, but greater for
immigrant women in AT/DE/CH, BE/FR, FI, UK.

In terms of employment quality, long-settled non-EU immigrants are often still in worse jobs than non-immigrants, with the high-educated twice as likely to be over-qualified for their jobs and the low-educated 2.5 times as likely to be living in poverty. High-educated men and women are much more likely to be working below their qualifications, especially in Southern Europe and Northwest Europe, with only the exceptions of IE, PT and UK. Low-educated workers are much more likely to experience poverty, with wages and benefits below their needs, especially in BE, DK, FR, LU, NL.

More – but not necessarily better – jobs tend to go to immigrants in countries with flexible & growing labour markets and more open labour migration & study channels, especially for immigrants speaking or learning the language. However, immigrants’ labour market integration is not simply explained by the general policy/context and their individual skills. Research finds that employment outcomes are better for immigrants who get legal access to the labour market, a formal recognition of their foreign degree, a new domestic degree and/or domestic work experience. Targeted policies may be too new, small-scale or general to achieve these objectives. Whether each country’s policies obtain these effects in practice depends on the implementation and the national context. A few Northern European countries submit their policies to robust evaluation, whose results will allow us to understand the link between employment policies and outcomes for immigrants and similar groups on the labour market.
Employment rates comparing high-educated
EVIDENCE BASE

What do we learn from robust studies?

So far, only certain general and targeted employment policies can be directly associated with better labour market outcomes for immigrants and a lower incidence of employment discrimination. Robust evaluations collected through this project (see Bilgili 2015, also Liebig and Huddleston 2014 and Butschek and Walter 2014) suggest that what works for non-immigrants also works well for immigrants, especially for the low-educated, although these programmes work better when applied early and targeted to immigrants’ specific needs. Immigrants benefit the most from programmes providing early work experience. Some evidence also suggests that early work-focused introduction programmes can also boost employment outcomes, so long as their focus is country-specific vocational trainings and the programme is combined with work experience to avoid the 'lock-in effect of courses. Other rather effective programmes include start-up funds for immigrant entrepreneurs and job search assistance (identifying
migrants’ skills and helping them look for jobs). More indirectly, facilitating naturalisation, a secure residence and a secure family life seems to have positive effects on boosting labour market outcomes for certain immigrants (Bilgili et al. 2015).
FAMILY REUNION

Key findings

For the small number of transnational families, family reunion policies are one major factor determining whether or not they reunite in the country.

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POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES

How many immigrants are potentially living in transnational couples?

Transnational couples are one of the main potential beneficiaries for family reunion, but they are rarely identified through statistics and assisted to reunite. According to 2011/2 estimates from 17 European countries, 5-7% of non-EU citizen adults were not living with their spouse or partner, a much higher level of "living apart together" than for national citizens. These non-EU citizens are likely living in internationally separated couples and thus potential sponsors for family reunion. >5% of non-EU citizen adults may be potential sponsors in DE, GR, IT, ES, especially in BE and SI (>10%), rising to 1 in 3 non-EU adults in CY separated from their spouse or partner. The numbers were comparatively lower in EE, LU, NL and UK and slightly lower for all non-EU-born (including naturalised citizens).

![Share of separated couples among non-EU citizens, 2012](image)

POLICY INDICATORS

How easily can immigrants reunite with family?

Most separated families have a legal right to family reunion that is just slightly favourable for their and their families' integration. Newcomers can secure their family life as the starting point for their integration under the procedures in traditional countries of immigration, most Northern European countries and new countries of labour migration (e.g. IT, PT, ES). In most countries, reunited families acquire both a secure residence and basic equal rights. However, policymakers across countries and parties disagree most on how to define the family and what are the conditions necessary for them to reunite. On the one end, those with inclusive definitions of the family often keep the conditions to a minimum, out of respect for family life. They then set the conditions to the minimum levels needed and required for all families living in the country (e.g. income at social assistance level, general housing requirements). On the other end, many established countries of immigration are restricting eligibility to the modern nuclear family and expecting transnational families to live up to standards that many national families could not: higher ages to marry, high incomes, no need for social benefits and tests about their language skills and social knowledge, all with disproportionately high fees to pay and little support to succeed (e.g. AT, CY, DK, FR, DE, GR, IE, MT, NL, CH, UK). Increasingly, countries make exceptions to the legal conditions for those most able to meet them (highly-skilled workers and the wealthy), but only rarely for those most vulnerable (usually for minors and beneficiaries of international protection).
Given the current political climate and influence of populist parties, transnational families face an uncertain future in many EU countries and now also in traditional countries of immigration. Since 2010, policies have been left largely untouched in 14 MIPEX countries (mostly new and small countries of immigration), improved in 12 (+4 on average) and restricted in 10 (-5 on average), including AU (-3), CA (-3) and NZ (-4). Family reunion is increasingly politicised, with policies changed based on electoral promises, not robust evaluations. Policies are mostly restricted based on statistics about the number of applications, not on evidence of their impact on integration. Improvements are often based on European law and the results of court cases by transnational families.

**DIMENSIONS**

**Eligibility**

- Temporary permits of ≤1 year: Most types of temporary residents (27 countries) can sponsor their family, either immediately (14) or after 1 year (10)
- Immigration laws recognise same-sex partners in most countries (26, recently AT, FR, IE, LU, MT, SI, US) and other long-term relationships in a near-majority (17)
- Age of majority for couples: Equal treatment remains the international standard, with 30 of the 38 treating all couples over 18/19 like adults. A higher age may be disproportionate for separated couples and ineffective for their integration
- Limited entitlements for dependents outside the modern nuclear family: These family members are somehow entitled to join their sponsor in 25 of the 38 countries, with full entitlements for parents or grandparents in 10 and for adult children in 6 (full for both in CZ, PT, SI, SE, recent restrictions in AU, CA, NZ, UK)

**Conditions**

- Only basic legal income and standard housing required: Sponsors in 22 countries can use any legal source to prove a ‘stable and sufficient’ income, though the level is often vague and higher (16 countries) than what national families need to live on social assistance (6). The other 16 countries have dropped equal treatment as their benchmark and raised the level to exclude low-income workers or expect reunited families to get by without the same social benefits as other families
- No language or integration requirements necessary: To learn the language, free courses are regularly available for families in most countries (27), but not guaranteed for all in 4 of the 10 with obligatory requirements (AT, FR, NL,
MIPEX 2015  Family Reunion

CH)

- No pre-entry test: Only 8 countries impose a language requirement abroad. None have designed successful conditions for all separated families scattered around the world to learn the language and significantly improve their integration prospects (see slightly favourable attempts in FR & KR). Pre-entry tests are rare in the EU and foreign to traditional countries of immigration (see only NZ’s pre-purchase requirement for family of labour migrants).

- Fees (often over 200€) are disproportionately burdensome for reuniting families in most countries (21) when compared to the normal administrative fees and average income in the country, especially in Southern and Central Europe, FI, FR, IE, NL, NO, UK and traditional countries of immigration.

Security of status

- Discretionary procedure: Families meeting the legal requirements can still be rejected on relatively vague grounds and suspicions in most countries (28, esp. Central Europe).

- Some—if not all—of an applicant’s effective links to the country must be weighted in their favour, including evidence of physical or emotional violence (all factors in 16, mostly Western European countries, AU, CA).

- Residence as secure as sponsor’s: Permits for family are as long and renewable as their sponsor’s in 19 countries (mostly Western Europe & traditional countries of immigration).

- Right to written decision and review: Rejected applicants in 29 countries learn why and can appeal to an independent body or court.

Rights associated

- Immediate equal right to work for families (25 MIPEX countries, not in several Central European countries, BE, IE, CY, JP, KR, MT, TU).

- Same access as sponsor to social benefits, such as education/training social security, housing (23 countries, recently DK, not in several Central European countries, AU, IE, NZ, TU, UK, US).

- Long and complicated path to autonomous residence: Family members often face serious delays (5 years) and obstacles (facilitated in only 11 countries: AU, BE, CA, IT, NO, NZ, PT, SI, ES, TU, SE).

- Not all vulnerable groups are automatically entitled, for example in cases of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, and emotional or physical violence (see instead AU, CA, NO, NZ, PT, ES).

Strand and four dimensions on family reunion, MIPEX 38 (average), 2014

![Graph showing the score for family reunion, eligibility, conditions for acquisition of status, and security of status. Favourable scores range from 80-100, slightly favourable from 60-79, halfway favourable from 41-59, unfavourable from 1-20, and critically unfavourable from 0-20.](image-url)
**Best case**

Families who are successfully reunited together have the socio-cultural stability to fully participate in society. In Europe, a non-EU family has the same rights and responsibilities as an EU family moving from one country to another. Upon arrival, any legal resident has the right to live with her spouse/partner, dependent children, and dependent parents and grandparents. They have the right to reunite in the country if they have a basic legal income and meet the legal requirements. Authorities have no reason to reject her application if it’s not fraudulent and poses no security threat. The procedure is free and short. The state promotes the family’s integration by facilitating autonomous residence and guaranteeing equal access as their sponsor to schools, jobs and social programmes.

**Worst case**

A person kept apart from his family has few prospects to settle in the community where he lives. He has to wait years just to be eligible to apply. Even then, the law only recognises the traditional nuclear family of a spouse and minor children. Sponsors must pass difficult conditions without government support. Only those with high incomes, stable jobs and high scores on language/integration tests can live with their family. Procedures are long, expensive and discretionary. The law forces reunited family members to be dependent on him since they cannot work or use public benefits. They are not entitled to an autonomous residence permit, even if he dies, divorces, or abuses them.

**REAL BENEFICIARIES**

**Are families reuniting?**

Popular stereotypes about family reunion are far from the realities of the new families making Europe their home. Around half a million non-EU family members were able to reunite with their non-EU sponsor in 2013 in one of 27 EU Member States (443,766), NO (9,906) or CH (16,351). The numbers of newly arrived non-EU families have remained rather stable in the EU from 2008-2012, except for a major 2010 peak in IT. In that period, the numbers dropped the most in ES and UK (from around 105,000 to around 70,000) as well as FR, GR, HU, PL and PT.

Most newly arrived immigrants are not non-EU families (only 19% of new permits across the EU in 2013), not even in the country with the highest share (SE, 42%). Non-EU families account for only around 1 in 3 newcomers in LV, IT, NL, SI, ES; 1 in 4 in BE, EE, FI, GR, LU, PT; and hardly any in CY, IE and PL. Newcomer families are very diverse, coming from all over the globe.

Rarely do the majority in a given country come from the same origin country or region. In nearly all countries, the majority of arriving family members are women. In most, non-EU family reunion is mostly made up of children, not spouses/partners (esp. BE, CZ, EE, FI and Southern European countries). Usually only the nuclear family are able to reunite, with hardly any elderly people (65+) joining a non-EU sponsor (lowest in AT, BE, DK, SE, CH).

**CONTEXTUAL FACTORS**

**What other factors explain whether immigrants reunite with family?**

- Many newcomers recently settling down with family in Nordics and Southern Europe
- Sizeable share of humanitarian migrants likely to stay and need family reunion in Nordics, AT, BE, DE, GR, MT, NL, US
- Few with the eligible or permanent permits to sponsor in BG, CY, IE, MT
- Many from developed/neighbouring countries and thus less likely to reunite in Baltics, HR, SI
How often do immigrants reunite with family?

Non-EU family reunion is relatively rare in the EU. Out of every 100 non-EU residents in the average EU country, only 2.2 are newly arrived non-EU family members. Since 2008, rates have slightly risen in DK, LT, LU, NL, SK and dropped in BE, BG, UK and Southern Europe. With very few exceptions, non-EU families have been more likely to reunite in countries with inclusive family reunion policies, such as the Nordic, Benelux and Southern European countries. Non-EU family reunion is very rare in countries with restrictive policies, such as CY, EE, IE, MT and, to some extent, AT, DE, GR and LV. For example, non-EU family reunion has become less common following reforms in BE and UK and more common in DK. Restrictive policies are slightly more likely to be selective based on immigrants’ backgrounds, with only certain nationalities able to reunite (e.g. DK, IE, CH). On the other hand, inclusive policies are slightly more likely to be equitable, with all nationalities affected equally and reuniting families representative of the makeup of the country’s non-EU population (e.g. BE, FI, IT, PT). While a family’s choice to reunite is also driven by other individual and contextual factors, making policies more restrictive, selective or discretionary can significantly delay or deter both family’s reunion and their integration in the country. Policies can quickly function as obstacles to the right to family reunion, with disproportionate effects on the most vulnerable groups (see below).

### Non-EU family reunion rate, all countries, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>13.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Min = 0.07  Max = 13.45
EVIDENCE BASE

What do we learn from robust studies?

Available studies and evaluations suggest that pre-entry tests, high age limits for spouses or high income requirements do not actually promote integration in practice (see Strik et al. 2013, Huddleston and Pedersen 2011). On the contrary, they are more effective for limiting the number of reuniting families. These policies have a disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable groups: the elderly, young adults, the less educated, people in certain – often unstable—countries, and—to some extent—women. These people are less likely to apply for family reunion, pass a pre-entry test or use alternative options like resettling in another EU country. With few families able to resettle somewhere else, some delay their application, while others give up altogether as they cannot meet the new requirements, no matter their amount of motivation and preparation.
Key findings

Countries respond to large numbers and poor outcomes of immigrant pupils with many new, but weak targeted education policies, which are not always well implemented or effective in practice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking 2014</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<th>Ranking 2014</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Romania</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Malta</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES

How many pupils have immigrant parents?

Foreign-born children make up 10-17% of all pupils in AU/CA/NZ and between 5-7% in IT and most Northern European countries. Figures are higher in LU (17%) and in major new destinations like IE & ES (around 8.5%), but much lower in DK, DE, NL (3%). Traditional countries of immigration AU/CA/NZ have large numbers of both first and second generation pupils, totalling between 20-30% of all pupils. Northwest European countries have relatively small numbers of first generation pupils and mostly second generation pupils (around 6-10% of all pupils, rising to 17.5% in CH and 29% in LU), the first and second generation now make up the majority of all pupils in a few major capitals and cities in Northern Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of 1st or 2nd generation pupils, 2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Min = 0 Max = 100

POLICY INDICATORS

Is the education system responsive to the needs of the children of immigrants?

Education emerges as the greatest weakness in integration policies in most countries. Most migrant pupils have little extra support to find the right school and class, catch up if they’re behind, quickly learn the language and, if they're lucky, learn some of the rules of the language that they use at home. Teachers and other pupils are lucky if they learn anything about diversity or immigrants. Most countries leave it up to the general education system to fix (or
Education policies are generally more targeted in countries with large numbers of pupils with an immigrant background. The Nordic countries take an individualised needs-based approach for all pupils. AU, CA, NZ developed strong targeted education policies through multiculturalism, while the US requires a general focus on vulnerable racial and social groups. In contrast, the education systems in DE-speaking countries, FR, LU seem less responsive to their relatively large number of immigrant pupils. New destination countries with small immigrant communities usually offer only ad hoc projects for a few groups and schools (e.g. JP, LV/LT, MT, Central and Southeast Europe). In the major new destinations such as GR, IE, IT and ES, weak targeted education policies have not caught up with the now relatively large numbers of immigrant pupils. More developed policies in CZ, EE, FI, KR, PT better serve these countries' relatively small number of immigrant pupils.

Policies are very slow to adapt to target the needs of immigrant pupils, with 25 countries making no major changes since 2010. 8 countries made minor improvements, opening the system to all legal migrants (RO) or to undocumented migrants (CH, SE), setting basic standards for language support (CZ, FR), opening to non-European languages (BE, and promoting diversity in school or society (AT, DK). A few leading countries lost some of their political will and resources to promote diversity (NL, ES), target migrant pupils' specific needs (NL, UK), enforce their policies for schools in practice (US), although education actors who mobilise in support of these targeted policies can have an impact (UK).

**DIMENSIONS**

**Access**
- Few school systems make professional assessments of what newcomer children learned abroad (see FR, LU)
- Migrant pupils rarely receive additional support to access pre-primary, vocational and higher education or to prevent them from dropping out (see ad hoc support in traditional countries of immigration, Nordics, AT, EE, KR, PT)
- Undocumented pupils can access some level of higher education in 16 MIPEX countries (all in EE, FR, GR, KR, NL, ES)

**Targeting needs**
- Schools have wide discretion and few resources to address the specific needs of migrant pupils, their teachers
and parents (see instead strong policies in traditional countries of immigration, Nordics, EE)

- Additional financial resources for schools in IS, NL, technical support/resources in 10 MIPEX countries, and 12 with both
- Teachers not required to be trained on migrants’ needs or intercultural approach in 23 countries
- Strong orientation policies with intercultural mediators/interpreters in 11 countries
- Migrants are entitled to support to learn the language (weak in 6 countries), but frequently it is not held to the same standard as the rest of the curriculum (only in 12)
- Limited attention to specific needs beyond basic language learning for newcomers in Central Europe, FR, GR, MT, TU

**New opportunities**

- Few countries, such as AU, CA, SE, are seizing the opportunities and skills that migrant pupils bring to the classroom; mostly limited to immigrant languages (e.g. FR, GR, LU, ES, UK) but often nothing at all (e.g. new immigration countries, IT, NL, US)
- Most countries teach immigrant languages and cultures though often only to migrant pupils, either at school (e.g. foreign language offer or teaching assistants) or through extra-curricular courses (see more accessible & flexible courses in AT, AU, CA, Nordics, CH)
- Hardly any have specific solutions to remedy 'white flight' from immigrant schools, communication difficulties with parents and the lack of preparation and diversity in the teaching force (a few promising initiatives in AU/CA/NZ, Nordics, BE/NL, DE/CH)

**Intercultural education**

- Schools in most countries are not required or supported to teach all pupils how to live and learn together in a diverse society, especially in DK, FR and most new countries of immigration
- Appreciation of cultural diversity is mostly just a cross-curricular priority, a subject for voluntary teaching trainings and a government budget line for ad hoc projects
- Countries such as AU, BE, CA, LU, NO, NL, NZ, PT, UK are changing and monitoring the curriculum so that pupils can learn about cultural diversity throughout their day and also in specific subjects, such as citizenship education (e.g. see courses in BE, CA, IS, IT, NL, SE, UK, but no longer ES)
Best case
Any child living in the country can go from kindergarten to university and achieve the best she can. She benefits from the same general measures as classmates with the same socio-economic background. If she has different needs because of her or her families’ immigration experience, she benefits from additional support. Her teachers are trained to recognise those needs and set equally high expectations for her. She is entitled to extra courses and teaching to catch up and master their language. Her parents play an active role in her education because the school specifically involves them at every step of the way. She and her parents also bring new opportunities to her school. All students can enrol in classes about her families’ language and culture. Her school uses an intercultural approach in its curriculum, textbooks, schedule and hiring practices. She, along with all students and staff, learn how to live and learn in a diverse society.

Worst case
The school does not function as a motor for the integration of immigrant pupils. Many children living in the country do not even have the right to a full education. Only a few schools or ad hoc projects deal with integration. Most of the time, a migrant child is treated just like everyone else of his age. Worse, teachers may see him just as a problem. They have no way to reach out to parents like his, with different languages and backgrounds. He never properly learns the languages of his family or the host society, because language support is poor or absent. He ends up with other immigrant students in under-performing schools. Teachers and staff members are not diverse themselves and cannot handle diversity in their school. All students do not learn to respect and work together with people of diverse backgrounds.

REAL BENEFICIARIES

Are pupils with limited literacy getting remedial courses?
Low-literacy immigrant pupils are more likely to benefit from extra out-of-school literacy courses in countries where these courses are generally available for all pupils and where their targeted education policies are strong for migrants. The numbers for foreign-born low-literacy pupils are slightly higher (50%) but broadly similar to the other low-literacy pupils in the country. The majority of low-literacy pupils, whatever their background, benefit from extra literacy courses in DK, FI, SE, IT, PT, US. The majority of foreign-born low-literacy pupils also benefit in AU/CA/NZ/UK, DE, GR, IE, IT, NO. Around half are taking these courses in BE, FR, LU, NL, CH, while the numbers drop to around 1/3 in AT & ES.
Contextual Factors

What other factors explain whether the children of immigrants excel at school?

- >2/3 of 1st/2nd generation speak the official language at home in AU, KR, PT, Baltics, Central Europe, with minorities in AT, CZ, IT, LU, Nordics
- >50% of immigrant pupils with low-educated mothers are concentrated in disadvantaged schools in most Western European countries and AU/CA/US, GR, with widest gaps in BE/FR/LU, DK/SE, DE, US
- >25% of foreign-born pupils arrive after age 12 in BE, FR, HU, SK, SI, English-speaking countries (except US)
- % of GDP spent on education highest in Northwest Europe, CY, MT, NZ and lowest in Central/Southeast Europe, IT, JP
- Student-teacher ratios relatively low in Nordics, Baltics, AT, BE, GR, IT, LU, IT, PL, PT and relatively high in English-speaking countries, DE, KR, NL, TU

Outcome Indicators

How well are the children of immigrants achieving at school?

Comparing foreign-born and non-immigrant pupils with low-educated mothers, the foreign-born are slightly more likely to be low-achievers on PISA math tests. Parity was achieved for this first generation only in countries with many low-achievers among the native-born (e.g. GR, HR, LV, US). The numbers of low-achievers among immigrants with low-educated mothers were comparatively low (20-40%) and similar to the numbers for non-immigrants in AU, CA, FR, IE, IS, NL and UK. Numbers were high (50-70%) and much higher than for native-born (>2 times higher) in BE/LU, DK/FI/SE, DE, ES/PT. By the second-generation, the number of low-achievers is the same as for non-immigrants or fewer in AU/CA/NZ/US, HR, IE. The other countries coming closest to parity were SE, FR, SI, UK. Most countries made significant progress from the first to second generation, closing the gap with the native-born by one-third, with the exceptions of AT, GR, NO, NL. Still large gaps remain in DK/FI/NO, AT/DE/CH, BE/LU/NL, and GR/IT/ES/PT. No systematic link emerges between targeted education policies and outcomes. The reasons are hard to know for
certain, since experimentation and robust evaluations are usually missing on migrant education. Targeted education policies may be too new, too weak, too late or too general for most migrant pupils to benefit from them across the country and education system. Moreover, the general quality and structure of the education system probably have a greater impact on the outcomes of migrant and other disadvantaged pupils.

### Low-achievers gap between foreign-born students and students with a non-immigrant background, Low-achievers gap between native-born offspring of immigrants and students with a non-immigrant background, 2012

![Bar chart showing the low-achievers gap between foreign-born students and students with a non-immigrant background, and native-born offspring of immigrants and students with a non-immigrant background.](chart.png)

### EVIDENCE BASE

**What do we learn from robust studies?**

The most significant factors determining the educational attainment of migrant pupils are their parents' educational background, their language skills, the composition of their school and the general structure and quality of the country's education system ([Bilgili et al. 2015](#)). Migrant pupils and other vulnerable groups appear to do better with an early and long duration of compulsory education, limited school choice, late ability tracking, less differentiated school systems and more teaching hours ([SIRIUS 2012, EC 2013](#)). What matters most for the outcomes of immigrant and non-immigrant pupils is whether the school and education system fights or reproduces inequality. Although targeted immigrant education policies adopted at national level do not display consistent results across countries in terms of pupils' tests scores, most studies conclude that inclusive schools and education systems are more successful when they also target the specific needs of immigrant pupils.
HEALTH

Key findings
Major differences emerge in immigrants' healthcare coverage and ability to access services between countries; Policies often fail to take their specific health needs into account.

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POLICY INDICATORS

Is the health system responsive to immigrants’ needs?

Attention to migrants’ health needs is fairly recent in integration policies. On one end, health systems are usually more ‘migrant-friendly’ in countries with a strong commitment to equal rights and opportunities. Policies are at least slightly favourable in most English-speaking countries (NZ, US, AU, UK), the Nordics (NO, SE, FI) and major regions of destination in CH, IT and AT. On the other end, health systems are rarely inclusive or responsive in countries with restrictive integration policies, such as in most of Central and Southeast Europe. Exceptionally in a few countries, migrant health policies are much more or much less favourable than the country’s integration policies in other areas. The healthcare system may more actively target migrants’ specific needs due to adaptations in regions with many immigrants (AT, IT, CH). Where numbers of migrants are very low (BH, RO, BG, JP, PL, KR, SK) little or nothing may be done to adapt service delivery to their needs. Austerity measures also play a major role (GR, PT, ES).

Targeted migrant health policies are usually stronger and services more responsive in countries with greater wealth (GDP), more immigrants and tax-based as opposed to insurance-based health systems. For example, 8 of the 9 countries with the most responsive policies to achieve this change have national health systems (AU, DK, IE, IT, NZ, NO, ES, UK), the only exception being the US. Links also emerge between migrant health policies across most countries. First, the most responsive services are found in countries with good mechanisms for promoting change (UK, NZ, US, AU). Nevertheless, such countries do not necessarily grant migrants the best entitlements. Some countries offer migrants legal entitlements to healthcare, but make little effort to adapt services to their needs (JP, FR, EE and most Southeast European countries), while others seem to have the opposite priorities (AU, US, UK).

DIMENSIONS

Entitlements

- Although the law may grant migrants certain entitlements to healthcare coverage, administrative procedures (e.g. requirements for documentation or discretionary decisions) often prevent them from exercising these rights
- Wide discrepancies exist for legal migrants, despite the EU’s declared aim to harmonise their entitlements. CY scores lowest, with an integrated system of health coverage for nationals still under development. ES and PT have cut back some entitlements as part of austerity policies. UK has introduced new restrictions for migrants. Precise entitlements in MT are not legally formalised, while Central European countries with few migrants offer only limited entitlements. By contrast, countries such as BE, FR, NL, SE and CH grant virtually the same entitlements to migrants as for nationals
- Entitlements for asylum seekers also show wide variations. KR, LV, DE, MT and LT offer only limited rights or impose administrative barriers, while CA has abolished entitlements for certain categories of asylum seekers. In many countries, entitlements require that asylum-seekers remain inside reception centres or designated areas. On the other hand, TU and FR offer virtually the same entitlements as for nationals, while GR, RO, AT and CZ are not far behind
- Coverage for undocumented migrants remains a controversial issue in most countries. BG, NO, NZ, KR, LV, AU, BH, PL, CZ and TU do not even cover emergency care, although some treatments may be provided on public health grounds. By contrast, CH, SE, IT, NL, LU, CY and FR provide partial or complete healthcare coverage under certain conditions. In many countries, administrative barriers prevent undocumented migrants from exercising their legal entitlements

Access policies

- Multiple methods and languages are used to inform all categories of migrants about entitlements and the use of health services in FR, IS, IE, JP, PT, ES, CH, BE, NZ and SI; in contrast, HU and BG do little or nothing. There is strong support for health education and promotion in IS, IE, JP, PT, CH, NZ, AT, SE, FI and US, but these activities seem to
be ignored in CZ, LV, GR, HR and HU
- Cultural mediators or trained patient navigators are provided to a certain degree in 18 countries
- Healthcare providers are required to report undocumented migrants in SE, BH, SI, UK, HR and DE, whereas this is forbidden in CZ, DK, FR, IS, IT, NO, PT, ES, CH, NL and US (either by law or by professional codes of conduct). In HR, DE, GR and TU, legal sanctions are possible against providing care to them, and organisations may discourage staff from doing so in AU, BE, CA, LT, LU, NL, NZ, SI, UK, US

Responsive services

- Most effort made to adapt services to the needs of migrants in UK, NZ, US, AU, AT, while in LT, TU, SI, SK, PL, EE, BG, LV, GR, HR do little or nothing in this direction
- Language support is provided where necessary in 14 countries (UK, NZ, US, AU, AT, CH, DE, SE, IE, NO, IT, FI, BE, LU), but hardly at all in most Central and Southeast European countries (RO, BH, CY, LT, SK, PL, EE, BG, LV, GR, HR)
- In 21 countries, migrants are involved to some extent in information provision, service design and delivery – most actively in AT, AU, IE, NZ, UK
- Staff are only prepared for migrants' specific needs at national level in UK, NZ, CH, NO. In 17 countries no training modules are regular available

Mechanisms for change

- Active measures promoting change in AU, NZ, NO, UK, US, and promising efforts in IE, with little policy support to achieve change in HR, FR, LV, LU, SI, IS, PL
- Most countries have the research and data they need to address migrants' specific health needs
- Action plans on migrant health have been developed in 22 countries though rarely involving measures to implement them (AU, NO, IE, KR) or migrant health stakeholders

Best case

All residents have the same healthcare coverage as nationals in law and in practice. To access their entitlements, all residents can get information in various languages and through various methods, including cultural mediators. Healthcare providers are informed of these entitlements, allowed to serve all residents and equipped to meet their needs, through training, various interpretation methods, adapted diagnostic methods and a diverse staff. Health policies are supporting these changes and also equipped to respond to the needs of an increasingly diverse society.
Worst case

Legal migrants, asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants cannot access the healthcare system without any exceptions, except perhaps emergency care. Even then, their access may depend on providers’ discretion and burdensome documentation. Migrants do not know how to access the health system or address major health issues. Service providers are forced to report undocumented migrants and sanctioned for serving them. Providers do not have the training or staff to serve migrant clients and their health needs. Policy is hindering these changes, as migrants are ignored in health policy, data and research, while health is ignored as an area of integration policy.

Note: The MIPEX health strand was developed in a three-way collaboration between MPG, IOM and COST Action ADAPT (Adapting European Health Services to Diversity). COST is the EU Association for European Cooperation in Science and Technology. The normative framework underlying the health strand was provided by the Council of Europe’s (2011) Recommendations on mobility, migration and access to health care (see http://bit.ly/rKs2YD and http://bit.ly/xF0g6U). These recommendations were formulated during a two-year process of consultation with researchers, health professionals, national and international organisations, as well as NGOs serving or run by migrants.

Financing of the additional costs of the Health strand was provided by the IOM in the framework of its project ‘Equi-Health’ (Fostering Health Provision for Migrants, the Roma, and other Vulnerable Groups) (see http://equi-health.eea.iom.int/). This project is co-financed by the EU’s Directorate-General Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) through the Consumers, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive Agency (CHAFEA). The process of developing and piloting the questionnaire was undertaken by ADAPT, which is a network of 120 experts on migrant health working in 30 countries. Data collection was organised by the IOM. Most of the experts and peer reviewers responsible for completing the Health strand questionnaire were members of ADAPT, while the rest were recruited from or through MPG’s network of integration policy experts. Scientific coordination was provided by Prof. David Ingleby of the University of Amsterdam’s Centre for Social Science and Global Health. Towards the end of 2015, detailed Country Reports on the European countries covered by MIPEX will be published by the IOM as part of its ‘Equi-Health’ project.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Key findings
Promoting immigrants' political participation is the sign of a confident country of immigration. Restrictive policies disenfranchise 10 million non-EU citizens from voting and engage few others through weak consultative bodies and funding for immigrant organisations.
POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES

Who are disenfranchised from voting?

Around 10 million non-EU adults (aged 15+) are disenfranchised in 13 EU countries, according to 2014 data. That's 3.5 million people in DE (around 5% of the adult population), 2.7 in IT (5.4%), 2.2 in FR (4%), around 500,000 in GR (5.6%), 450,000 in AT (6.4%), 275,000 in LV (17%), 225,000 in CZ (2.6%), as well as thousands in CY (6.3%), BG, HR, MT, PL and RO. The same is true for foreign citizens in CA, JP, TU and US. In the US in 2013, that's 21.9 million people disenfranchised or around 7% of the total population and around 10% of the population in states like CA (4.8 million), TX (2.9), NY (1.9), FL (1.7), NJ, DC, MD, AZ and NV.

Disenfranchised immigrants, 2012

POLICY INDICATORS

Do immigrants have comparable rights and opportunities to participate in political life?

Political participation is a slight area of weakness for integration policy across countries. Most immigrants, especially foreigners, have few opportunities to inform and improve the policies that affect them daily, since most authorities design policies ‘for’ them and are not informed by or accountable to them. On average, immigrants are slightly more discouraged than encouraged to participate through the standard civic channels, limited local voting rights for (non-EU) foreigners, weak consultative bodies and poorly supported immigrant organisations. Immigrants’ political opportunities differ enormously from country-to-country, especially between Western and Central Europe. Generally in AU, NZ and Western Europe, immigrants enjoy greater voting rights, stronger consultative bodies, more support for immigrant organisations and more outreach from mainstream organisations and authorities. Outside Europe, political participation policies are further ahead in AU & NZ than CA & US and in KR than JP. In contrast, immigrants in Central Europe, Baltics, CY, MT and TU enjoy nearly none of these rights unless they (can) naturalise. Political participation is missing from their integration strategies, despite European norms and regional promising practices (CZ, EE, LT, SI).

Immigrants' political opportunities are not getting much better over time (only +1 on average since 2007). Among the
few major changes, DK and LU took a greater lead, while NO and NL undermined this area of strength in their integration policies. One new country of immigration (CZ) started the process of political participation, while another (HU) further restricted opportunities for foreigners. Overall, promoting political participation is slowly becoming part of integration strategies, as countries show renewed interest in voting rights and consultative bodies. Future reform will often require greater political will (e.g. CA, FR, UK, US) or constitutional reforms/cases (AT, DE, PT, ES).

**DIMENSIONS**

**Electoral rights**

- Non-EU nationals after 3-5 years can stand as local candidates in 11 EU countries, vote locally in 15, regionally in 5, and nationally in 2 (certain groups in PT & UK), with overall IE and the Nordics granting the most inclusive voting rights in Europe
- Outside the EU, immigrants can also stand in 3 more (IS, NO and CH cantons), vote locally in 6 more (AU, IS, KR, NO, NZ, CH), regionally in 4 more (KR, NO, NZ, CH) and nationally in NZ, the most democratically inclusive destination for immigrants in the world
- Voting rights are long fought (e.g. AT, FR, DE, GR, MT, CH) and hard won: in CZ in 2001, EE, LT and SI in 2002, LU and SK in 2003, BE in 2004 and again in LU in 2011. Movements are even pushing for the revival of these long-repealed rights in CA and US
- Once passed, voting rights are here to stay: hard to obtain, but even harder to revoke. GR, the only country to make significant progress in recent years (+15 in 2010) became in 2013 the first country in recent history to repeal voting rights for foreigners

**Political liberties**

- Immigrants are guaranteed the same basic political liberties as national citizens in JP, traditional countries of immigration and all Western European countries (with a minor exception in IS)
- All 11 EU countries in Central Europe and TU deny non-EU foreigners some of their basic political liberties, such as joining a political party or founding a political association
- These restrictions are slow to change and depend on courts or politicians seeing immigrants as benefits to the country’s democratic order (e.g. 2012 CZ revision) and not as threats (e.g. 2012 HU political party restriction)
Consultative bodies

- Immigrants can be consulted through local consultative bodies in 24 MIPEX countries, national bodies in only 13 and, since 2009, at EU level
- New and sometimes innovative structures continue to be founded in both old and new destination countries (new in CZ, EE, FR, GR, JP, IE, LT, NL, UK, US, projects in Central Europe, soon MT)
- Most bodies are not strong and independent enough to create meaningful opportunities for immigrants to improve policies. These bodies, especially new ones, tend to be weak, government-led, sometimes government-appointed and too poorly funded to engage immigrants and represent their diverse interests
- Bodies can quickly come and go, based solely on whether or not the government is willing to listen to them. Government disinterest recently led to the closure of KIM in NO and LOM in NL, the two strongest bodies in existence. Bodies with weak powers and public commitment can aggravate problems of trust, interest and professionalism for immigrants and policymakers

Implementation policies

- Immigrants in 27 MIPEX countries can get some funding for their political activities, while those in 19 get mostly ad hoc information about their political rights
- Most funding and information is provided in Northwest Europe, CA, KR, NZ, and PT
- Funding for immigrant organisations also tends to come and go (DK, NL, ES, UK), depending on government’s priorities and not on community needs

Strand and four dimensions on political participation, MIPEX 38 (average), 2014

Best case

When states open political opportunities, all residents can participate in democratic life. A newcomer enjoys the same civil liberties as national citizens. After a limited number of years of legal residence, she can stand in local elections and vote in local, regional and even national elections. She can be elected and even lead a strong and independent immigrant consultative body in her community, region, or for the whole country. The state informs her of her political rights and supports the emergence of immigrant civil society.

Worst case

An immigrant cannot contribute to the political decisions that most affect him in the city, region, and country where he lives. The state restricts his basic civil rights. He cannot found a political association, join a party, or work as a journalist. Only nationals (and, in EU Member States, EU nationals) have the chance to vote. He lives in a city where
government does not even consult with immigrants. The state does not implement any policies to encourage him to participate in democratic life. If he wants to organise his fellow immigrants, he will have to create and fund this migrant-run organisation without any guaranteed state support.

REAL BENEFICIARIES

How many non-EU immigrants are eligible to vote?

More inclusive voting rights lead to higher shares of enfranchised non-EU citizens, according to rough 2011/2 estimates for 24 EU countries. Inclusive voting rights have expanded the franchise to nearly all non-EU citizens in EE, FI, and IE at local level (and in NZ at all levels). Large numbers of non-EU citizens have also been enfranchised at local level in DK, NL, SE (around 85%) as well as in BE and LU (around 2/3). More restrictive voting rights have enfranchised only a minority of non-EU citizens in LT (14%) and HU (25%). Large numbers of non-EU nationals have used the vote when countries have granted them this right, although registration rates are generally lower than for national citizens but often similar or higher than for EU citizens.

Looking at both enfranchised and naturalised non-EU citizens in 2011/2, the most politically inclusive countries emerge as NL, SE, IS, PT, NO and BE as well as several Central European countries with small long-settled communities (HR, PL, LT, SK, SI). FR and the UK are only halfway favourable because of voting rights restrictions, while DK, EE, FI, IE, LU so far qualify as ‘second-class’ citizenship countries, with an inclusive local franchise but low shares of naturalisation. The most politically exclusive countries emerge as AT, DE, IT, CH and Southeast Europe.
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

What other factors explain whether immigrants become politically active?

- Generally high levels of civic engagement in Nordics, Benelux, and English-speaking countries
- Around half are university-educated in IE, UK, LU, BG, PL, EE
- Many from highly developed countries in HR, SI, Baltics, GR, AT, DE
- Most long-settled in Northwest Europe and Baltics
- Sizeable number of humanitarian migrants more politically active in long-term in Nordics, AT, BE, DE, GR, MT, NL, US

OUTCOME INDICATORS

Are immigrants participating in political life?

Long-settled non-EU-born adults seem on average almost as likely to participate politically as non-immigrants with similar levels of education. In the 2000s, 37% of long-settled residents (10+ years' stay) reported recently taking part in a political party, association, petition, demonstration or contacting a politician, compared to 43% for non-immigrants. Political participation was generally equitable for immigrants in the Nordics, Benelux, FR, ES and UK and actually higher than for non-immigrants in HR, IE and PT. The level of political participation was also generally similar comparing the university-educated (53% on average for immigrants) and just slightly lower comparing the low-educated (22% on average for immigrants). The gaps in political participation levels were greatest between immigrants and non-immigrants in AT/DE/CH, EE, SI, and between high- and low-educated immigrants in AT, DK, GR and LU.

The link between political participation policies and rates is probably not direct. It is clear that no trade-off exists between promoting political participation among foreigners and promoting naturalisation. Actually, political participation policies tend to be stronger and non-EU immigrants slightly more likely to naturalise in countries with inclusive naturalisation policies.
Political participation rates comparing high-educated
**EVIDENCE BASE**

What do we learn from robust studies?

Immigrants’ voter registration and participation rates are generally lower than for national citizens. Encouragingly, their participation often increases as they spend more time in the country and naturalise. Immigrant voters also tend to vote and join mainstream political parties. The few studies on political participation find that targeted policies and the acquisition of nationality may potentially boost participation rates for certain immigrant groups. One study (Aleksynska 2010) finds that more extensive political participation policies, as measured by MIPEX, are related to higher levels of political participation for immigrants from developed countries, for newcomers (≤20 years’ residence) and for Muslim immigrants. Another (Thorkelson 2015) finds that countries with inclusive integration policies tend to have higher levels of non-electoral political participation among the first and second generation as well as among non-immigrants. Other studies do not find that political participation policies are related to all immigrants’ intention to vote, voter turnout or formal or informal political participation (see Bilgili et al. 2015).
PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Key Findings

The security of permanent residence may be a fundamental step on the path to full citizenship and better integration outcomes. Most immigrants are long enough settled to apply—and most have in many major, longstanding and new destinations.

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POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES

Who can become permanent residents?

Most non-EU immigrants have lived in the country long enough to become permanent residents, according to 2011/2 estimates. Over 3/4 could be permanent residents in most European countries. The level is slightly lower in (2/3) in countries with many newcomers. Around 2/3 could qualify in BE, BG, FI, DE, IE, LU, SI, UK. In CY, NO, SE, only around half of the non-EU population has lived there 5+ years. Men are slightly more likely to qualify than women in CY, DK, FR, NL, PT, SI, CH, while there are slightly more long-settled men than women in LT and PL.

POLICY INDICATORS

How easily can immigrants become permanent residents?

The path to permanent residence is just a slight strength for integration in MIPEX countries. Most residents living there for around 5 years can apply for a permanent status and equal rights, but only if they prove that they can make their own way in society, often without any state support. Those needing help or unable to pay the high fees are kept on their temporary status, without the needed support and opportunities to invest in their integration.

Permanent residence is a normal part of the integration process in top-scoring countries, such as BE, Nordics, Southwest Europe, a few Central European countries (BG, EE, HU, PL). AU, CA and NZ traditionally grant permanent residence upon arrival or after just a few years, so that migrant workers, families and refugees can start their settlement process with secure and near-equal rights. Elsewhere, most newcomers are kept ineligible to become permanent residents in CY and TU, while many may be unable to pass the restrictive and costly conditions in a long list of countries: AT, CZ, FR, GR, KR, LV, MT, NL, SK, CH and UK.

Countries rarely reform their entire path leading to permanent residence. The two major reforms in recent years were driven by the politicisation of immigration, as DK undid previous restrictions (+11) and the UK (-11) imposed them. Immigrants in MIPEX countries have been slightly more likely to face a few new restrictive conditions (10 countries, -6 points on average) than to see minor improvements in their eligibility, support or rights (8 countries, +4 on average). The restrictive trend is to extend the conditions once reserved for citizenship onto permanent residence. These new language, integration and high income requirements make it as difficult for immigrants to become permanent residents as it is for them to become citizens. Most minor improvements to policies and fees
were made to comply with EU law and court cases (e.g. BE, GR, IT, NL, Central Europe), although the European Commission deplores its weak impact so far.

### DIMENSIONS

#### Eligibility

- Most—but not all—temporary residents have the right to become permanent residents after 5 years in most EU countries—or slightly sooner under a few national schemes (HU, Nordics)
- In traditional countries of immigration, nearly all can apply earlier under discretionary schemes, without the right to permanent residence
- The wait is exceptionally long and unfavourable in JP, TU and CH, while IE is the only country missing a long-term residence status for all residents
- Several permit-holders, such as temporary workers and international students, are denied a path to settle permanently, even if living in the country for 5 years or more (most unfavourable in AT, CY, FI, FR, IE, JP, KR, MT, NL, CH, TU, UK, US)
- Few systems are flexible enough to promise a path to permanent residence for all who meet the general requirements (e.g. AU, DK, NZ, SE and, to some extent, UK)

#### Conditions

- The requirements to become permanent residents are radically different for immigrants across MIPEX countries
- Fees and requirements are likely too high for many immigrants to succeed in CY, GR, LV, MT, CH, and UK as well as for some vulnerable groups in countries such as AT, CZ, FR and SK
- Language levels and fees are also high and variable in AU, CA, and NZ, though more flexible and supportive for different categories of immigrants and vulnerable groups
- Within the EU, language requirements expanded from only one EU country in 1999 (DE) to 18 by 2014. Many of these requirements are more likely to deter more immigrants from applying (e.g. HR, CY, GR, SK, CH, now NL) than to stimulate more to learn the language (better support in CZ, EE, IS, IT, NO, PT, now DK)
- Fees are often high (esp. AU, UK, US, GR, DK, BG, IE, CY) and rising, sometimes due to the economic crisis and austerity (e.g. CZ, PT, ES)
- Despite these restrictive trends, many MIPEX countries do not restrict permanent residence to only the
employed/self-sufficient (26), 'integrated' (23), fluent (14) or applicants paying high fees (<160 euros in 20 MIPEX countries)

Security of status

- On average, the procedures for obtaining and losing permanent residence leave immigrants only halfway secure in their new status
- The status is critically weak in IE and slightly insecure in countries such as TU, US and several Central European countries
- In 27 other MIPEX countries, applicants obtain a permanent secure status for their entire life in the country
- Their residence is relatively secure in Western Europe, though never as secure as it is for national citizens. Authorities in most countries retain discretion to refuse or withdraw a permit even after decades, although personal circumstances must usually be taken into account and there are grounds for an appeal

Rights associated

- Permanent residents can work, study and live in the country with the same social and economic rights as nationals in 30 MIPEX countries
- Elsewhere, their life opportunities are still limited by underdeveloped laws in TU, closed job sectors in FR and gaps in the social system in CY, CZ, KR and SI
- Newcomers with permanent residence in AU, NZ and US must build their life in the country without full access to the social safety net, much like many temporary residents must in Europe

Best case

Soon after arrival, any temporary resident has the right to settle permanently in the country if she secures a basic legal income, obey the law and, if necessary, improved her language skills through free courses and study materials. For an applicant, the procedure is short and nearly free, with full rights to appeal. If accepted, she is secure in her status as a permanent resident and treated equally as nationals, with the same rights and responsibilities in most areas of life.

Worst case

Foreigners are trapped in a ‘permanently temporary’ legal status, without the equal opportunities and rights to invest in their integration. A legal immigrant may be ineligible to apply because of his type of permit, even though he meets
all of the other requirements. High-level language fluency and vague 'integration' requirements are imposed on all applicants, even the elderly, invalid, disabled and locally educated, all without enough free courses and materials for them to pass. He must pass a demanding income, employment and integration check that many national citizens would fail. He can also be rejected on several vague grounds. If finally accepted, his status remains insecure and his rights limited. He faces renewals every few years and the threat of deportation for minor absences or offenses, even after decades in the country. He still cannot access all types of jobs, housing or social programmes unless he can naturalise as a citizen.

REAL BENEFICIARIES

How many immigrants are permanent residents?
12 million non-EU citizens have settled as permanent residents in 28 European countries by 2013. The largest numbers live in the largest countries, which are all major immigrant destinations: Germany (2.4 million), Italy (2.2 million), France (1.8 million), Spain (1.8 million) and UK (1.6 million). Countries such as AT, CZ, EE, GR, LV and SE each count between 150,000-350,000. The numbers are very low in BG (150), CY (1,439), DK (5,302), IE (4,869), IS (1,802) and MT (614). Across countries, few permanent residents are EU long-term residents, a status with guaranteed rights under EU law, including the right to move and work freely in other EU Member States. The recorded number of EU long-term residents is only 2.8 million, or which 77% or 2.1 million live in Italy. Only 630,000 EU long-term residents were identified in other EU countries (196,549 in AT and 173,280 in EE). EU long-term residents made up most or all of the permanent residents in AT, BG, EE, IT, LT, LU, RO, SI, but almost none in BE, CY, HU, LV, ES and SE.
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

What other factors explain whether immigrants become long-term residents?

- Residents with <1-year-permits potentially ineligible: majority in MT, PL and estimated 12-25% in BG, CY, FI, HU, IE, NL, UK
- Around half are newcomers with <5 years' residence in CY, NO, SE (also high in JP, KR, TU)
- Mostly humanitarian or family migrants likely to settle in US and Northwest Europe
- Only option to secure residence for long-settled residents and 2nd generation in countries with restrictive naturalisation policies (e.g. Baltics, Central Europe, AT, IT, ES, CH)

OUTCOME INDICATORS

How often do immigrants become permanent residents?

Around 45% of non-EU citizens in Europe have become permanent residents, according to 2013 data from 28 European countries. The difference between countries is enormous. Nearly 100% of non-EU citizens are permanent residents in the Baltics. The majority (2/3) are permanent residents in the major destinations (FR, IT, ES, SE, UK) and a
few Central European countries (CZ, SK, SI) as well as near-majorities in AT and DE. Around 1/4 are permanent residents in GR, RO and the Benelux, while hardly any (1-6%) are in BG, CY, DK, IE and MT. The few permanent residents in countries such as BG, DK and IE do not resemble the rest of the non-EU population in terms of their age, gender and nationality, while permanent residents reflect the population in the Baltics, CZ, SI, IT, ES.

The number of permanent residents strongly reflects countries' path to permanent residence and citizenship. New countries of immigration with restrictive residence policies allow for very few permanent residents (e.g. CY, GR, IE, MT). Longstanding destinations that restrict residence and naturalisation eventually end up with high numbers of permanently resident foreigners, including their children born in the country (e.g. AT, CH). Immigrants are more likely to become permanent residents under inclusive residence policies and over time, but also more likely to move on and become citizens under inclusive citizenship policies. Countries that restrict naturalisation but facilitate permanent residence (as the 'second-class citizenship' alternative) end up with very high numbers of permanent resident foreigners, including their children born in the country (e.g. AT, CH). Immigrants are more likely to become permanent residents under inclusive residence policies and over time, but also more likely to move on and become citizens under inclusive citizenship policies. Countries that restrict naturalisation but facilitate permanent residence (as the 'second-class citizenship' alternative) end up with very high numbers of permanent resident foreigners, including their children born in the country (e.g. AT, CH). Immigrants are more likely to become permanent residents under inclusive residence policies and over time, but also more likely to move on and become citizens under inclusive citizenship policies. Countries that facilitate both (e.g. BE, PT, LU, SE) emerge with a certain number of permanent residents every year, depending on the annual immigration flows, administrative practices and choices of immigrants themselves. The numbers are comparatively high in FR and DE, two longstanding destinations where certain policies and practices may discourage naturalisation. The numbers in DK and UK are expected to change, following DK's reform and the UK's restriction of their paths to permanent residence and citizenship.
EVIDENCE BASE

What do we learn from robust studies?

Policies can have disproportionate effects on access to permanent residence, especially for vulnerable groups. Research on family reunion and access to nationality suggests that high fees, income, language, and integration requirements disproportionately affect the less educated, economically disadvantaged, very young or very old, newcomers, refugees, other vulnerable groups, and women (see Strik et al. 2013, Huddleston and Pedersen 2011). The security of permanent residence can affect immigrants' likelihood to settle permanently in the country. Countries' policies on long-term residence appear to be related to how long immigrants end up staying in the country (De Waard and Raymer 2012): shorter in restrictive countries (e.g. BG, CY, CZ, CH) and longer in more inclusive ones (e.g. Nordics, Northwest Europe, IT, PT). A secure legal status may also improve immigrants' labour market integration. Non-EU migrants are more likely to hold lower-status jobs where access to permanent residence is restricted and the requirements for citizenship are increased. Difficulties in transitioning to a more secure legal status affect non-EU migrants' insecurity on the labour market, even after controlling for the major individual and contextual factors (Corrigan 2013).
ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Key findings

Much-needed citizenship reforms can significantly increase naturalisation rates and boost other integration outcomes for the large number of potential citizens.

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POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES

Who can become a citizen?

In most European countries, more than half of the non-EU citizen adults have lived there long enough to become citizens. At least two thirds meet the residence requirements in AT, FR, GR, IE, NL, PT and the Baltic states. An important share of eligible applicants are actually second generation adults born and raised in AT, DK, IT, NL (15-20%) and in EE & LV (around 40%).

Share eligible for naturalisation, 2012

POLICY INDICATORS

How easily can immigrants become citizens?

Citizenship policies remain a major area of weakness for most European countries, especially in AT, MT, the Baltics and Southeast Europe. The highly discretionary and costly path to citizenship often discourages rather than encourages immigrants to apply and succeed as new citizens. A few countries have not caught up with international reform trends on dual nationality and citizenship entitlements for children. In contrast, immigrants have slightly favourable opportunities to become citizens in the traditional countries of immigration as well as in PT, SE and DE. Since 2010, reform efforts were completely undermined in GR, while policies were slightly restricted in CA, NL, UK and, to some extent, BE. At the same time, immigrants' opportunities to become citizens have improved in 11 countries from all corners of Europe, with significant reforms accomplished in DK and PL. More specifically, immigrants in PL enjoy a secure path to citizenship since 2012, with the option to obtain dual nationality, bringing PL up to the EU average. DK finally followed international trends and opened up to birthright citizenship in 2013 and dual nationality in 2014, although immigrants are still confronted with higher language and economic resource requirements in DK than in most European countries. In 2013, GR's Council of State annulled the major 2010 reform, which had brought GR up to the EU average. Immigrants and their Greek-born children again face one of the most restrictive naturalisation policies compared to the other major destinations in Northern or Southern Europe.
**DIMENSIONS**

**Eligibility**
- Countries converging on residence requirements: 5 years is most common (13 MIPEX countries) and 7 years is the average
- Trend in most countries to create entitlement to citizenship for children born or raised in the country (18 countries, recently CZ and DK)

**Conditions**
- Language levels diverge across countries (A2 in 13, B1 in 12), but few provide enough language courses for applicants to succeed
- Citizenship/integration test required in only half and even fewer courses for applicants to succeed
- Income/job required for citizenship in only half, but not in traditional countries of immigration
- Average fee around 250€, highest in AT, GR, IE, NL, SK, CH, UK, US

**Security of status**
- Immigrants who meet all the legal requirements can still be rejected in the highly discretionary procedures in CY, GR, IE, MT, UK, Baltics and Central Europe
- Entitlement to naturalisation established in most Northern European countries, PT, ES, and now PL
- Right to reasoned decision & appeal in 31 countries (most recently all applicants in BE, GR, LU, PL)

**Dual nationality**
- Dual nationality is increasingly accepted as the rule (25 countries, now CZ, DK, PL) or at least as an exception (now BG, DE, LV, LT)
Best case

All settled residents who see their future in the country get full support to become citizens and equally participate in public life. All citizens can be dual nationals. A child born in the country to immigrant parents becomes a citizen at birth (jus soli) like all other children. Someone born abroad has become attached to the country after living there for 5 years. She is entitled to the nationality when she meets the legal conditions, such as having no recent criminal record. The requirement to pass the basic language test and a citizenship course encourages her to succeed through free, flexible and professional courses and tests. As a new citizen, she has the same citizenship protections as her fellow nationals.

Worst case

States that discourage immigrants from acquiring their nationality create a long-term democratic, social and economic deficit. The children and grandchildren of immigrants are still treated as foreigners. An immigrant is not considered eligible unless he has lived in the country for 10+ years. New citizens cannot be dual nationals, though other citizens can. The other conditions are too onerous for many settled residents – or even nationals – to pass (e.g. income, fees of 1,000+ euros). An applicant must pass demanding, discretionary and costly language and integration tests, without the support to pass. The procedure is fully discretionary, without judicial oversight. As a new citizen, he can be stripped of his citizenship at any point in his life, even becoming stateless.

REAL BENEFICIARIES

How many immigrants are becoming citizens?

800,000 people have been naturalised every year by the EU Member States since 2010.

Over the past decade, the number of naturalisations has increased in countries passing citizenship reforms, such as GR, LU and PT, and in new countries of immigration, such as IT, PL and ES, while naturalisations fell in several countries with restrictive requirements: AT, BG, DE, DK, EE and LV.

Most recently, between 2010-2012, naturalisation rates rose dramatically in HU, IE, FI and SE and dropped in BE and FR.
**CONTEXTUAL FACTORS**

What other factors explain why immigrants become citizens?

- Most from less developed countries in Nordics and Western Europe
- Most long-settled in Northwest Europe and Baltics
- Mostly humanitarian or family migrants in US and Northwest Europe
- Most from countries allowing dual nationality in Southern Europe, Western Europe & Baltics

**OUTCOME INDICATORS**

How often do immigrants become citizens?

Citizenship policies are the strongest factor determining the naturalisation outcomes for immigrant men and women from developing countries. Non-EU immigrant men and women are much more likely to become citizens in countries with inclusive citizenship policies, such as IE, PT, UK, the Nordics and the Benelux countries, than in countries with restrictive policies, such as AT, CH and the Baltic states. The high naturalisation rates in restrictive BG and HU are unrelated to immigrant integration, as most naturalised citizens are not immigrants, but co-ethnics abroad benefiting from special naturalisation privileges.

![Total naturalisation rate, all countries, 2012](image-url)
EVIDENCE BASE

What do we learn from robust studies?

Immigrants from developing countries are the most likely to naturalise and the most affected by naturalisation policies. The restrictiveness of the policy has the greater effect on their naturalisation rates than other individual and contextual factors. The acceptance of dual nationality is one of the most important policies affecting naturalisation rates. Naturalisation also seems to lead to better employment outcomes and higher levels of social and political participation for certain naturalising immigrants (Biligili et al. 2015, OECD 2011).
Key findings

First came reform, now time for enforcement. New laws and weak equality policies may mean that potential victims are too poorly informed and supported to take even the first step in the long path to justice, as most people experiencing discrimination do not report it to the authorities.

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POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES

Who said they experienced racial/ethnic or religious discrimination last year?

According to 2012 Eurobarometer data, 4.2% of all people in the EU felt that in the past year they had been discriminated against or harassed based on their ethnic origin (3%) and/or religion/beliefs (1.6%). <2.5% thought they had been potential victims of ethnic and/or religious discrimination in DK, GR, LT, MT, SI, SE, while the levels rose to between 4.5-7% in AT, BE, BG, CY, FR, HU, IT, LU, RO, SK, and UK. Ethnic discrimination was reported as experienced that year by 27% of Europeans identifying as ethnic minorities and 13% of Europeans identifying as religious minorities. 37% of ethnic minority Europeans and 18% of religious minority Europeans also said that they had witnessed or heard of incidents last year.

POLICY INDICATORS

Is everyone effectively protected from racial/ethnic, religious, and nationality discrimination in all areas of life?

Victims are best protected and supported in traditional countries of immigration (CA & US better than AU & NZ), EU countries with longstanding legislation (strongest in PT, SE, UK) and a few new EU Member States (BG, HU, RO). Nearly all MIPEX countries now have slightly favourable laws prohibiting ethnic, racial and religious discrimination. Following the adoption of EU law in 2000, the creation of national anti-discrimination laws has been the greatest and most consistent improvement to integration policies across Europe in the past 15 years. For example, since 2007, 15 MIPEX countries made major positive reforms (+10 points on average), with only few minor reversals (e.g. FR, UK). The greatest progress had to be made in new countries of immigration and Central Europe (e.g. most recently, AT, HR, CZ, EE, MT, PL, SK). Others had to make minor improvements to comply with EU law. For instance, countries are increasingly adopting comprehensive acts to guarantee equal protection on all grounds and in all areas (earliest examples in CA/NZ/US, recently FI/NO/SE & UK, not yet in AU, ES, NL). IS, JP, CH and TU remain the only countries critically lagging behind these European-led trends, without the momentum for reform.

Notwithstanding these major legal gains, people might not know and use these rights in practice because these laws are rather new and often poorly supported by weak equality bodies and policies. Commitments to equality come (e.g. AU, DK, FR) and go (e.g. HU, NL, SK, ES, UK), depending on the government. Equality policies are often limited to...
voluntary initiatives, such as Action Plans and Diversity Charters, without any obligations or monitoring. Many equality bodies are relatively new and chronically under-staffed. Since 2007, several faced major funding cuts (e.g. HU, IE, LV, LT, RO, UK) and mergers into larger bodies (FR, IE, NL, SE, UK), which may reduce their capacity to receive and handle discrimination complaints.

DIMENSIONS

Definitions
- Wide range of actors can be punished for discriminating against someone based on their race, ethnicity or religion
- Victims have little-or-no options to fight discrimination based on multiple grounds in 30 countries or based on their nationality in 16 MIPEX countries (and weak in another 6)
- CA, US, UK provide favourable models for the definitions of discrimination, which have been largely adopted in BE, BG, FI, NZ, PT and SE. National laws and courts continue to improve these definitions (e.g. recently on racial profiling in DE & HU)
- Definitions of discrimination are not full and explicit in JP, IS, and, to some extent, in CY, EE, KR, LV and TU

Fields of application
- Everyone is generally protected against ethnic, racial, religious and nationality discrimination in all areas of life in 16 MIPEX countries across the globe (few gaps still emerge in countries such as AU, AT, DE, NL, NZ)
- At a minimum, 30 countries have taken a 'horizontal' approach to largely outlaw racial/ethnic and religious discrimination in all areas of life (e.g. 'minimum' horizontal approach in AT, HR, CY, CZ, DK, GR, LU, MT, NO, PL, ES)
- Baltics have only done the minimum that the EU requires to fight discrimination
- Victims' protections are also missing or weak in critical areas of life in IS, JP, CH and TU

Enforcement mechanisms
- Victims are able to benefit from favourable mechanisms to bring forward a case in traditional countries of immigration, FR, NL, SE and leading Central European countries (e.g. BG, HU, RO, recently HR, PL, SK)
- Enforcement mechanisms are rather weak in IS, JP, KR, CH and TU
- Victims seeking justice benefit from sharing the burden of proof (31 MIPEX countries, notably not AU and NZ),
**Anti-discrimination protections against victimisation (31 countries) as well as financial aid and interpreters (28)**

- Equality NGOs could have stronger legal standing to intervene on behalf of victims (16) lead class actions or *actio popularis* claims (21, now also GR) and use situation testing and statistics in court (13)

**Equality policies**

- While many countries allow for positive action, few governments actually take steps to guarantee that their laws, staff and service-providers are not committing discrimination. Both equality bodies and policies are, to some extent, strong in AU, CA, FI, FR, NO, NZ, PT, SE UK and US. Victims can also turn to strong bodies in BG, HU, IE, NL, NZ and RO. Too few equality bodies have the full powers and independence they need to help victims to find justice, for example with quasi-judicial powers or the legal standing to start proceedings on victims' behalf. In the extreme, victims receive limited support from weak equality bodies in CZ, DE, IT, PL, ES, CH, while no such state body even exists in IS, JP, TU

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**Best case**

All residents, whatever their background, can fight discrimination and benefit from equal opportunities. Anyone in the country can bring forward a case against all forms of discrimination, as well as racial profiling and incitement to hatred. These are illegal in all areas of public life – from employment to education, public space, housing and social protection. A victim is empowered to seek justice because laws are well enforced and used. Independent equality bodies and NGOs help her throughout the proceedings. Courts use wide-ranging sanctions to prevent, discourage and correct discrimination. The state adopts positive duties and actions, which encourages other institutions to open up. They find the best person for the job or contract, while better reflecting the population they serve.

**Worst case**

People are free to deny opportunities to someone, purely because of his race, religion and nationality. A victim has to bring forward a case in court, without legal aid, interpreters or the support of an NGO. To prove discrimination, he has to carry the burden of proof throughout. If he is not discouraged by the lengthy procedure, he is by the purely symbolic sanctions. Around him, he sees no government action to promote equality and receives little help from weak government-controlled equality body.
REAL BENEFICIARIES

How many racial/ethnic and religious discrimination complaints were made to equality bodies?

The number of discrimination complaints to equality bodies is the only available indicator of how common it is for people to report discrimination in different countries, given that other types of discrimination cases are rarely recorded by police and justice systems. MIPEX provides the best harmonised data on the number of ethnic/racial and religious discrimination complaints received or handled by equality bodies, both promotional and quasi-judicial (see definition for which types of complaints can be directly compared). These numbers are only one rough indicator of the frequency of discrimination reporting until authorities start collecting more and better data on discrimination complaints and cases. In 2013, equality bodies in 25 EU countries (missing AT partially, FI, UK) received or handled over 30,000 complaints of ethnic/racial discrimination (28,020) and religious discrimination (3,286). Large numbers of complaints were recorded in FR, NL and BE. Among Europe's largest countries, a relatively small number of complaints was recorded by promotional bodies in IT, DE, ES and PL. Very small numbers were recorded in EE, LV and MT.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

What other factors explain whether potential victims report discrimination cases?

- <1/3 of general public know their rights as discrimination victims in countries with low-scoring laws and access to justice (AT, DE, LU, EE/LV, mostly Central and Southern Europe)
- Low levels of trust in police and justice system in Central and Southern Europe
- Mostly newcomer immigrants in new countries of immigration
- Most not naturalised in AT, IE, CH, Central and Southern Europe

OUTCOME INDICATORS

How many complaints were made last year for every person who said they experienced racial/ethnic and religious discrimination?

Few complaints are made compared to the large number of people reportedly experiencing incidents of racial/ethnic or religious discrimination. Complaints seem to be more common in the countries with stronger, longstanding and well-resourced anti-discrimination laws and bodies; 1 complaint is received for approximately every 150-250 people experiencing ethnic or religious discrimination in FR, NL, IE and SE. Similar levels of complaints are estimated in BE (391) and CY (515). Hardly any complaints seem to be made across Europe, especially Central Europe, even in the countries with new, strong but poorly supported anti-discrimination laws and bodies: around 1 in 3,000 in HU, IT, LT, SI; 1 in 5,000-6,000 in BG, CZ, DE, EE, GR, PL and hardly any in BG and RO.

Better data for more countries will confirm whether potential victims are more likely to report discrimination in the countries with stronger anti-discrimination laws, equality policies and bodies. What is clear is that most countries have not even taken the first steps to properly enforce and resource their anti-discrimination laws in order to guarantee the same access to justice for potential discrimination victims as they do for victims of other crimes and illegal acts.
What do we learn from robust studies?

Countries' anti-discrimination laws and equality bodies are systematically monitored by the European Commission for their compliance with EU law (see Chopin and Germaine-Sahl 2013). Using MIPEX, one study finds that people in countries with stronger anti-discrimination laws are more likely to be aware of discrimination in society and know their rights (Ziller 2014). Although people experience discrimination in all types of countries, greater knowledge over time is associated with higher reports of witnessing discrimination and lower levels of people identifying as a discriminated group. The EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency observes that the general public’s knowledge/culture of reporting might explain the comparatively high level of discrimination reporting by immigrants in FR, BE, SE (EU-MIDIS 2009). Generally, not reporting discrimination is the norm for almost all migrants and ethnic minorities, with few exceptions. Migrants experiencing discrimination are slightly more likely to report it if they have been repeatedly experiencing it, long-settled in the country or naturalised as citizens. Their likelihood to report is only marginally related to their age, education, gender, income, job situation, language or neighbourhood.
AUSTRALIA

Rank: 8 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 66

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 58
Family Reunion: 67
Education: 76
Health: 67
Political Participation: 64
Permanent Residence: 54
Access To Nationality: 69
Anti-discrimination: 74
Changes in context

- Traditional and growing destination country, with the foreign-born accounting for 23% of the population in 2000 and 27% in 2012
- According to OECD, 2/3 of all arrivals in 2012 were temporary migrants, with at least 1/2 arriving as temporary workers and 1/4 as international students; Half of permanent arrivals were family migrants, 1/4 were labour migrants and just 6% were humanitarian arrivals
- Irregular boat arrivals start to increase in 2009, especially in 2012/3
- Generally most positive attitudes towards immigrants in AU than rest of developed world, alongside other English-speaking countries and Nordics
- Conservatives with minority-government from 2006-2011 and majority from 2011-today
- 2007-2013 Labor governments replaced by Centre-right Liberal/National Coalition with 2013 federal election

Changes in policy

Since 2010, the AU federal government has maintained its long-standing commitments to equality and non-discrimination, settlement services and multiculturalism, and its clear well-supported path to citizenship. However, little has been done to remedy its long-standing weaknesses and gaps, for example on consultative bodies, anti-discrimination and the rights of permanent residents and temporary workers. Restrictions on healthcare entitlements and access for detained asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants also raise integration and public health concerns. Complicated and changing provisions to access permanent residence and family reunion may delay or discourage eligible residents from investing in their long-term integration in AU. These changes lost AU -1 point on MIPEX from 2013 to 2014. Looking ahead, 2014’s austere federal budget cut several of the governments grants that make settlement work in AU, such as support for multicultural community organisations, human rights education and workplace English training.

Conclusions and recommendations

AU has traditionally welcomed the immigration of close family members and skilled workers and helped these newcomers and their children get the targeted support they need to participate in AU’s education system or labour market. Newcomers are encouraged and supported to quickly learn English and become dual nationals, so that immigrants are becoming and seen as equal citizens. Multiculturalism policies and funds encourage the AU public and mainstream institutions to remain open to diversity and to support AU’s multicultural communities,
from the workplace to the school, hospital and public sphere. Scoring 66/100, AU's long-established integration policies have likely contributed to immigrants' positive outcomes and progress over time in many areas of life. But losing the point on the MIPEX scale in 2013 raises questions about the future direction of AU's traditionally inclusive integration policies, with a similar setback registered in CA. Budget cuts, restrictions to family reunion and permanent residence – and now a government consultation on the ordinary path to citizenship – may bring several unintended consequences, doing more harm than good to AU's integration outcomes.
AUSTRIA

Rank: 20 out of 38  
MIPEX Score: 50

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 64  
Family Reunion: 50  
Education: 47  
Health: 63  
Political Participation: 38  
Permanent Residence: 57  
Access To Nationality: 26  
Anti-discrimination: 57

Austria, 2014

OVERALL SCORE (WITH HEALTH)

HEALTH

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

FAMILY REUNION

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Legend:

80-100 - Favourable  
60-79 - Slightly favourable  
41-59 - Halfway favourable  
21-40 - Slightly unfavourable  
1-20 - Unfavourable  
0 - Critically unfavourable
Changes in context

- Postwar country of net immigration, previously low-skilled work and family migrants from non-EU countries
- Increasing numbers of EU free-moving citizens and high-skilled non-EU migrants
- General employment situation held stable during and after the economic crisis at about 75%
- Similar balance of power between far-right parties and the traditional Grand Coalition of centre-right/left parties since 2006
- High level of anti-immigrant sentiment, but slightly decreasing in recent years

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN 2010 data in 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Note: Adults aged 18-64,</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

AT integration policy has made significant progress since 2007, rising 8 points on the MIPEX scale. Labour market mobility has been the major political priority for new integration policies, while anti-discrimination laws were created and improved to comply with EU law. The 2010 National Action Plan and Integration Ministry/Fund announced many new initiatives, though mostly limited in time and reach. Today, with a score 50/100, AT’s overall integration policies create as many opportunities as obstacles for non-EU immigrants to fully participate in society. Immigrants have equal rights and opportunities in fewer areas in AT than in almost all Western European countries, just above CH and far below DE and other destination countries of its size. Most countries tend to provide better opportunities for immigrants to reunite with their family, participate politically, become citizens and fight discrimination.
Conclusions and recommendations

Non-EU immigrants in AT have similar needs in terms of labour market integration, education and family reunion as they do in other longstanding countries of immigration in Northwest Europe. Labour market integration improves over time in AT as elsewhere, but the employment gaps are greater for high-educated immigrants, while the school system seems to reproduce inequalities over time. Still, they may have a harder time accessing AT’s available policies and programmes. New targeted employment, education, health and anti-discrimination policies may be too new, weak or general to affect integration outcomes across the country. A culture of robust evaluations of policy impact is also missing in AT integration policymaking (see Bilgili 2015), making it difficult to know if these policies will fail or succeed.

AT's mostly long-settled non-EU citizens and the growing 2nd generation have greater needs for citizenship and political participation than immigrants in most other countries. AT made no progress on political participation and fell further behind international reform trends as other countries extend citizenship entitlements for the 2nd generation and dual nationality for all. AT's requirements for family reunion, permanent residence and naturalisation, some of the most restrictive in Europe, do not take into account immigrants' real efforts to participate in society to the best of their individual abilities and their local circumstances. This combination of unrealistic expectations and limited support may be setting many applicants up for failure, with disproportionate effects on vulnerable groups. These obstacles have clear impacts on immigrants' active citizenship and other integration outcomes too. AT emerges as one of the most politically exclusive democracies in the developed world, with large numbers of disenfranchised non-EU citizens and one of the most restrictive naturalisation policies and rates.

Policy Recommendations from Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen

- Open equal access to public sector jobs and trade licenses for non-EU citizens
- Increase work placements, bridging courses and effective diversity strategies for both high- and low-educated
- Increase the family reunion rate based on impact evaluation of the high income requirement, 21-year age limit and a review of the best ways to support learning German after reunification in AT
- Allow dual nationality for all citizens
- Guarantee AT citizenship for all 2nd generation at or after birth
- Increase uptake of naturalisation and permanent residence based on impact evaluation of the income and language requirements
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 16 of 38
Score: 64

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 32%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 12%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 31 of 38
Score: 50

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 5%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 1

EDUCATION

Rank: 16 of 38
Score: 47

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 17%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 33%

HEALTH

Rank: 8 of 38
Score: 63

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training:

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 21 of 38
Score: 38

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 88%

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 39%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 22 of 38
Score: 57

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 66%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 34 of 38
Score: 26

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 6%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 48%

OUTCOME INDICATORS

Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 1

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 1%
Belgium, 2014

**Rank:** 7 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 67

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 64
- Family Reunion: 72
- Education: 61
- Health: 53
- Political Participation: 57
- Permanent Residence: 86
- Access To Nationality: 69
- Anti-discrimination: 78
Changes in context

- Important country of net immigration since 1950s, with an estimated 11% of the population foreign born and 8% second generation
- Belgians have maintained more favourable attitudes towards immigrants than most in Europe
- 1 in 2 foreign-born from the EU and 22% of non-EU-born from low-developed countries
- Relatively high share (45%) of non-EU-born lacking upper or post-secondary education
- Few general effects of crisis: employment rate remains around EU average (67%) and expenditure on labour market programmes remains one of highest in EU (2.9% of GDP)
- Few non-EU workers and students allowed in, less common for family and humanitarian migrants since 2010
- Long period of grand coalitions between left, centre and liberal parties replaced in 2014 by right-of-centre VL-majority coalition

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1950s</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Immigrants still benefit from many of BE’s well-established integration policies: basic school support for immigrant pupils, accessible health entitlements and services for immigrant patients, some targeted support for political participation, a clear path to permanent residence and a rather strong anti-discrimination law and body. Since 2010, BE politicians overcame some of their traditional political and linguistic divisions on integration. On the one hand, labour market integration became a clearer priority for the federal level and FR-community. A 1st phase of more organised and intensive integration support means that newcomers will be able to learn basic NL or FR and be oriented to the general services that help people pursue jobs and vocational training. On the other hand, the rights to family reunion and BE citizenship were restricted through new 'integration' requirements in 2011 and 2012.
**Conclusions and recommendations**

BE's integration policies still provide slightly favourable support for equal rights and opportunities for immigrants. These policies score 67/100 and rank 7th on MIPEX, alongside Nordic and traditional countries of immigration. Despite this high-level of legislative activity on integration, policies only improved +2 points since 2007. That's because these new changes have shifted BE's integration policies in two potentially conflicting directions.

A focus on labour market integration raises the public's and immigrants' expectations and requires programmes that work in practice. The 1st and 2nd phase support must be large and effective enough to improve the socio-economic outcomes of the large number of immigrants in need. And yet the 2nd phase of support for pursuing jobs and training is still weak compared to the programmes in other Northern European countries. Both language communities will need to develop a culture of piloting and evaluation to improve and expand this support.

Improving outcomes also means removing the legal and practical obstacles for non-EU residents to work and obtain BE degrees.

On the other hand, the new requirements for socio-economic integration not only raise the expectations for the integration policy, but they punish immigrants if the policy fails. The new requirements are not based on the minimums needed and required of all people living in BE. Even some BE citizens would fail them. Moreover, they were introduced before the new integration support was fully available. Unless this new support is effective in practice, the 2011 and 2012 laws will not act as incentives for integration, but instead as disproportionate obstacles. Non-EU residents will be less likely to reunite and naturalise. More and more transnational families and non-naturalised residents will be waiting but unable to apply, creating a new backlog of unmet needs for family reunion and naturalisation. Delaying the acquisition of BE citizenship or the arrival of non-EU spouses and children also deprives these BE residents of the opportunities and the time to further invest in their integration, potentially leading BE to worse integration outcomes than before.

**Policy Recommendations from GERME/DiverCity at Free University of Brussels (ULB)**

- Retain high family reunion and naturalisation rates based on scientific impact evaluations of the new requirements
- Increase uptake of vocational training and employment by non-EU newcomers (specifically low-educated and women) through greater access and effective support
- Remedy the school concentration of socially disadvantaged pupils by piloting new policies on equal
opportunities

- Increase awareness of politicians and practitioners of the specific needs of immigrants, particularly women, in employment, training, education, health, political participation and access to justice
- Address immigrants' language and information needs through accessible new options
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 16 of 38
Score: 64

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 52%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 16%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 6 of 38
Score: 72

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 13%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 3

EDUCATION

Rank: 7 of 38
Score: 61

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU 15y/o with immigrant background: 15%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 46%

HEALTH

Rank: 12 of 38
Score: 53

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 14 of 38
Score: 57

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 64%

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 58%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 61%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 1 of 38
Score: 86

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 64%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 5 of 38
Score: 69

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 21%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 7%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 9 of 38
Score: 78

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 8%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 391
BULGARIA

Rank: 31 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 42

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 50
Family Reunion: 64
Education: 3
Health: 28
Political Participation: 13
Permanent Residence: 67
Access To Nationality: 21
Anti-discrimination: 89
Changes in context

- Not yet a country of net immigration, the number of newcomers has risen in recent years from 3,900 in 2008 to 6,400 in 2013, especially due to labour migration of highly skilled workers, engineers and technical staff.
- Another major change is the huge increase in humanitarian immigration due to the war in SY: Almost 11 thousand individuals arrived to BG in 2013 in just a few months.
- BG employment rate is still relatively low for the EU but recovering in 2014.
- Public opinion is slightly negative towards immigrants: only 37% think that immigration enrich the country economically and culturally.

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Immigrant integration is still not a priority for the BG government. Therefore, little has changed since the first MIPEX evaluation of Bulgaria in 2010.

The minor changes that have occurred since 2010 are mainly in areas regulated by EU law: family reunification, long-term residence and anti-discrimination. BG (like HU and LT) has attracted a very small number of non-EU citizens (0.5% like BG, LT). Therefore, the government does not invest efforts in developing integration policies responding to the needs of the newcomers and continues to target mainly long-term residents, which have already integrated in the country.
Conclusions and recommendations

Newcomers benefit from halfway favourable policies that create slightly more obstacles than opportunities for non-EU immigrants to quickly and fully participate in society, ranked 31st (behind RO, CZ, EE and HU). Thanks to EU law, most non-EU newcomers can access the labour market and training, reunite with family and secure EU long-term residence, despite some of the persisting gaps in these areas. BG’s strong anti-discrimination laws and body can further contribute to equal treatment for non-EU citizens when practices go against the law, if the state supports their implementation through financial resources.

The major obstacles to integration in BG are common problems in the region. Despite EU law, when seeking or renewing permits, immigrants who meet all the legal requirements still face wide administrative discretion. BG has the most restrictive naturalisation policies out-of-touch with integration processes and out-of-reach for non-EU residents without ethnic Bulgarian roots. Immigrant pupils have extremely limited access to the school system and cannot benefit from any measures nor resources to support their specific needs. BG (as well as RO) is one of the most restrictive countries in denying all political rights to the small number of non-EU citizens, residing in its territory. Immigrants have also limited access to health services, with policies that often fail to take their specific health needs into account.

In contrast, other new destination countries continue to make major improvements (e.g. CZ, GR, PL), following international reform trends. BG can learn from other countries and international trends: reforming citizenship (PL, CZ, PT) from an integration perspective, implementing intercultural education (PT, Western Europe) and opening political opportunities (SI, IE, PT, ES).

Policy Recommendations from the Open Society Institute Sofia

- Include migrants with ‘continuous’ 1-year-renewable-permits and their families on continuous permits as beneficiaries of all integration policies, including equal access to public health insurance, social security, and general education and training
- Decrease disproportionately burdensome fees for reuniting families, long-term residence permit, naturalisation and access to the school system
- Allow local voting rights for permanent residents following international reform trends
- Amend BG citizenship law to establish a clear path to BG citizenship from an integration perspective, including by removing Bulgaria’s renunciation requirement for non-EU residents without BG roots and decreasing the residence requirement to 5-7 years, the average in the MIPEX countries. Guarantee the right to appeal of decisions denying citizenship
- Grant equal access to schools for all migrant pupils and make intercultural education a reality – through the school curriculum, teacher training, BG and immigrant language classes, support for parents and prior learning assessment
- Enforce BG’s strong anti-discrimination laws and body by supporting its implementation through financial resources – raising awareness among the potential beneficiaries, monitor legislation’s compatibility with anti-discrimination standards, promote equality through information campaigns
- Remove the labour market test for non-EU residents with 1-year-renewable-permits in accessing the labour market
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY
Rank: 27 of 38  
Score: 50

FAMILY REUNION
Rank: 17 of 38  
Score: 64

EDUCATION
Rank: 38 of 38  
Score: 3

HEALTH
Rank: 31 of 38  
Score: 28

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 1%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 27%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 4

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Rank: 33 of 38  
Score: 13

PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Rank: 10 of 38  
Score: 67

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY
Rank: 36 of 38  
Score: 21

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
Rank: 3 of 38  
Score: 89

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 42%

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 71%

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 58%

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 5%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 5%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 6144
Canada, 2014

**Rank:** 6 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 68

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 81
- Family Reunion: 79
- Education: 65
- Health: 49
- Political Participation: 48
- Permanent Residence: 62
- Access To Nationality: 67
- Anti-discrimination: 92
Changes in context

- Around 1/5 of residents are born abroad in this large and longstanding country of immigration
- Family migrants and university-educated made up a slight majority of permanent immigration
- Generally most positive attitudes towards immigrants in developed world, alongside other English-speaking and Nordic countries
- Conservatives with minority-government from 2006-2011 and majority from 2011-today

Changes in policy

Often seen at home and abroad as a country of equal opportunities for immigrants, CA has actually undergone several small restrictions in recent years that all together sent CA in the opposite direction, losing one point on the MIPEX 100-point-scale. Permanent residents face greater waits, restrictions and documentation burdens to become CA citizens, reunite dependent family and secure them equal residence.

Conclusions and recommendations

Losing points on the MIPEX scale raises questions about the future direction of CA's traditionally inclusive integration policies. One key to CA's immigration model has been that selected immigrants arrive as permanent residents with equal rights to invest in their integration and quickly become full CA citizens. Recent delays and restrictions to family reunion and citizenship may bring unintended consequences for permanent residents, doing more harm than good to CA's integration outcomes. Moreover, the increasing number of temporary workers may also be discouraged and delayed to invest in their integration, as they have limited opportunities to try out new jobs or trainings, learn EN or FR for free or become permanent residents, citizens and voters.

In the meantime, CA still leads the developed world in promoting rapid labour market integration, non-discrimination and a common sense of belonging. Immigrants and CA citizens generally enjoy the same access, social rights and strong discrimination protections on CA's flexible labour market. New settlement services are frequently piloted and evaluated through qualitative studies, clear performance indicators and available longitudinal data. Both low- and high-educated newcomers benefit from the increasing funds for settlement services, long-term language support and bridging/recognition procedures, depending on their sector/province. Federal and provincial support for cultural diversity not only encourages immigrants to identify with CA and contribute to civil society. It also helps CA society to understand and respond to newcomers' specific needs, be they in the labour market, adult education, schools, health system or local community. Overall CA's policies are
Canada is slightly favourable for integration in most areas of life. These policies score 68/100 and rank 6th out of the 38 countries, alongside AU, slightly below NZ, PT and Nordic countries and above the US and UK.

**Policy Recommendations from the Ryerson Centre for Immigration & Settlement**

- Increase entrepreneurship and survival rates of immigrant businesses as a route to integration and prosperity
- Increase family reunion for all residents separated from their close family and dependents
- Speed up democratic participation by allowing immigrants to vote in local elections
- Provide more access to permanent residency for temporary foreign workers and irregular migrants
- Maintain high naturalisation rates for newcomers by revoking recent barriers

### POLICIES - SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Mobility</td>
<td>5 of 38</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunion</td>
<td>4 of 38</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4 of 38</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>18 of 38</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Nationality</td>
<td>8 of 38</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>1 of 38</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**

- 15y/o with immigrant background: 30%

**Real Beneficiaries**

- 15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 61%
CROATIA

Rank: 30 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 43

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 54
Family Reunion: 69
Education: 15
Health: 20
Political Participation: 13
Permanent Residence: 65
Access To Nationality: 31
Anti-discrimination: 61
Changes in context

- Country of net emigration with <1% non-EU citizens
- In the last two decades, regional immigration, mainly from other former Yugoslav republics, replaced the flows of refugees and displaced persons into Croatia, following the break-up of Yugoslavia
- Due to economic downturn, employment rates decreased significantly as did labour migration into shipbuilding and construction industries, which traditionally enjoy the largest number of migrant workers

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Changes in policy

As part of its preparation for EU accession, Croatia harmonised its Aliens’ Act and Asylum Act with the EU acquis in 2013, and started a significant policy and administrative reform. The Croatian government adopted a strategic document, establishing the migration policy priorities of the Republic of Croatia for 2013 – 2015, as well as the “Action Plan on the removal of obstacles to the exercise of particular rights in the area of the integration of foreigners 2013-2015”.

Conclusions and recommendations

Newcomers to HR face barely halfway favourable policies for their integration. With an overall MIPEX score of 43/100, it ranks 30th out of 38 countries, alongside other ‘new’ immigration countries in Southeast Europe (e.g. BG, GR, HU, RO, SI, Western Balkans). Croatia's policies that best promote integration are in areas of European law. Nevertheless, these legal conditions can be undermined by authorities' rather discretionary procedures, a
problem across Central and Eastern Europe. Future policies and funds need to address the areas missing in its current integration strategies: work-related language courses, access to vocational training and study grants, targeted education support for children beyond language learning, health entitlements/access and a migrant health plan, discrimination against non-EU citizens and political participation (e.g. voting rights, support and consultative bodies for immigrant leaders).

**Policy Recommendations from Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies**

- Increase access to vocational training for non-EU citizens, including through access to study grants for permanent residents and family migrants
- Guarantee all pupils' access to intercultural education throughout curricula by developing a systematic national educational framework
- Increase political participation of non-EU citizens by extending local voting rights to permanent residents
- Guarantee equal healthcare entitlements for all categories of migrants, including undocumented migrants
- For permanent residence and naturalisation, make language requirements more attainable for both low- and high-educated non-native speakers
LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 23 of 38
Score: 54

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 57%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 33 of 38
Score: 13

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 99%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 12 of 38
Score: 65

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 83%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 31 of 38
Score: 31

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 49%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 18 of 38
Score: 61

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 53%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 8 of 38
Score: 69

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 12%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 44%

EDUCATION

Rank: 35 of 38
Score: 15

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 12%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 44%

HEALTH

Rank: 36 of 38
Score: 20

Potential Beneficiaries

Real Beneficiaries

**CYPRUS**

**Rank:** 36 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 35

**KEY FINDINGS**

Labour Market Mobility: 34  
Family Reunion: 39  
Education: 27  
Health: 31  
Political Participation: 25  
Permanent Residence: 37  
Access To Nationality: 37  
Anti-discrimination: 50
Changes in context

- Country of immigration since mid-1980s, 2/3 of non-EU citizens are ordinary labour migrants, mostly coming from medium-developed countries
- Non-EU citizens make up a larger share of CY's population than in most countries, though decreasing since the 2012/3 financial crisis by around 15,000 from 7.3% of the population to 6.6% in 2013 to 5.6% in 2014
- Unemployment rates nearly doubled, especially for non-EU citizens, and the number of labour migrants and international students with legal permits dropped by 50%
- Anti-immigrant attitudes are higher in CY than on average in the EU, with only a minority in 2012 believing that immigrants enrich CY economically and culturally (23%) and should have equal rights as CY citizens (39%)

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1980s</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

No major improvements were made to CY's integration policies from 2010 to 2014, despite the major effects of the 2012/3 CY banking crisis on non-EU migrant workers. Instead, the CY government responded to the effects of the crisis on foreign investors by further facilitating their access to national permanent residence and CY (and thus EU) citizenship.

Conclusions and recommendations

CY's policies discourage long-term integration and rank 2nd-to-last in the EU, similar to LV and not far from TU. CY's non-EU citizens are mostly migrant workers and international students, with the experience and skills to
integrate in the CY labour market. Instead, limited access and rights means that they are tied to their jobs or studies and expected to leave afterwards, under an official policy of 'temporary' migration. With some of the most restrictive policies (comparable only to TU, IE and now UK), reuniting with family or securing long-term residence is nearly impossible for the large number of potentially eligible non-EU citizens, with the exception, since the 2012/3 CY banking crisis, for the wealthy few. These policies and practices may go against EU law.

Furthermore, hardly any targeted support is organised for non-EU citizens' employment, training, health or political participation, with a few exceptions (KYSATS for foreign qualifications, ZEPs for disadvantaged schools, Ombudsman for nationality discrimination). Although CY spends EU funds on ad hoc integration policies, its restrictive policies and limited support discourage immigrants and local communities from investing in their integration.

While integration may be a reality on the ground for a few resilient groups in a few areas, the large numbers of 'permanently temporary' non-EU citizens in CY are at risk of irregularity with a precarious legal status and at risk of social exclusion with limited socio-economic rights.

**Policy Recommendations from CARDET**

- Support the creation of Immigrants Civil Society and Youth organizations, which will have an active role in the public dialogue on upcoming migration policies and integration initiatives, and also to have active participation in migrant related civil society organizations
- Improve the implementation of non-discrimination policies at the work place by creating specialized observatory bodies and providing training to employers
- Create the civil space for migrants to have an active participation at the local community level and local authorities bodies as a form of political participation
- Lift the barriers in the family reunification process, especially for families with children – provide grants and financial support to civil society organizations to promote and support family reunification
- Creation of a media observatory body for public speech and creation of a coordinating body for issue of non-discrimination and media
- Provide extensive training to public servants on communication skills, law, human rights and non-discrimination approaches
- Organize extracurricular school activities (i.e. sports, theatre) with the participation of both immigrant and Cypriot pupils
## POLICIES - SUMMARY

### LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

- **Rank:** 36 of 38
- **Score:** 34

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 19%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU in lifelong learning: 9%

### FAMILY REUNION

- **Rank:** 37 of 38
- **Score:** 39

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU separated couples: 34%

### EDUCATION

- **Rank:** 25 of 38
- **Score:** 27

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU in lifelong learning: 9%

### HEALTH

- **Rank:** 29 of 38
- **Score:** 31

### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

- **Rank:** 25 of 38
- **Score:** 25

**Real Beneficiaries**
- Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 18%

### PERMANENT RESIDENCE

- **Rank:** 37 of 38
- **Score:** 37

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 48%

### ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

- **Rank:** 23 of 38
- **Score:** 37

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 32%

### ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

- **Rank:** 27 of 38
- **Score:** 50

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 6%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 515
CZECH REPUBLIC

Rank: 23 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 45

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 52
Family Reunion: 57
Education: 38
Health: 44
Political Participation: 21
Permanent Residence: 51
Access To Nationality: 49
Anti-discrimination: 48
Changes in context

- Recent country of immigration since 1990s, CZ has small non-EU immigrant population (2.5%) that is the largest in Central Europe after SI
- Overall employment rates dropped a few points in 2009-2011 but fully recovered by 2013/4
- Immigration declined sharply during crisis from 61,000 in 2008 to 21,000 in 2011, but increased afterwards in 2012 to 2013 to 45,000 due to work and ‘other’ reasons
- Right-wing and centre parties still dominate in government
- CZ public opinion is less positive towards immigrants than on average in Europe; for example only 1/4 believe immigrants enrich CZ economically and culturally

Key Common Statistics

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<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

- CZ continues to take the lead in Central Europe in developing an integration policy that can respond to the needs of local communities, immigrants and their children. Authorities took several 1st steps forward to remedy weaknesses identified by MIPEX in 4 areas, but also took a few steps back in 2 areas, family reunion and long-term residence. Overall, its general framework for integration advanced by +3 points on MIPEX from 2010 to 2014 (and +4 points from 2007 to 2010 due to the 2009 Anti-Discrimination Law)
- +17 on Political Participation: Authorities open some basic political liberties, ad hoc local consultative bodies and potential funding channels for immigrant-run associations
- +9 on Access to Nationality: 2014 Citizenship Act opens dual nationality for all and right to citizenship for CZ-educated youth, but significantly restricts the general requirements to become CZ citizens
- +3 on Education: Support expanded to non-EU pupils with limited CZ language proficiency
- +2 on Labour Market Mobility: Immigrants get more basic information about the labour market (+5) but less favourable access to trade licenses for newcomers wanting to open a business (-3)
- -5 on Family Reunion: Higher fees and income requirements for non-EU separated families, which are no longer based on the minimum levels generally required and allowed for all families to live in CZ
- -5 on Permanent Residence: Similarly higher fees and income requirements potentially out-of-touch with social and economic realities
- 0 on Anti-Discrimination: Since 2009 Anti-Discrimination Law doubled CZ’s score, the law has remained generally unchanged, with average laws, weak equality body and no equality policies
Conclusions and recommendations

CZ’s many settled non-EU residents and increasing number of newcomers face slightly more obstacles than opportunities to fully participate in society. CZ policies score 45/100 and rank 23rd, alongside others in Central Europe taking the very 1st steps to address immigration and diversity in society (EE, GR, HU, RO, SI). Most notably, CZ authorities have kept their Integration Concept ‘Living Together’ up-to-date in 2011 and 2014 and passed major citizenship reform in 2014. Whether these policies are effective in practice is hard to say in CZ or in most recent destination countries, given the lack of data, robust evaluations or structural consultation with immigrants themselves. Non-EU immigrants in CZ have been able to access work and, before recent restrictions, reunite with family and become long-term residents. However, compared to immigrants in other countries, they have been less likely to access training, quality jobs, CZ citizenship and the anti-discrimination law. For example, the number of discrimination complaints is still low, despite the 2009 law and the important number of people reporting discrimination in surveys. Its naturalisation rate, the EU’s lowest in recent years, may be boosted by the 2013 citizenship reform if its requirements realistically reflect most immigrants’ continued efforts to integrate in CZ society. Similarly, non-EU immigrants now face disproportionately high fees and income requirements to reunite with their family and become long-term residents, even though they were disproportionately affected by the global recession in CZ (similar approach in IT and ES, unlike in PT, SI and, perhaps soon, GR). CZ integration policies still have far to go in order to guarantee equal rights and opportunities for CZ and non-EU citizens. The policy is not strong in any area of integration, with strengths and weaknesses in each. Like most European countries, CZ policies are strongest in areas with EU law though gaps still emerge there. As more immigrant adults and children settle for the long-term, CZ authorities are starting to follow the trends from the more established immigration countries and provide essential support and reform in other areas, such as education, health, political participation and access to nationality. These more ambitious integration policies are certainly needed in CZ, which policymakers can see in the numbers of separated families, disenfranchised non-EU adults, settled residents without long-term residence or CZ citizenship and the potential victims not reporting discrimination.

Policy Recommendations from the Multicultural Centre Prague

- Guarantee equal access to the public health insurance system for temporary residents and their families
- Maintain existing realistic language requirements for temporary and long-term residents
- Allow local voting rights for permanent residents, following international reform trends
- Guarantee that all future CZ citizens are treated equally by establishing a clear right to become CZ citizens and removing vague integration and income requirements
- Strengthen the Public Defender of Rights’ powers to fight discrimination, following European trends
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 25 of 38
Score: 52

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 19%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 11%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 24 of 38
Score: 57

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 5%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 4

EDUCATION

Rank: 19 of 38
Score: 38

Potential Beneficiaries
15yo with immigrant background: 3%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 11%

HEALTH

Rank: 21 of 38
Score: 44

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in lifelong learning: 11%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 11%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 29 of 38
Score: 21

Potential Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 35%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 31 of 38
Score: 51

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 82%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 65%

OUTCOME INDICATORS

Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 6334

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 31 of 38
Score: 48

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 3%
DENMARK

**Rank:** 13 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 59

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 79
- Family Reunion: 42
- Education: 49
- Health: 53
- Political Participation: 64
- Permanent Residence: 74
- Access To Nationality: 58
- Anti-discrimination: 50
Changes in context

- A country of net migration since the 1960s, the foreign-born make up 10% of the population (higher than FI but lower than NO and SE)
- Slight decline during global financial crisis in DK's comparatively high employment rates, despite its large investment in active labour market programmes
- Increased numbers of highly-skilled, 1/4 of non-EU are university-educated (similar to FI, lower than NO/SE)
- Increasing numbers of asylum-seekers in 2013 and 2014
- As in other Nordics, most people in DK think immigrants enrich DK economically and culturally, feel good in their life there and deserve equal rights as DK citizens
- A conservative minority government has depended on the support of the DK People's Party from 2001-2011 and again since the 2015 elections, following a 2012-2015 centre-left coalition

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
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<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Since 2001, centre-right minority governments have been supported by the DK People's Party in exchange for immigration and integration restrictions, while the opposition has often been galvanized in reaction to these restrictions. The 2011-5 centre-left coalition systematically reduced these restrictions and redirected DK towards international best practices and trends. Most of these restrictions are now likely to be reintroduced by the new centre-right minority following the 2015 elections. Rather than adopt one clear reform or system, both centre-right and centre-left governments chose to make many small changes over time, especially before elections, but for different reasons. The centre-right was constantly responding to criticism by DK People's Party with new 'restrictive' messages while the centre-left tried to avoid further politicisation of the debate. MIPEX recorded around 40 major changes since 2007 (see timeline) with around 30 changing DK's MIPEX score:

2007-2010 changes: -2 overall (6 policy areas)
-9 on family reunion policy
-3 on political participation policy
+2 on permanent residence policy
-1 on access to nationality policy
+3 on anti-discrimination policy

2010-2014 changes: +10 overall (7 policy areas)
+9 on labour market mobility policy
+14 on family reunion policy
+4 on migrant education policy
+8 on political participation policy
+11 on permanent residence policy
+23 on access to nationality policy
+4 on anti-discrimination policy
Conclusions and recommendations
The need for greater integration support is generally similar in DK and most countries in Northwest Europe. Both high- and low-educated non-EU men and women are less likely to find jobs than non-immigrants, while their children are put at a disadvantage in the school system and progress is slow over time. The Nordic countries' well-known investments in the education/training system, public sector and active citizenship help improve and activate the skills of large numbers of people in DK, including immigrants, who are more likely to access targeted trainings, justice and civic volunteering in Nordic countries than elsewhere. The challenge is to guarantee that immigrants are not under-represented in the most effective measures (e.g. mixed quality schools for children, work-specific/based training for adults).

The needs are greater in DK than elsewhere for a clear path to permanent residence and citizenship. While most non-EU immigrants are long-settled in this long-established destination country, they have been much less likely to reunite with their family, settle as permanent residents or become citizens in DK than in similar European countries. Until recent reforms passed, most had been discouraged by a decade of some of the developed world's most restrictive policies that leave immigrants legally precarious and socially excluded. This approach does not support and recognise immigrants’ real efforts to participate in society to the best of their abilities and circumstances. Such unrealistic expectations may be setting many immigrants up for failure, with disproportionate effects on vulnerable groups and integration outcomes in many areas of life.

DK's integration policies are less comprehensive, responsive and evidence-based than others in Northwest Europe because immigration has been so highly politicised that little consensus exists on almost any aspect of integration policy, even individual naturalisations. Close elections and unstable coalitions have allowed the far-right to dictate the terms of the debate. This debate is largely focused on reducing the number of arrivals, use of social benefits and persistent integration gaps. As a result, evidence on integration and the effects of policies goes uncollected or gets overlooked or dismissed as politically biased. The few robust evaluations and pilots (see Bilgili 2015) are limited to labour market and education support.
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 7 of 38
Score: 79

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 25%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 36%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 35 of 38
Score: 42

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 3

EDUCATION

Rank: 14 of 38
Score: 49

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 9%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 69%

HEALTH

Rank: 12 of 38
Score: 53

Potential Beneficiaries

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 9 of 38
Score: 64

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 47%

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 75%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 3 of 38
Score: 74

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 84%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 1%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 15 of 38
Score: 58

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 55%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 1323

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 27 of 38
Score: 50

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 2%
ESTONIA

Rank: 22 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 46

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 73
Family Reunion: 67
Education: 58
Health: 27
Political Participation: 21
Permanent Residence: 71
Access To Nationality: 18
Anti-discrimination: 32
Changes in context

- Larger country of emigration than immigration, with around just 2000-3000 non-EU newcomers per year from 2010-2013
- Most of the newcomers and the long-settled foreign-born (around 15% of population) come from CIS countries
- Non-EU-born in EE have higher levels of education (40% with university degrees) than those in most other European countries
- Centre-right government since 2011
- Slight majority with anti-immigrant attitudes in EE, higher than in most developed countries: around half do not believe that EE is a welcoming country for immigrants

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x UN 2010 data in 2013</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Non-EU citizens benefit from slightly more targeted support to pursue jobs and training in EE, which boosted EE's MIPEX score by +1 point since 2012. Targeted support has continuously improved over the years, culminating in December 2014 with the new Strategy of Integration and Social Cohesion in Estonia "Lõimuv Eesti 2020". Looking further back to 2007, EE has made the greatest progress by adopting the basic EU-required protections against discrimination under 2009's Equal Treatment Law. Looking forward, the 2015 amendments to the Citizenship Act—to be assessed in the next MIPEX—is an important step to reduce statelessness among non-citizens, but a missed opportunity to include new immigrants and their children.
**Conclusions and recommendations**

EE’s integration policies lead the Baltics and Central Europe, ranking 22nd out of 38, just above CZ, HU, RO and several points ahead of LV and LT. EE’s policies can be seen as halfway favourable, with clear strengths and weaknesses for immigrants to fully participate in different areas of public life. EE’s ambitious employment and education policies are trying to respond to the specific needs of both newcomers and the long-settled non-EU-born. More could be done to respond to the specific problems of victims of discrimination to take even the 1st step to access justice. The major challenge now is to create the inclusive conditions for all residents to participate, trust and interact with each other in democratic life. While long-term residents are secure in their status and enfranchised in local elections, they face more restrictive opportunities to participate in national public life or to become citizens in EE than in nearly all developed democracies. The increasing use of data such as MIPEX and EE’s Integration Monitoring can help to design new policies and reach out to the non-EU citizens who could benefit.
MIPEX 2015  Estonia

POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 8 of 38
Score: 73

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 33%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 8%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 11 of 38
Score: 67

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 2%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents):

EDUCATION

Rank: 10 of 38
Score: 58

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 8%

REAL BENEFICIARIES

Non-EU in lifelong learning: 8%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 29 of 38
Score: 21

Potential Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 37%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 91%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 5 of 38
Score: 71

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 99%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 92%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 37 of 38
Score: 18

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 96%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 1%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 34 of 38
Score: 32

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 4%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 5512
FINLAND

Rank: 4 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 69

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 80
Family Reunion: 68
Education: 60
Health: 53
Political Participation: 79
Permanent Residence: 70
Access To Nationality: 63
Anti-discrimination: 77
Changes in context

- Relatively small and recent country of net immigration since mid-1980s
- Slightly more humanitarian migrants in recent years, though no dramatic changes in the overall number of newcomers
- 2011-2014 left-right coalition replaces centre-right coalition after 2011 election
- Some of most positive attitudes towards immigrants in EU: 80% think that non-EU immigrants should have the same rights as FI citizens

Key Common Statistics

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<tr>
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<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Immigrants will benefit from greater support to promote their integration in several areas of life, as FI followed international reform trends on labour market mobility (+7), access to nationality (+6) and anti-discrimination (+4). Based on well-evaluated practices in FI and new initiatives in SE, newcomers use individualised integration plans to obtain effective training and subsidised work experience in order to find their way on the labour market. They enjoy a quick, clear and well-supported path to citizenship after 5 years, as is common in MIPEX countries. Potential victims of discrimination should be able to access justice and support equally on all grounds and in all areas of life. All these reforms should have some direct or indirect benefits for integration in the labour market and other areas too. Overall these new achievements in FI's integration policies have risen a notable +2 points on the MIPEX scale. Following these improvements, immigration and integration have not been a major priority in recent elections.
Conclusions and recommendations

Finland remains a country with slightly favourable policies on equal opportunities for immigrants, ranking 4th overall and similar to CA, NO, NZ, PT and SE. So far, FI has maintained its investment in integration and its traditionally inclusive democracy as in other Nordic countries (e.g. NO, SE and recent improvements in DK). FI and immigrant volunteers are also actively promoting integration in many areas of life through NGO actions, often government-funded. These policies seem to reach many of the concerned immigrant adults and children who are able to benefit, for example, from family reunion, training and citizenship. A culture of piloting and evaluations has developed effective integration support in several areas, including employment. Further data, evaluations and pilots can make these integration policies even more effective in practice.

Policy Recommendations from the Institute of Migration

- Increase number of non-EU-born adults and youth obtaining FI professional and higher education degrees
- Increase non-EU-born’s uptake of work-based training and apprenticeships in the public and private sector across FI regions
- Speed up Finnish/Swedish learning through language courses that are better adapted to different skill levels and available both in urban and rural settings
- Remedy inequalities in health, education and job over-qualification for immigrants from diverse linguistic backgrounds
- Recognise immigrants’ contributions to the economy, entrepreneurship, cultural and other inputs to FI
- Develop integration strategies for different vulnerable groups, e.g. foster home system for unaccompanied refugee children
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 6 of 38
Score: 80

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 30%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 33%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 9 of 38
Score: 68

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 3%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 5

EDUCATION

Rank: 8 of 38
Score: 60

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 69%

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 41%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 7%

HEALTH

Rank: 12 of 38
Score: 53

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 30%

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 41%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 3 of 38
Score: 79

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 69%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 96%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 6 of 38
Score: 70

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 60%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 10 of 38
Score: 63

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 4%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 11 of 38
Score: 77
FRANCE

Rank: 17 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 54

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 54
Family Reunion: 51
Education: 36
Health: 50
Political Participation: 53
Permanent Residence: 48
Access To Nationality: 61
Anti-discrimination: 77
Changes in context

- One of Europe's oldest countries of immigration, with around 1/4 with immigrant background (large 2nd generation and average-sized foreign-born population)
- 2/3 of foreign-born from outside EU and 90% of these from low-or-medium-developed countries
- Non-EU-born are mostly low (40%) or medium (31%) educated, though 5% increase in share of university-educated in recent years
- 2012 presidential and legislative elections see socialist and left-wing government replace right-wing parties, though increasing share of votes for far-right populist National Front party
- Sizeable minority of public hold anti-immigrant attitudes in FR as in the average European country

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1950s</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Little has changed in FR's integration policies from the previous conservative government to the current socialist government, rising +1 on the 100-point MIPEX scale. Before the elections, the previous government politicised FR's traditional path to FR citizenship, following the so-called Loi Besson/Guéant (2011-334). This was the last of the 5 immigration reforms in 9 years. Since 2012, newcomers should benefit from equal housing rights, better targeted education support for their children, the right to family reunion for LGBT married couples, clearer requirements for FR citizenship and greater commitments to promote equality through the public service. The new government has yet to deliver on its promises of greater support for all newcomers to learn FR and for non-discrimination in schools, local voting rights, a new multiannual permit and clearer path to permanent residence as well as a less discretionary procedure for naturalisation.
Conclusions and recommendations
FR schools and health services are inclusive but slow to adapt targeted measures to guarantee equal access in practice, although its strong anti-discrimination laws are starting to help victims of discrimination take their 1st step in the long path to access justice. While pilots are sometimes used to test out new ideas, robust scientific evaluations are often missing to determine just how effective new policies are to improve integration outcomes in practice.
FR restricts and delays labour market integration more than most countries, with an estimated 5.3 million jobs ‘closed’ to non-EU immigrants and few accessing education or training in FR. FR also severely restricts and delays family reunion, with non-EU citizens less likely to reunite with their family in FR than in most European countries. These delays put newcomers on an unequal footing in FR, with potentially negative long-term effects on many integration outcomes. Non-EU residents are also often insecure in their status. Permanent residence is increasingly the exception rather than the rule for immigrants, even after 5 years settled in FR.
From a democratic perspective, with an estimated 2.2 million non-EU citizen adults disenfranchised in elections, FR can avoid becoming an exclusive democracy by facilitating naturalisation and/or expanding voting rights, following several international reform trends. From family reunion to long-term residence and citizenship, FR’s new requirements over the past decade demand more of its non-EU immigrants than most countries do, while doing less to support them to succeed. This legal approach does not recognise immigrants’ real progress and efforts to participate to the best of their abilities and local circumstances.

Policy Recommendations from France terre d’asile

- Guarantee that every newcomer receives the opportunity for a formal recognition of their foreign degree and/or skills/experience, and receives at least language training adapted to their needs and their career goal
- Secure long-term residence (10-year-card) for all immigrants with 5 years’ legal residence
- Increase non-EU immigrants’ civic and electoral participation by delivering on the promised local right to vote and by increasing the naturalisation rate
- Actively inform and encourage immigrants to become citizens when they meet the requirements by making the criteria clear and legally transparent and by launching large-scale campaigns
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 23 of 38
Score: 54

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 45%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 10%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 30 of 38
Score: 51

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 5%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 1

EDUCATION

Rank: 21 of 38
Score: 36

Potential Beneficiaries
15 y/o with immigrant background: 15%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 46%

HEALTH

Rank: 17 of 38
Score: 50

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU family reunification score: 5%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 17 of 38
Score: 53

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 59%

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 86%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 69%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 36 of 38
Score: 48

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 3%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 11 of 38
Score: 61

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 85%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 135

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 11 of 38
Score: 77

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 5%
GERMANY

Rank: 10 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 61

KEY FINDINGS

- Labour Market Mobility: 86
- Family Reunion: 57
- Education: 47
- Health: 43
- Political Participation: 63
- Permanent Residence: 60
- Access To Nationality: 72
- Anti-discrimination: 58
Changes in context

- One of Europe’s major destination countries since 1960s, traditionally composed of family migrants and former guest-workers
- Immigrants contribute to the positive state of DE labour market, with one of the highest and growing over employment rates, reaching nearly 78% in 2014 (behind only CH and IS/NO/SE)
- Growing number of newcomers since 2008 (mostly EU citizens since global recession, but also rise in non-EU newcomers by 75% to 200,000 in 2013) and rise in the numbers of asylum-seekers
- One of the few developed countries with improving attitudes towards immigrants: 83% think DE is a welcoming country and 72% that non-EU and DE citizens should have equal rights

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Note: Adults aged 18-64, Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN 2010 data in 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

DE makes slow but steady progress on providing both equal rights and greater support, takes time to build consensus, generally pilots and then evaluates whether new policies are effective at boosting outcomes. Earlier in 2008/9, DE took 1 step forward and 1 step back, raising and then lowering its score. Non-EU immigrants could benefit from guaranteed enough free and accessible courses to pass the new common citizenship test, but not the German immigration test abroad. Since 2011, DE’s integration policies have taken 3 steps forward on integration, boosting DE’s total MIPEX score by a significant +3 points.

DE has taken the lead in Europe to facilitate and support the recognition of foreign qualifications and skills, thanks to its much-praised 2012 Recognition Act. Contrary to earlier assumptions, the labour market integration challenges for high-educated immigrants are not less than for low-educated, but different and, perhaps, even greater. Also since 2012, victims of racial profiling should have a clearer path to justice since a higher administrative court case confirmed that ID checks based on skin colour are unconstitutional in DE. In 2014, DE took the near-final step to embrace dual nationality for the 2nd generation born DE citizens since the 1999 landmark citizenship reform recognised that DE was a country of immigration. DE was the only country with such a restriction for the 2nd generation and is now the only major destination country not yet embracing dual nationality for all immigrants.
Conclusions and recommendations

DE has now entered the Top 10 on Integration Policy, just above the average for Western Europe. DE’s overall score of 61/100 indicates that its policies slightly promote equal opportunities and a welcoming culture in DE. Increasingly, other countries of immigration in Europe and abroad are looking to Germany for inspiration on integration policy. In contrast, several neighbouring countries have either been blocked in their reform efforts (e.g. AT and CH) or pulled out of the Top Ten (e.g. NL and UK) by far-right parties often setting the agenda on integration.

DE has had the right political, economic and social conditions to experiment, evaluate and expand new ambitious integration policies. DE’s integration policies have benefited and arguably contributed to its rising employment rates and positive public attitudes towards immigrants. Placing a federal Commissioner at the Chancellery has made it easier to discuss integration and coordinate plans with different ministries, länder and cities (see also AU, NO, PT, recently US). BAMF’s nationwide infrastructure guarantees that immigrants across the country can guarantee the same quality courses and new programmes (e.g. BME, JMD, MiMi, SprInt). Policymakers can use indicators to monitor integration, bust myths and design policies as well as several robust pilots and evaluations to assess and improve these policies’ effects (see MIPEX review, Bilgili 2015).

Slow but steady progress still needs to be made on integration, with similar needs in DE as other European countries. Similar numbers in DE as across Europe are reportedly experiencing racial/ethnic or religious discrimination. Similar numbers of non-EU citizens are not in employment, education or training, stuck in jobs below their qualifications and separated from their non-EU families, while sizeable numbers are also eligible for long-term residence and DE citizenship. The gaps in some areas of life – adult and child education, political participation, family reunion – are even larger in DE than in most European countries. DE is one of few countries with a language test abroad, restrictions on dual nationality, limited healthcare entitlements for asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants, and a weak equality body and equality policy. These policies may be disproportionate and ineffective from an integration perspective, with many unintended consequences and negative long-term effects. The challenge is to expand access to the most effective general and targeted programmes and to pass new reforms from an integration perspective. An update of the National Action Plan Integration is scheduled for 2015.

Policy Recommendation from the Rat für Migration (Council for Migration)

- Anti-discrimination policies and commitment against racism must be considered as integration policy and must be funded accordingly
- We need to know the extent of social and institutional discrimination as well as hate crimes. Therefore
comprehensive examinations and data collections are necessary. This matches recent demands by the United Nation to fulfill the requirements of the "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination"

- The inequality in education does not suit a wealthy country like Germany. Education policy must follow the principle of equivalence. The same lead should apply with health policy. It is unacceptable that Integration policy is discussed and governed without considering the central fields like education and health
- Structurally weak municipalities, that bear high expenses for integration, must be provided with more financial and human resources
- The same goes for groups in civil society, working in the fields Germany is inadequate (education, health and anti-discrimination), which must be strengthened
- We need a clear shift away from the paradigm of control and national security concerning migration and integration. Integration policy should be the responsibility of departments which are not primarily dealing with national security policy
### POLICIES - SUMMARY

#### LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 of 38</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 32%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU in lifelong learning: 10%

#### FAMILY REUNION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 of 38</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU separated couples: 6%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 1

#### EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 of 38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- 15y/o with immigrant background: 13%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- 15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 56%

#### HEALTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 of 38</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 of 38</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Real Beneficiaries**
- Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 17%

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 66%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

### ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 of 38</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 54%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Non-EU naturalisation: 2%

### ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 of 38</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 4%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 4850
GREECE

Rank: 27 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 44

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 55
Family Reunion: 55
Education: 36
Health: 27
Political Participation: 30
Permanent Residence: 54
Access To Nationality: 34
Anti-discrimination: 60
Changes in context

- Already a country of immigration since the 1970s, 7.3% of GR residents were born abroad (75% outside the EU)
- Employment rates in GR declined the most since the crisis/austerity and are now the lowest in the EU (only around 50%)
- Also during the crisis, GR experienced the highest rise and levels of anti-immigrant attitudes within the developed world, with only 41% saying GR is a welcoming place and >2/3 saying immigrants do not contribute economically or culturally
- While asylum and irregular arrivals are major issues for GR’s immigration system, new legal arrivals declined by 50% since the crisis and most legal residents in GR are long-settled as former labour and family migrants
- Government approach to immigration likely to change after 2012-2014 centre-right/left coalition replaced in 2015 by majority radical left in coalition with right-wing populists

Key Common Statistics

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1970s</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

- +9 points overall in 2010 with just 3 Laws facilitating naturalisation, birthright citizenship and local voting rights: the greatest progress of any MIPEX country at the time
- -5 points overall in 2013: GR became the 1st country in recent history to take away the right to vote from immigrants, while repeal of birthright citizenship left large numbers of children born in GR without equal rights and even some without papers until 2014
- 2014 Immigration Code transposes EU laws in ways to make more flexible legal migration and residence system, including better access to self-employment and family reunion procedure (+2 overall)
- With crisis/austerity, general inaction and limited funds for integration; many civil society actors had to turn their attention from improving integration outcomes to recording and fighting extreme right racist violence
- Law 4285/2014 in response improves protections against hate speech and racist crimes (+1 overall)
Conclusions and recommendations

The recession and austerity exacerbated structural problems within GR social and integration policies. Its rigid labour market reacted to the global crisis with some of the developed world’s weakest social benefits and largest cuts in mainly private sector jobs, general wages and job quality, especially for vulnerable groups like non-EU immigrants. Few had secured permanent residence and equal rights under GR’s rigid and restrictive residence policies, which were slow to respond while many who lost their jobs also lost their legal status and basic social entitlements. In the health sector, further limits and discretion in available services and even higher out-of-pocket payments led more people, especially vulnerable groups with weak entitlements like non-EU migrants, to develop unmet health needs due to costs, waiting lists and access. GR’s small-scale investments and infrastructure on integration were severely cut in terms of language and vocational trainings, intercultural schools and support for immigrant civil society. Moreover, the anti-immigrant minority grew, as did the extreme-right (from 0.3% in parliamentary elections in 2009 to 7% in 2012 and 6.3% in 2015), both attempting to block reform of GR’s traditionally exclusive and ethno-nationalist policies on citizenship, voting rights and discrimination.

By the end of 2014, GR ranked 27th out of the 38 MIPEX countries, alongside countries with smaller, newer and more homogenous immigrant communities than GR (e.g. JP, SI, HR, HU). Long-term improvements in GR’s economic, social and political prospects would certainly improve GR and non-EU citizens’ societal outcomes – and make it easier to work on integration. Much can, has been and must be done within the current context to fix the residence, citizenship and anti-discrimination policies for GR’s now long-settled immigrant population. The needs for integration are greater now more than ever and are more visible both to the GR public and international community. Any solutions must rely on limited administrative capacity and significant political will.

The new 2015 SYRIZA government promised a more humane and rational migration policy as part of its social policies. A prospective MIPEX assessment using the 2014 GR data suggests that legal reforms in the several MIPEX areas would substantially improve the conditions for integration, bring GR up to the European average and put local communities on the 1st steps to becoming stable and welcoming, as in IT and ES.
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 22 of 38
Score: 55

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 41%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 2%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 28 of 38
Score: 55

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 5%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 1

EDUCATION

Rank: 21 of 38
Score: 36

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 13%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 55%

HEALTH

Rank: 32 of 38
Score: 27

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 41%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 2%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 24 of 38
Score: 30

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 88%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 25 of 38
Score: 54

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 79%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 26%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 27 of 38
Score: 34

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 2%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 2%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 20 of 38
Score: 60

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 2%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 5640
HUNGARY

Rank: 23 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 45

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 40
Family Reunion: 61
Education: 15
Health: 40
Political Participation: 23
Permanent Residence: 68
Access To Nationality: 31
Anti-discrimination: 83
Changes in context

- Destination country since 1990s experiencing big drop in immigration during the economic crisis
- Overall employment rates dropped slightly from 2008-2011 but fully recovered and growing in 2013/4
- 2010 elections saw right-wing majority government replace left-wing government
- Dramatic increase in asylum-seekers coming across HU’s southern border since 2013 takes over previous long-term discussions on other forms of legal migration and integration
- Anti-immigrant attitudes greater and increasing more than on average in EU e.g. around 1/3 believe in equal rights for immigrants as opposed to 2/3 on average in EU

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
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<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

- No major change on integration since 2010: +1 point in 2014 due to EU-required single residence/work permit
- Small steps on long-term residence & ordinary naturalisation procedure
- Small steps back on basic political liberties and cost of citizenship test
- On contrast, other new destination countries continue to make major improvements (e.g. CZ, GR, PL)

Conclusions and recommendations

Promoting immigrant integration has not been a government priority from 2010 to 2014. The minor scattered changes do not change the fact that ordinary non-EU legal residents in HU still have more obstacles than...
opportunities put in their path to participate in HU society, with its overall integration policies scoring 45/100 and ranking 23rd alongside RO and the rapidly-advancing CZ. HU is home to a very small number of non-EU citizens (0.6% like BG, LT) and immigrant children. HU integration policies have yet to respond to the needs and opportunities they bring to nearly all areas of life in HU. In contrast, other new destination countries continue to make major improvements (e.g. CZ, GR, PL), following international reform trends. Several old and new countries of immigration have implemented effective policies that reach and support immigrants to become employed, trained, reunited with family, civically active, long-term residents and national citizens.
## POLICIES - SUMMARY

### LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

**Rank:** 31 of 38  
**Score:** 40  

**Potential Beneficiaries**  
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 37%

**Real Beneficiaries**  
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 6%

### FAMILY REUNION

**Rank:** 20 of 38  
**Score:** 61  

**Potential Beneficiaries**  
15y/o with immigrant background: 2%

### EDUCATION

**Rank:** 35 of 38  
**Score:** 15  

**Potential Beneficiaries**  
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 6%

### HEALTH

**Rank:** 25 of 38  
**Score:** 40  

**Potential Beneficiaries**  
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 52%

### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

**Rank:** 27 of 38  
**Score:** 23  

**Real Beneficiaries**  
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 58%

### PERMANENT RESIDENCE

**Rank:** 8 of 38  
**Score:** 68  

**Potential Beneficiaries**  
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 78%

### ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

**Rank:** 31 of 38  
**Score:** 31  

**Potential Beneficiaries**  
Non-EU with permanent residents: 37%

### ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

**Rank:** 7 of 38  
**Score:** 83  

**Potential Beneficiaries**  
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 6%

### Outcome Indicators

- **Non-EU with permanent residents:** 37%
- **Non-EU naturalisation:** 6%
- **Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims):** 3727
ICELAND

Rank: 23 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 45

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 51
Family Reunion: 59
Education: 23
Health: 40
Political Participation: 67
Permanent Residence: 62
Access To Nationality: 53
Anti-discrimination: 5
Changes in context

- Small new country of immigration since the mid-1990s, with 11% foreign-born in 2013 (around 2/3 from the EU and 1/3 from outside EU)
- Number of non-EU newcomers stable during crisis (<1000 per year), with >40% arriving for family reasons, ~25% for study, fewer for work and small but rising numbers for international protection
- One of the world’s highest employment rates, with slight drop and recovery due to the global financial crisis (82% in 2013)
- Some of the most positive attitudes towards immigrants in developed world, alongside other Nordics and the English-speaking countries
- Significant political changes since the crisis; application for EU membership introduced in 2009 but then withdrawn in 2013 after parliamentary elections shifted the government from left-to-right

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1990s</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Compared to its fellow Nordic countries, IS is a comparatively small and recent destination country, mostly for EU citizens who enjoy free movement and near-equal socio-economic rights as IS citizens under the EEA agreement. Among Non-EU citizens, family members and international students continue to move to IS in small numbers. IS’ recent negotiations for EU membership would have given an impetus to review and develop more coherent integration, residence and anti-discrimination policies, as happened in other accession countries with rather recent histories of immigration.

Conclusions and recommendations

Currently, IS’ policies create slightly more obstacles than opportunities for immigrants to fully participate in society. Overall, its integration policies, scoring 45 out of 100 points on MIPEX, seem much less developed or inclusive than policies in other Nordic countries, even DK (59 points in 2014, 49 points in 2010). The inclusive Nordic approach to local democracy is a good start for integration in IS by encouraging immigrants to be local voters and candidates, consulted and organised together. The major gap is anti-discrimination. IS is one of only 4 MIPEX countries (alongside JP, CH, TU) without a dedicated anti-discrimination law and official body to help victims seek justice in cases of racial, ethnic, religious and nationality discrimination. The rest of IS’ gap on integration policy is due to its weaker under-developed infrastructure to support equal opportunities for immigrants in other key areas of life than language learning. Thanks to comprehensive integration policies in countries like FI, NO and SE, immigrants in these countries can overcome specific obstacles to employment, education, health services and other areas. Non-EU immigrants also face slightly more demanding and discretionary procedures in IS than in most Nordic or EU countries to reunite families, settle as permanent residents or naturalise as full citizens.
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 26 of 38
Score: 51

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 22 of 38
Score: 59

EDUCATION

Rank: 28 of 38
Score: 23

HEALTH

Rank: 25 of 38
Score: 40

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 4%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 2

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 50%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 8 of 38
Score: 67

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 16 of 38
Score: 62

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 17 of 38
Score: 53

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 38 of 38
Score: 5

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 67%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 38%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 7%
IRELAND

**Rank:** 19 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 52

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 38
- Family Reunion: 40
- Education: 30
- Health: 58
- Political Participation: 73
- Permanent Residence: 49
- Access To Nationality: 59
- Anti-discrimination: 66
Changes in context

- Net immigration country since mid-1990s, with 15% foreign-born and mostly EU citizens (65%)
- Sharp drop in new arrivals after start of economic crisis
- Overall employment rate dropped by 10% from 2007 to 2012 but started to rebound in 2013 & 2014
- 2011 general election saw Fianna Fáil replaced by Fine Gael-Labour coalition
- As in most Western European countries, slight majority of IE think immigrants enrich IE culturally & economically and should have the same rights as IE citizens

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1990s</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Little has changed in the government's role and policies on integration, other than ad hoc projects, discussions and guidelines. National authorities are not doing much more than they did in 2007 (only +1 on MIPEX scale in 7 years). Overall, little has been done to improve non-EU citizens' chances for family reunion, long-term residence or rapid labour market integration. Moreover, funding has been cut for targeted support (e.g. for labour market mobility, education, equality bodies/policies), while residence and citizenship fees are now relatively high by international standards. A few families may see the positive effects of recent guidelines on family reunion and victims of domestic violence, which promise some of the minimum standards guaranteed in most other countries' legislation. Most positively, political will turned around IE's low naturalisation rates and created world-class procedures and ceremonies. However, such achievements can come and go (like the 2010 Ministerial Council on Integration, funding for equality bodies and funding since 2008 or family migrants' labour market access since 2009) unless they are secured in law. For example, IE recently improved on MIPEX when same-sex partners were legally guaranteed equal chances to reunite in IE and become citizens. Immigration reform has been left languishing in IE longer than in few other MIPEX countries (e.g. US), with plans for an Immigration and Residence Bill dating back to 2002.
Conclusions and recommendations

With an overall score of 52/100, IE’s integration policies create only slightly more opportunities than obstacles for non-EU immigrants to invest in integration and participate in IE society. In comparison, these policies rank 19th out of 38 countries, below all Western European countries except AT and CH. Immigrants benefit from more targeted support and clearer paths to family reunion and long-term residence in most other English-speaking and Western European countries, including new countries of immigration undergoing austerity (e.g. IT, PT, ES). Since IE is missing robust evaluations of the impact of its integration policies, the MIPEX results on policies, beneficiaries and outcomes can foster debate and complement other qualitative studies and quantitative data (e.g. ESRI’s Annual Integration Monitoring).

The traditional areas of strength on integration in IE – political participation and anti-discrimination – seem to produce positive effects as immigrants and their organisations become civically active and also begin to report discrimination. In other areas of integration, immigrants experience both opportunities and obstacles to participate in society. Results in the new MIPEX area – health – show that eligible immigrant patients can benefit from more accessible and responsive health services, although IE’s leading Intercultural Health Strategy should be up for renewal in 2015. While many working-age non-EU immigrants find their way in IE’s inclusive and flexible labour market, their access to training and education is comparatively limited and their uptake is rather low. Small gaps emerge over the long-term in employment rates and quality for university-educated men and women. IE schools are also slow to respond to the growing number of immigrant pupils who bring specific language and academic needs and opportunities to the classroom.

IE’s areas of weakness are clearly undermining immigrants’ integration and falling below the standards in most other countries. IE has some of the most discretionary family reunion, residence and citizenship policies in the developed world, meaning that non-EU citizens are less likely to reunite with their family, become long-term residents or, until recently, become citizens in IE than in nearly all other European countries. Following European and international reform trends, immigration reform in IE may provide clear entitlements with a great potential to boost integration outcomes in several areas of life.

Policy Recommendations from Immigrant Council of Ireland

- Recognise the permanent nature of migration by concretely improving the social, economic and legal situation of settled residents in a new comprehensive National Integration Strategy
- Increase IE’s very low levels of family reunion and long-term residence among the many eligible families and settled residents by comprehensively reforming Immigration and Residence legislation, including a clear entitlement to both and an independent appeals mechanism
- Maintain IE’s efforts to catch up on naturalisation rates by further promoting and reforming the citizenship process, including lowering the high costs where possible
- Guarantee and monitor equal access, support and opportunities for immigrant pupils in all types of schools by including integration in a school admissions bill
MIPEX 2015

POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

**Rank:** 33 of 38  
**Score:** 38

**Potential Beneficiaries**
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 33%

**Real Beneficiaries**
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 17%

FAMILY REUNION

**Rank:** 36 of 38  
**Score:** 40

**Potential Beneficiaries**
Non-EU separated couples: 4%

EDUCATION

**Rank:** 24 of 38  
**Score:** 30

**Potential Beneficiaries**
15y/o with immigrant background: 10%

HEALTH

**Rank:** 10 of 38  
**Score:** 58

**Potential Beneficiaries**

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

**Rank:** 6 of 38  
**Score:** 73

**Real Beneficiaries**
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 24%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

**Rank:** 35 of 38  
**Score:** 49

**Potential Beneficiaries**
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 71%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

**Rank:** 14 of 38  
**Score:** 59

**Potential Beneficiaries**
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 70%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

**Rank:** 17 of 38  
**Score:** 66

**Potential Beneficiaries**
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 3%

**Outcome Indicators**
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 197
Italy, 2014

**Rank:** 13 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 59

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 66
- Family Reunion: 72
- Education: 34
- Health: 65
- Political Participation: 58
- Permanent Residence: 65
- Access To Nationality: 50
- Anti-discrimination: 61
### Changes in context

- A country of net immigration since mid-1970s, with mostly non-EU citizens settling long-term, fewer newcomers since the crisis, and a growing 2nd generation born in IT
- Non-EU citizens are generally medium educated: 1 out of 2 has a secondary school or university degree
- Main reasons for migration are family reunion and work: Former labour migrants settling long-term and reuniting with families
- Asylum and irregular arrivals by boat continue and are growing in early 2015
- Large majority with positive attitudes towards immigrants and vocal anti-immigrant minority in IT, similar to the average EU/OECD country
- 2008-2011 right-wing coalition replaced by technocratic government and in 2013 by centre-left coalition

### Key Common Statistics

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1970s</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Changes in policy

The 2007 MIPEX found that IT's integration policies were some of the best among Europe's major countries of immigration. While the following conservative government made statements recognising MIPEX as an assessment tool, their restrictions (e.g. 2009 Security Law) made IT's score drop by 3 points in 2010 and lose their place in the ranking to ES, given that country's continued commitment to integration despite the crisis. Immigrants were presented as responsible for general social problems, with debatable statistics and without evaluations of policies' impact on integration. The current government brought IT's score up 1 point in 2013/2014 by opening public sector jobs to long-term residents and opening this status to beneficiaries of international protection, as part of their respect of EU law.
Conclusions and recommendations

Although IT’s integration policies have not changed much over the past 10 years, the reality of its immigrants have changed as many are settling in IT, with immigration now a permanent part of IT society. Former labour and regularised migrants are now settling and newcomer adults and children are coming for more long-term reasons, namely family reunion and humanitarian reasons. This previously ‘new’ country of immigration is now home to most of its non-EU citizens.

Reviewing IT’s policies in 8 areas, the conditions are only halfway favourable for integration, with IT ranking 13th, behind PT/ES and recently DE. IT has achieved the 1st step towards legal integration and equal rights, but now the harder 2nd step remains to achieve equal opportunities in practice. Thanks to legal labour market access for labour and regularised migrants, most of the long-settled have found jobs, but often below the level of their qualification or basic needs and without accessing education and training. IT’s ‘family-friendly’ policy welcomed most families of legal residents who use their right to family reunion. Now, these spouses may need targeted labour market support, while their children need both support and recognition through school and citizenship.

Most non-EU citizens have taken the 1st step of becoming long-term residents, but not the final step of becoming full IT citizens, due to its restrictive, discretionary and bureaucratic paths to citizenship. Because of IT’s young anti-discrimination laws and weak equality policies and body, most potential victims of discrimination have not even taken the 1st step towards justice. This 2nd step requires legislative reform as well as new thinking, policies and funding. Good practice often at local/regional level needs to be upscaled across the country and evidence-based through a new scientific approach using pilots, experiments and evaluations.

Policy Recommendations from ISMU, Institute for the Study of Multi-ethnicity

- Increase employment rates through on-the-job training and support, specifically for youth
- Remedy IT’s widespread problem of ‘over-qualification’ so that educated immigrant workers find jobs matching their expectations and avoiding the unproductive waste of their skills and expertise
- Combat early school leaving through early prevention: target support at pupils from disadvantaged families, support intercultural education and provide training and professional support to school teachers and staff
- Build a sense of trust among non-EU residents’ towards Italian public authorities, who must do more to counter racial/ethnic and religious discrimination
# LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

**Rank:** 14 of 38  
**Score:** 66  

- **Potential Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 33%  

- **Real Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU in lifelong learning: 5%

---

# FAMILY REUNION

**Rank:** 6 of 38  
**Score:** 72  

- **Potential Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU separated couples: 5%  

- **Outcome Indicators**  
  Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 3

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# EDUCATION

**Rank:** 23 of 38  
**Score:** 34  

- **Potential Beneficiaries**  
  15y/o with immigrant background: 8%  

- **Real Beneficiaries**  
  15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 57%

---

# HEALTH

**Rank:** 6 of 38  
**Score:** 65  

- **Potential Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 33%  

- **Real Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU in lifelong learning: 5%

---

# POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

**Rank:** 12 of 38  
**Score:** 58  

- **Real Beneficiaries**  
  Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 24%  

- **Real Beneficiaries**  
  Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

---

# PERMANENT RESIDENCE

**Rank:** 12 of 38  
**Score:** 65  

- **Potential Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 87%  

- **Outcome Indicators**  
  Non-EU with permanent residents: 70%

---

# ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

**Rank:** 19 of 38  
**Score:** 50  

- **Potential Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 62%  

- **Outcome Indicators**  
  Non-EU naturalisation: 2%

---

# ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

**Rank:** 18 of 38  
**Score:** 61  

- **Potential Beneficiaries**  
  Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 5%  

- **Outcome Indicators**  
  Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 3515
JAPAN

Rank: 27 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 44

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 65
Family Reunion: 61
Education: 21
Health: 51
Political Participation: 31
Permanent Residence: 59
Access To Nationality: 37
Anti-discrimination: 22

Japan, 2014
Changes in context

- Few immigrants admitted since 1990s not enough for Japan's shrinking and rapidly ageing population
- Foreign citizens represent only 1.6% of the total Japanese population
- Attitudes towards immigrants slowly improving over time in JP and KR (around 2/3 with positive attitudes in 2012)
- Most newcomers come for work (41%) or family reasons (36.5%)
- People with Japanese ancestry mostly from South America automatically receive long-term residence, while others mostly from East Asia arrive as workers, trainees and technical interns

Changes in policy

Despite JP’s initial steps towards an integration policy in 2006 and 2009/10, little has improved since 2010. A minor 2012 amendment means that permanent residents will enjoy a slightly more secure status (residence card up from 5 to 7 years’ duration).

Conclusions and recommendations

For the 1st time, JP’s efforts on integration can be directly compared to policies in all other developed countries of immigration, with MIPEX data from all countries from December 2014. JP’s policies currently create slightly more obstacles than opportunities for long-term societal integration. Like other new destination countries in Southern and Central Europe, efforts on integration started rather late in JP, with local plans 'multicultural living-together' (tabunka kyôsei) started in 2006, followed by the 1st national integration programmes in 2009. Today, JP’s integration policies remain under-developed, mostly local and limited to the employment and education of immigrants with Japanese ancestry living in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods. JP’s approach is slightly ahead of poorer Central European countries with equally small and new immigrant populations, but far behind other highly-developed countries, including KR. In these leading countries, coordinated national and local policies provide greater support and opportunities for many types of newcomers in all areas of public life.

Foreign residents in JP enjoy relatively favourable access to the labour market (ranked 15th out of 40) and the health system (migrant health policies ranked 16th overall). But the opportunities for long-term integration are limited for various types of immigrants. One out of every three foreigners is an unskilled temporary worker such as a technical intern, who is denied the chance to make their career, family life and home in JP, similar to KR. Other foreigners, such as skilled temporary workers, are likely to face relatively discretionary procedures for
family reunion (20th) and permanent residence (20th) and be discouraged from becoming citizens (23rd) or politically active (23rd). Their children receive little targeted support in the JP education system, except in a small number of cases through private ethnic schools and the small number of ‘rainbow bridge schools’ (29th). More broadly, any potential victims of ethnic, racial, religious or nationality discrimination have little chance to access justice in JP, one of the last MIPEX countries without a dedicated anti-discrimination law and body (37th place with only IS further behind). KR policies are better developed on anti-discrimination, political participation, education and targeted employment support.

### POLICIES - SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Market Mobility</td>
<td>15 of 38</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunion</td>
<td>20 of 38</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29 of 38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>16 of 38</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**

- 15y/o with immigrant background: 0%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>23 of 38</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Residence</td>
<td>20 of 38</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Nationality</td>
<td>23 of 38</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>37 of 38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcome Indicators**

- Non-EU naturalisation: 1%
**Latvia, 2014**

**Rank:** 37 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 31

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 46  
- Family Reunion: 55  
- Education: 17  
- Health: 17  
- Political Participation: 13  
- Permanent Residence: 53  
- Access To Nationality: 17  
- Anti-discrimination: 34
Changes in context

- A country of emigration home to the largest number of non-EU citizens (15.3%) long-settled or born in LV
- Number of new permits dropped dramatically from 7,700 in 2008 to 2,300 in 2009 but recovered by 2013
- Employment rates dropped from around 75% in 2008 to 67% in 2009 and slowly recovered to 71% in 2014, above the EU average
- The LV general public has highest levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in EU with only a minority saying in 2012 that immigrants enrich LV economically and culturally (19%) or deserve equal rights like LV citizens (30%)

Key Common Statistics

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Little has improved in LV’s integration policies since 2010. Policies towards newcomers remain ad hoc and project-based through EU funds, while the general framework for non-EU citizens remains unchanged.

The 2013 Citizenship Act was a major step forward for stateless/non-citizen children, but a missed opportunity for immigrant integration. LV’s score only climbed +1 point on MIPEX as a result, as dual nationality was allowed as an exception for naturalising foreigners and Latvians abroad, but only for refugees with certain nationalities: EU member states, European Free Trade Association member states, NATO member states, Australia, Brazil and New Zealand. This change is an important symbolic first step, it is also an indicator of the continued difficulties of discussing integration in LV. Dual nationality for other foreign nationals is still seen in LV as a disincentive for integration with many risks and few benefits, contrary to the experience of other countries adopting dual nationality.
Conclusions and recommendations

LV still has the weakest integration policies among the EU Member States, as its current approach creates almost no targeted support and many more obstacles than opportunities for non-EU citizens to participate in society. LV scores 4-6 points behind the next lowest-scoring countries (including LT) and far below EE (46). LV’s slight areas of strength were required by the EU (family reunion and permanent residence) and still weaker than the policies in most other European countries. If immigration increases, schools, hospitals, employment services and local communities may need greater targeted support to equally service immigrants and benefit from their skills (see improvements in EE, CZ, PT, Nordics).
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 28 of 38
Score: 46

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 38%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 5%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 28 of 38
Score: 55

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 5%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 1

EDUCATION

Rank: 33 of 38
Score: 17

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 97%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 1%

HEALTH

Rank: 38 of 38
Score: 17

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 4%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 25755

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 33 of 38
Score: 13

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 30 of 38
Score: 53

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 99%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 38 of 38
Score: 17

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 97%

REAL BENEFICIARIES
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 5%

POSSIBLE BENEFICIARIES
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 38%
Non-EU separated couples: 5%
15y/o with immigrant background: 5%
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 99%
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 97%
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 4%

POSSIBLE BENEFICIARIES
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 38%
Non-EU separated couples: 5%
15y/o with immigrant background: 5%
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 99%
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 97%
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 4%

REAL BENEFICIARIES
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 24%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%
LITHUANIA

Rank: 34 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 37

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 40
Family Reunion: 59
Education: 17
Health: 26
Political Participation: 16
Permanent Residence: 59
Access To Nationality: 35
Anti-discrimination: 43
**Changes in context**

- LT is not yet a country of net migration
- Nearly all immigrants from outside the EU, mainly neighbouring CIS countries
- Employment rate and number of newcomers dropped with crisis but rebounded afterwards
- Relatively positive public opinion on equal rights for immigrants in LT, with levels of anti-immigrant sentiment average for Europe

**Key Common Statistics**

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<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Changes in policy**

LT’s several minor amendments to immigration laws may benefit the integration of a few non-EU immigrants, including the very small number of high-skilled workers admitted in LT in recent years. Integration polices started to move beyond ad hoc principles and funds in 2014. First the LT Migration Policy Guidelines set out a special chapter on the Integration of Foreigners. Next, the Social Security and Labour Ministry created a multi-stakeholder working group and finally an Action Plan on the Integration of Foreigners. The implementation of this Action Plan should lead to new support measures and concrete policy changes in 2015 and beyond.

**Conclusions and recommendations**

LT has far to go to develop strong and comprehensive integration policies. LT’s policies are overall slightly unfavourable for integration of current and future immigrants. LT’s slight areas of strength on integration are very new and required by the EU (e.g. reforms of family reunion, long-term residence, labour market mobility, anti-
discrimination). As immigration increases, schools, hospitals, employment services and local communities may need greater targeted support to equally service immigrants and profit from their skills (see improvements in EE, CZ, IE, PT, Nordics).

LT’s current policies rank 34th out of 38, slightly below average for Central Europe (above LV but below EE/PL/CZ). Non-EU immigrants in LT benefit from a clearer path to family reunion, long-term residence and citizenship than in LV/EE, though CZ/PL are leading Central European reform trends. Immigrants also benefit from less targeted support in several areas of life in LT than in new destination countries such as EE and CZ.

**Policy Recommendations from the Lithuanian Social Research Centre**

- Increase mobility of migrant workers in labour market
- Increase the family reunion rate for non-EU citizens, particularly low-educated migrant workers
- Grant access for non-EU citizens to political parties and associations
- Through new consultative forum, regularly consult representatives of non-EU citizens on upcoming political issues
- Expand healthcare coverage entitlements for temporary non-EU residents
- Guarantee basic infrastructure to welcome newcomer pupils across the country
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<td>Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>32 of 38</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 31%
- Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 85%
- Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 73%
- Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 2%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU in lifelong learning: 12%
- Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 89%
- Enfranchised non-EU adults: 14%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 5
- Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 2900
- Non-EU with permanent residents: 98%
- Non-EU with permanent residents: 98%
- Non-EU naturalisation: 1%
- Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 2900
Luxembourg, 2014

**Rank:** 15 out of 38
**MIPEX Score:** 57

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 42
- Family Reunion: 65
- Education: 48
- Health: 43
- Political Participation: 81
- Permanent Residence: 64
- Access To Nationality: 68
- Anti-discrimination: 49
Changes in context

- Foreign citizens make up nearly half of the LU population (recently estimated at 46%) a larger share than in almost any other developed democracy (only comparable to SG) and the largest share of EU citizens (38% of the total population)
- University-educated make up larger share of non-EU immigrants in LU (1/2 and rising since 2008) comparable only to IE and UK
- Overall employment rates are relatively stable and above-average for the EU
- Pro-immigrant attitudes held by large majority of LU residents who agree that immigrants enrich LU culturally and economically and should enjoy equal rights as LU citizens
- Stable government coalition in LU including both right and left parties; now Christian Democrats out of power for 1st time since 1979 and only 2nd time since WWII

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1950s</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

- +2 points overall on integration policies in 2010/1
- +4 on Labour Market Mobility with new procedure for right to Validation of Acquired Experience (VAE)
- +3 2011 Orientation provided to training opportunities in LU through Welcome and Integration Contract (CAI)
- +1 on Family Reunion: Sponsors in ‘stable relationships’ now eligible to reunite
- +8 on Political Participation with non-EU citizens granted the right to stand for all municipal positions, including mayor
- 2011 saw minor changes in powers and structure of local and national Councils of Foreigners
Conclusions and recommendations

2008 saw the passage of major reforms recognising LU as a permanent country of immigration. More opportunities for integration were provided by the Nationality Law (+5 points overall on MIPEX though stricter eligibility and language requirements than in most countries) as well as several improvements on family reunion, anti-discrimination and political participation (+5 more points). Since then, only minor improvements were made to LU's approach to integration.

Integration is the reality for the mostly long-settled immigrants in this small, wealthy, multilingual country, according to EU's Migrant Integration Indicators and the MIPEX data. Employment rates for EU citizens are higher than for LU citizens and generally similar or higher for long-settled non-EU citizens. Nearly half of working-age EU and non-EU citizens are university-educated, compared to 1/3 of LU citizens. These high-educated may become more politically active over time than the high-educated born in LU. Inequalities do appear in terms of the social concentration of immigrant pupils in disadvantaged schools, the under-representation of immigrants and their descendants in the public sector (the greatest of any Western country), gaps in income, in-work poverty, poverty-risk and uptake of training, especially for non-EU citizens, experiences of discrimination as well as knowledge and use of the LU language compared to the other 2 official languages (FR and DE).

Democratic deficit is probably the most glaring inequality in LU today. The Nationality Law has shown some success (18,982 new citizens in 5 years since reform vs. 5,374 in 5 years before), while LU enfranchises most EU and non-EU citizens in its relatively inclusive model of local democracy. Even so, LU remains one of the most exclusive national democracies in the developed world, with the largest share of adults disenfranchised in national elections. According to 2013 OECD data, after 10+ years in the country, LU citizenship had been granted to only around 20% of the foreign-born, including among the non-EU-born, who are generally most likely to naturalise and see the benefits. LU would have joined NZ, UK, PT and a few global leaders in granting national voting rights for foreign citizens, had this not been rejected in a 2015 referendum on the 2013 Liberal/Socialist/Green coalition's package of 3 electoral reforms.

In the aftermath of the referendum, the government is reconsidering how to guarantee equal opportunities for all foreign citizens, encourage them to naturalise and open up LU public institutions to diversity. A revised Nationality Law can better recognise integration realities for long-settled residents and reward FR- or DE-speaking newcomers for making extra efforts learning to speak basic Luxembourgish. The anti-discrimination framework could strengthen protections against nationality discrimination, especially for non-EU citizens, and strengthen all victims' access to justice through roles for equality NGOs/class actions and greater powers and resources for LU's relatively weak Equal Treatment Centre. Mainstreaming diversity and equality in this very international country could open up the public sector with greater access and bridging support for settled residents and greater
equality duties across society, following international trends. The education system in particular has a duty to promote social integration and intercultural education through greater outreach to immigrant parents and communities and guaranteed access for all pupils to adapted language learning and teaching on diversity, citizenship and immigrants’ languages.

Policy Recommendations from ASTI

- Concerning access to social security, it would be crucial to have a standard and to define whether it is compulsory to have a residence permit or if a proof of living in Luxembourg is enough to apply for social security.
- For non-EU citizens, the 12 months residency and work delay is too long for a family reunification demand, as well as the waiting period of 9 months for the answer. The housing criteria for the family have to be better specified: the number of bedrooms, the size of the house, etc.
- For both non-EU and EU citizens the definition of “dependency” concerning parents or children above 21 in relation to family reunification, is not clear, since it is difficult to evaluate the exact amounts of money the person in Luxembourg has to have sent to his family member in order to prove it.
- To obtain a long-term residency permit, the non-EU citizen has to prove 5 years residency and work in Luxembourg before he can apply. If he stopped working, even for a short period, the long-term residency permit can be denied (except for some specific reasons like health, pregnancy or studies).
- The waiting period of 6 months to obtain an answer from the authorities is too long.
- The new law on citizenship should be large and inclusive in order to permit a large access to Luxembourgish nationality, especially by introducing the “jus soli”
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET
MOBILITY

Rank: 30 of 38
Score: 42

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 31%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 17%

FAMILY
REUNION

Rank: 15 of 38
Score: 65

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 4%

Real Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 46%

EDUCATION

Rank: 15 of 38
Score: 48

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 3

Real Beneficiaries
15y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 49%

HEALTH

Rank: 22 of 38
Score: 43

POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION

Rank: 2 of 38
Score: 81

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 21%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 68%

PERMANENT
RESIDENCE

Rank: 14 of 38
Score: 64

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 68%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 27%

ACCESS TO
NATIONALITY

Rank: 7 of 38
Score: 68

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 59%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 2%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 29 of 38
Score: 49

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 7%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 1661
Malta, 2014

Rank: 33 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 40

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 45
Family Reunion: 48
Education: 19
Health: 45
Political Participation: 25
Permanent Residence: 50
Access To Nationality: 34
Anti-discrimination: 51
Changes in context

- Country of net immigration already since 1970s, with a few thousand arriving every year since 2008
- Slight increase in immigration from low-developed countries
- GDP growth and overall employment rates approaching EU average
- Less positive attitudes towards immigrants in MT than the average European country

Key Common Statistics

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1970s</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Non-discrimination and equality has been and continues to be Malta's main way of moving forward on integration policy. While reform continues, all public bodies must already promote equality and all residents must be protected in many areas of life from unequal treatment based on their race, ethnicity, religion and other grounds. These advances on anti-discrimination for all (+14 on anti-discrimination law since 2007) were largely cancelled out by further restrictions for non-EU citizens to become long-term residents (-13 since 2007), which would guarantee them basic equal rights as MT citizens in many areas of life. While health emerges as a new area of recent improvement in MT, little-to-no improvements have been made to the other areas of MT's integration policy.

Conclusions and recommendations

MIPEX finds that MT's policies can be slightly unfavourable for integration, scoring only 40/100 and ranking 33rd out of 38 countries. Immigrants in MT do not yet benefit from a comprehensive integration policy in all areas of
MT society. Ongoing plans for a more comprehensive equality law and policy can provide sanctions and incentives for MT citizens and immigrants to treat each other equally in many areas of life. These principles of equal treatment are critically important and missing from MT’s other integration policies. Ordinary non-EU residents are less likely to reunite with family, become long-term residents with equal rights, and become citizens in MT than in almost any other MIPEX country. Delaying family reunion also delays the integration of these families and their sponsor. By delaying long-term residence, non-EU citizens are denied the equal rights and opportunities that they could use to improve their integration in many areas of life. These restrictions have the greatest impact on the most vulnerable, such as MT’s beneficiaries of international protection, women, youth, the elderly and the ill. MT’s integration policies can be redesigned from an integration perspective, based on evidence of their impact and the current needs in communities. Equal opportunities will also be the driving goal behind new measures to raise education outcomes for immigrant pupils and the democratic participation of long-settled immigrant communities, in order to avoid social segregation. MIPEX has and can be further used by MT stakeholders in the preparation of MT’s National Migrant Integration Strategy 2015-2020, under the lead of the Ministry for Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs and Civil Liberties.

**Policy Recommendations from People for Change**

- Increase political will and public support for integration by informing media/public discourse, producing annual assessments of integration on the basis of specific indicators and systematically evaluating all integration initiatives
- Obtain clear integration goals and commitments in all relevant areas through the new integration strategy
- Address specific needs of vulnerable groups to access and complete integration and residence policies
- Increase number of applications and recognition for non-EU qualifications and experience
- Increase civic and political participation and visibility of non-EU citizens through greater support
- Increase immigrants’ and mainstream service providers’ awareness of immigrants’ rights to access services and discrimination remedies
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 29 of 38
Score: 45

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 33 of 38
Score: 48

EDUCATION

Rank: 32 of 38
Score: 19

HEALTH

Rank: 19 of 38
Score: 45

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 13

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 25 of 38
Score: 25

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 34 of 38
Score: 50

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 27 of 38
Score: 34

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 26 of 38
Score: 51

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 2%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 6%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 10%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 1329
NETHERLANDS

Rank: 11 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 60

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 73
Family Reunion: 56
Education: 50
Health: 55
Political Participation: 52
Permanent Residence: 55
Access To Nationality: 66
Anti-discrimination: 73
Changes in context

- One of Europe’s long-established destination countries, with 11.5% born abroad, mostly from medium-to-low developed non-EU countries and most with low-to-medium levels of education
- NL public still express some of the greatest support for integration and equal rights, alongside citizens of Northern Europe and traditional countries of immigration (e.g. in 2012 85% thought legal immigrants should have the same rights as NL citizens)
- New 2012 grand coalition after collapse of 2010 right-wing government with support of far-right
- Numbers of non-EU newcomers decreased from 2008-2012 but returned to previous levels in 2013: increases were significant for international students and small for labour migrants; 2013 increase in humanitarian migrants and all types of reuniting families
- Asylum requests nearly doubled from 2013-to-2014 to 24,500, mostly SY and ER citizens, with >90% chance to be recognised as beneficiaries of international protection

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

While few NL policies changed from 2007-2010, the far right continued to politicise integration policy, set the terms of the debate and pressure government for restrictions. From 2010-2014, the NL abandoned its traditional commitment to equal opportunities for immigrants and dropped -8 points on MIPEX, more than any other country has from 2007-2014. The NL is no longer a leader on integration policy, with many looking instead to the slow but steady improvements in DE and the high levels of ambition in the Nordics and traditional countries of immigration. The NL is largely on its own in its new approach to integration. The only other country taking a similar turn is the UK, due to the government’s pledge to cap migration to tends of thousands and to pursue austerity and localism.

The current NL approach to integration could be called a ‘policy of no policy.’ Immigrant adults are demanded but not supported to learn the NL language and its core civic values, with ‘loans’ replacing the grants and free courses provided traditionally by NL and by most other countries. Immigrants are expected to be employed, healthy and civically active but without the targeted support to overcome any specific obstacles they face in NL society. According to the current government’s understanding of mainstreaming, it’s up to immigrants to pay and do it themselves and up to mainstream institutions to respond. While immigrants are required to integrate, mainstream institutions are not required to open up and no role is foreseen for integration policymakers or immigrant civil society to build bridges between the two. This radical reversal has undermined integration policies in nearly all areas of life, especially the labour market, political participation and education. The previous and current NL governments have also continued to restrict family reunion, leading to few measurable benefits and many potentially negative impacts for integration.
Conclusions and recommendations

Overall, MIPEX suggests that the NL’s approach to integration barely qualifies as ‘slightly favourable’ for guaranteeing equal rights and opportunities for immigrants, scoring 60/100. Newcomers still benefit from equal socio-economic rights, relatively strong anti-discrimination laws and a basic entitlement to NL citizenship, while their children should be educated by teachers trained and supported to target their specific learning needs and to teach all pupils about diversity. However, NL policies on family reunion, long-term residence and dual nationality are more restrictive than on average in Western Europe. These restrictions can delay the integration of the small number of transnational families and discourage many long-settled residents from becoming long-term residents or citizens and further investing in their integration. They may also face greater obstacles to investing in their integration without the support of free language and integration courses, immigrant self-organisations and effective targeted programmes in employment, education, health and so on. The MIPEX statistics on beneficiaries and outcomes suggest that integration policies are still needed in several areas and these changes can have a significant impact, for better or for worse. These policy changes and cuts can be independently evaluated in terms of their effects on integration outcomes in the many areas of life. More evaluations, pilots and experiments may help focus the integration debate on realistic objectives for what integration policies can and must achieve for the development of NL society.
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 8 of 38
Score: 73

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 29%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 31%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 26 of 38
Score: 56

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 3%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 7

EDUCATION

Rank: 13 of 38
Score: 50

Potential Beneficiaries
15 y/o with immigrant background: 11%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 51%

HEALTH

Rank: 11 of 38
Score: 55

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for education: 84%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 31%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 18 of 38
Score: 52

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 85%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 84%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 24 of 38
Score: 55

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 84%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 9 of 38
Score: 66

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 4%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 14 of 38
Score: 73

Potential Beneficiaries
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 180

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 8%
KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 67
Family Reunion: 68
Education: 66
Health: 75
Political Participation: 74
Permanent Residence: 64
Access To Nationality: 71
Anti-discrimination: 79
Changes in context

- Traditional and growing destination country, with the foreign-born accounting for 17% of the population in 2000 and 24% in 2012
- Nearly zero net migration rate, due to high levels of immigration and emigration
- Large family and increasingly temporary migration: Nearly 1/4 of annual migration flows are permanent immigrants (around 60% are family migrants), while nearly 1/2 of temporary migrants are international students
- Comparatively high employment rates and GDP growth
- Generally most positive attitudes towards immigrants in NZ than rest of developed world, alongside other English-speaking countries and Nordics
- Centre-right minority government since 2008

Changes in policy

The NZ government has maintained its overall path to citizenship and settlement for migrants and refugees and its wider policies to promote cultural competences and non-discrimination in society. However, the current government, following certain international trends, restricted the definition of the family for immigrants in May 2012, leading to a 4-point-drop in NZ's MIPEX score on family reunion. These new caps on parents and closing routes for adult children and siblings were followed by a 23% decrease in approvals in the capped family stream and largely responsible for the 4% decrease in permanent residence approvals from 2011/2 to 2012/3, as recorded by the OECD.

Conclusions and recommendations

According to MIPEX, recent immigrants in NZ benefit from slightly favourable policies to guarantee their equal rights and opportunities in many areas of life. They enjoy similar opportunities in NZ (ranked 3rd, scoring 70) as in other traditional settlement countries, such as CA (ranked 6th, scoring 68) or AU (ranked 8th, scoring 66). Many immigrants and their families are eligible to arrive as or later become permanent residents and then full NZ citizens. Already after one year of permanent residence, they can also vote in all elections in this inclusive democracy and confident country of immigration. Newcomers and immigrant communities receive support in many areas of life from language learning to education, health, citizenship and voting.

To improve, NZ can still be more inclusive of newcomers, more ambitious on multiculturalism and more effective
in access to services. Newcomer migrants, especially temporary residents, face high costs for family reunion and permanent residence and delays to access general job, training and social support. NZ's standards on multiculturalism and non-discrimination could be better targeted to the needs of immigrant communities. Many eligible migrants may not take up the most effective settlement services due to limited access, coordination and evaluation as well as outreach by mainstream services and advisory bodies.

**POLICIES - SUMMARY**

- **LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY**
  - Rank: 12 of 38
  - Score: 67

- **FAMILY REUNION**
  - Rank: 9 of 38
  - Score: 68

- **EDUCATION**
  - Rank: 3 of 38
  - Score: 66

- **HEALTH**
  - Rank: 1 of 38
  - Score: 75

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- 15y/o with immigrant background: 26%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- 15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 57%

- **POLITICAL PARTICIPATION**
  - Rank: 4 of 38
  - Score: 74

- **PERMANENT RESIDENCE**
  - Rank: 14 of 38
  - Score: 64

- **ACCESS TO NATIONALITY**
  - Rank: 4 of 38
  - Score: 71

- **ANTI-DISCRIMINATION**
  - Rank: 8 of 38
  - Score: 79
Norway, 2014

**Rank:** 4 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 69

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 90
- Family Reunion: 63
- Education: 65
- Health: 67
- Political Participation: 82
- Permanent Residence: 70
- Access To Nationality: 52
- Anti-discrimination: 59
Changes in context

- Country of net migration since mid-1960s, with 13% foreign-born and 15% of 2nd generation
- Large share of non-EU-born are university-educated (around 1/3)
- Decreasing share of newcomers are family migrants, with rise in study and humanitarian migrants
- One of the highest and increasingly positive attitudes towards immigrants in developed world, alongside other Nordics and English-speaking countries

Key Common Statistics

<table>
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<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mid-1960s</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN 2010 data in 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Note: Adults aged 18-64,</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
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</table>

Changes in policy

NO’s major strengths on integration policy are long-established going back a decade or more. Recent changes have slightly undermined those strengths. NO lost 2 points when its 2010 Immigration Law introduced fees and resource requirements for certain separated non-EU families that are higher than the established minimums of what the NO-born need and use to live together as a family. NO lost another point in 2014 when immigrants lost their national platform to inform and improve policy, KIM.

Conclusions and recommendations

Immigrants face many more opportunities than obstacles to fully participate in society, with NO ranked 4th,
Norway alongside FI and similar to CA and NZ. Overall, NO's general policies and context increase immigrants' participation in society, thanks to NO's high levels of employment, social support and political participation.

NO's strengths in many areas of integration are a testament to its 2012 comprehensive policy and its commitments to mainstreaming, equality and diversity. Immigrants count on the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion and its IMDi directorate to guarantee them equal rights and basic information and support to participate in different areas of life. For example, NO's introduction programme and requirements set realistic expectations for immigrants to put in equal efforts to learn as much as they can about the NO language and society. Mainstreaming means that the Ministry coordinates with other ministries, who take targeted actions on diversity as part of their general commitments to equal opportunities and outcomes. Through this process, immigrants have benefited from stronger laws and targeted support on anti-discrimination, employment, multicultural education and, recently, health.

Immigrants could benefit from better rights and opportunities if NO follows international reform trends on the recognition of non-EU degrees, dual nationality, birthright citizenship and comprehensive anti-discrimination laws. NO's integration policies are increasingly evaluated through robust studies, thanks to NO's wealth of administrative data. Access can be expanded in the most effective programmes: pre-primary education, professional degrees, wage subsidies, job-specific language training and citizenship. Immigrants can also get involved in this comprehensive process of mainstreaming through a new strong consultation structure, which would replace KIM and the current annual dialogue conference. Immigrant civil society needs the independent capacity and networks to engage in consultation and advisory bodies in all relevant national policies.
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 3 of 38
Score: 90

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training:
22%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning:
30%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 18 of 38
Score: 63

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents):
6

EDUCATION

Rank: 4 of 38
Score: 65

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background:
10%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses:
55%

HEALTH

Rank: 4 of 38
Score: 67

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 1 of 38
Score: 82

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults:
60%

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence:
56%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults:
0%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 6 of 38
Score: 70

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence:
56%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 18 of 38
Score: 52

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation:
40%

Anti-Discrimination

Rank: 21 of 38
Score: 59

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation:
7%
POLAND

Rank: 32 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 41

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 38
Family Reunion: 65
Education: 20
Health: 26
Political Participation: 6
Permanent Residence: 66
Access To Nationality: 56
Anti-discrimination: 52
Changes in context

- Not yet a major country of immigration, PL's immigrant population is small but hardworking and increasing in recent years from around 40,000 in 2008 to 275,000 in 2013, mostly workers from UA, BY, MD
- Non-EU immigrants to PL are increasingly coming from medium-developed countries (60% in 2013) and university-educated (41% in 2013)
- Similar to EU average, majority of public in PL think immigrants enrich PL culturally and economically (57%) and should have equal rights as PL citizens (69%)
- No major political changes impact the debate on immigration and integration

Key Common Statistics

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<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Changes in policy

Since 2010, +5 points, a significant improvement on MIPEX, means PL's overall integration policies are following international best practices and are no longer slightly unfavourable for integration as before:

- +30 points on Access to nationality: 2009 Citizenship Law (implemented in 2012) provides the 1st generation with a path to citizenship average for Europe, with a rights-based procedure as in Northern Europe and following international trends opening to dual nationality
- +26 points on Anti-discrimination: In 2010, PL was the last EU country to pass an Equal Treatment Law, creating an equality body, basic definitions of discrimination and strong enforcement mechanisms
- +2 points on Labour market mobility and Family reunion: Inspired by EU law, 2013 Aliens Act Amendments facilitates access to labour market for temporary residents, including reuniting families
Conclusions and recommendations

PL's integration policies create more obstacles than opportunities for immigrants to fully participate in society, with average policies compared to the rest of Central Europe. PL ranks 32nd out of 38 (alongside BG and MT but below CZ, RO, SI) because of its:

- Weaker general/targeted support for non-EU newcomers to pursue jobs and training
- Weaker school support for the small number of newcomer pupils disadvantaged by limited PL proficiency
- Weaker definitions of discrimination in the EU's youngest law on equal treatment
- One of the equality bodies and policies with the weakest powers in the world (ranked 31st)
- Outdated restrictions on political liberties, no consultative body of immigrants, missing reform on local voting rights
- Naturalisation requires higher language level (B1) and stricter income requirements than most countries
- Missing specific citizenship entitlements for PL-born or PL-educated children (e.g. recent reforms in CZ, DE, DK)

Policy Recommendations from Institute of Public Affairs (IPA)

- All non-EU citizens should be able to benefit from a structural Polish integration policy, adopted and implemented through broad consultation with government, NGO, academic and immigrant representatives
- Non-EU citizens' integration support should involve closer cooperation and information exchange between the Ministries of Interior and Labour and more actions from the many other ministries responsible for different aspects of public life
- Increase non-EU citizens' access to long-term integration support through more structural and varied funding sources for integration activities, including from the state budget
- Increase non-EU citizens' access to inter-sectoral integration activities at local level (as in Lublin) by making integration a higher priority in local development strategies
- Structurally consult immigrant representatives in cities with large numbers of foreigners
- Increase public awareness of integration's positive sides, successes and the challenges faced by foreigners in public life
Policies - Summary

Labour Market Mobility

- Rank: 33 of 38
- Score: 38
- Potential Beneficiaries: Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 35%
- Real Beneficiaries: Non-EU in lifelong learning: 12%

Family Reunion

- Rank: 15 of 38
- Score: 65
- Potential Beneficiaries: 15y/o with immigrant background: 0%

Education

- Rank: 30 of 38
- Score: 20
- Potential Beneficiaries: 15y/o with immigrant background: 0%

Health

- Rank: 34 of 38
- Score: 26

Political Participation

- Rank: 37 of 38
- Score: 6
- Real Beneficiaries: Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 92%
- Potential Beneficiaries: Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 84%

Permanent Residence

- Rank: 11 of 38
- Score: 66
- Potential Beneficiaries: Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 84%

Access to Nationality

- Rank: 16 of 38
- Score: 56
- Potential Beneficiaries: Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 65%

Anti-Discrimination

- Rank: 24 of 38
- Score: 52
- Potential Beneficiaries: Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 3%

Outcome Indicators

- Non-EU naturalisation: 9%
- Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 6620
PORTUGAL

Rank: 2 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 75

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 91
Family Reunion: 88
Education: 62
Health: 43
Political Participation: 74
Permanent Residence: 68
Access To Nationality: 86
Anti-discrimination: 88
Changes in context

- Economic crisis disproportionately affects overall employment rate, dropping over 7 points from 2008 to 2013 but improving in 2014, with continued investment in active labour market programmes
- Recent destination country since 1990s: mostly emigration since the crisis (2/3 to EU countries, 1/3 mostly to non-EU PT-speaking countries) and sharp decline in immigration (mostly still from non-EU PT-speaking countries)
- PT remains a country of integration with 3% non-EU citizens and large numbers of family reunions and naturalisations
- Immigrant population is increasingly high-educated (25% of non-EU citizen population in 2013)
- Shift in government from left-wing majority between 2007-2010 to right-wing majority since 2012
- Highly positive attitudes towards immigrants both before and during economic crisis, with no extreme-right party in national elections

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN 2010 data in 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Note: Adults aged 18-64</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Despite the crisis and austerity, PT maintained its investment in integration and even worked to increase its reach and effectiveness. PT continues to climb ahead on MIPEX: +1 point from 2007 to 2010 during the start of the crisis; immigrants benefited from more realistic family reunion requirements and more targeted support to pursue jobs, training and recognition procedures. PT rose another +1 point from 2010 to 2014; more immigrants can access protections against domestic violence and expanded targeted employment programmes, e.g. Mentoring for Immigrants Programme.

Moreover, PT's integration policies have been given a new overall focus after the crisis. The new mobility and social realities reconfirmed that PT is a country of emigration (both for PT and non-EU citizens now working abroad) and a country of integration (both for non-EU families settling long-term and PT citizens living in a more diverse society). As a result, the High Commissioner for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI) was transformed into the High Commissioner for Migration (ACM). This shift adds new goals on the mobility, return and integration of PT citizens working abroad to its well-established work on integration and dialogue in PT with immigrant residents and youth and increasingly with local communities.
Conclusions and recommendations

Immigrant residents in PT still benefit from the 2nd most favourable integration policies in the developed world, ahead of most Nordics and traditional countries of immigration and leading the new destinations (far ahead of ES and IT).

Its 'family friendly' immigration policies and its 2006 model for citizenship reform have clearly helped more immigrants to reunite with their family and become PT citizens, even during the crisis. The effects of PT’s integration policies on outcomes in other areas are less clear, as data is missing for robust experiments and causal evaluations (see Northern Europe, Bilgili 2015). The available data, monitoring reports and qualitative evaluations suggest that many of PT’s targeted programmes (CNAI/CLAI, Escolhas) are reaching large numbers of immigrants in need. These programmes are then well-appreciated by beneficiaries, well-reviewed by EU institutions and even replicated by other countries. Moreover, the need is still strong for these integration policies. Former labour migrants have settled long-term with their newcomer family members and children, all with their own specific employment, education, family, health and local needs.

More effective targeted, general and local policies may be needed for PT’s national policies to identify and reach the many potential beneficiaries in need, especially in disadvantaged areas. Integration stakeholders in PT are discussing these possibilities through their typically collaborative process of policymaking, now around the renewed national Integration Plan and new municipal plans. More accessible and responsive policies will likely require more resources e.g. for employment, education, health, equality policies and local services.

Policy Recommendations from the Centre for Geographical Studies, University of Lisbon

- Invest in the intercultural competencies of public service providers, in particular educators, to improve access to and quality of services
- Improve access to early years education for immigrant and low income families (focusing on bettering quality, language training and development services)
- Promote dialogue with and participation of families in education with the goal of reinforcing cultural diversity teaching in schools, improving parental support, and increasing the social inclusion of families
- Increase opportunities and the uptake of adult education and training with particular emphasis on providing work experience and professional placements for all skill levels, recovering and improving some good experiences from the past
- Sensitize health service providers to improve responsiveness to the specific health and access needs of migrants
### POLICIES - SUMMARY

#### LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY
- **Rank:** 2 of 38
- **Score:** 91

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 28%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU in lifelong learning: 14%

#### FAMILY REUNION
- **Rank:** 6 of 38
- **Score:** 62

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU separated couples: 4%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 2

#### EDUCATION
- **Rank:** 22 of 38
- **Score:** 43

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- 15y/o with immigrant background: 7%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- 15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 71%

#### HEALTH
- **Rank:** 2 of 38
- **Score:** 88

#### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
- **Rank:** 4 of 38
- **Score:** 74

**Real Beneficiaries**
- Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 65%

#### PERMANENT RESIDENCE
- **Rank:** 8 of 38
- **Score:** 68

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 77%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Non-EU with permanent residents: 18%

#### ACCESS TO NATIONALITY
- **Rank:** 1 of 38
- **Score:** 86

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 72%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Non-EU naturalisation: 6%

#### ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
- **Rank:** 4 of 38
- **Score:** 88

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 3%
ROMANIA

Rank: 23 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 45

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 57
Family Reunion: 67
Education: 20
Health: 45
Political Participation: 0
Permanent Residence: 57
Access To Nationality: 34
Anti-discrimination: 78
Changes in context

- A country of emigration, with emigration much greater than immigration
- RO’s small number of newcomers dropped by 50% from 2008-to-2010, with decrease in work migration (from 9,000-to-2,000) following the economic crisis
- Family and study are now the major reasons for non-EU immigration
- Slight increase in asylum-seekers from 2012-2014, most recently from SY with important groups from AF and IQ
- MD remain the top nationality of non-EU citizens in 2014 (21%), closely followed by TU (15%), CN (13%), SY (7%) and US (3%)
- Attitudes towards immigrants are relatively average for the EU

Key Common Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Note: Adults aged 18-64, Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN 2010 data in 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td>Eurostat 2013</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

+1 point goes to RO for Law 157/2011. While the law focused more on migration management and EU law, these clarifications may bring added benefits for immigrants’ integration. Compulsory education should be open to all children, while EU long-term residence should be open to nearly all temporary residents. The law also had its weaknesses, adding more discretionary requirements and limiting students’ access to family reunion.

Conclusions and recommendations

Newcomers to RO benefit from halfway favourable policies that create slightly more obstacles than opportunities
for non-EU immigrants to quickly and fully participate in RO society. The balance between opportunities and obstacles is more favourable in RO, CZ, EE, HU than in the rest of Central Europe, with RO several points ahead of BG and SK.

RO’s integration strategies provide basic opportunities for integration that still need to reach all types of immigrants in need. Thanks to EU law, most non-EU newcomers can access the labour market and training, reunite with family and secure EU long-term residence, though some gaps persist in these areas. Going above-average for the region, RO authorities and civil society are taking steps to provide free language training and basic information on jobs, training, schooling for children and healthcare. With the right resources and support, RO’s strong anti-discrimination laws and body can also be used to guarantee equal treatment for non-EU citizens when practices go against the law.

The major obstacles to integration in RO are common problems in the region. When seeking or renewing permits, immigrants who meet all the legal requirements still face wide administrative discretion, despite EU law. Support for RO’s few immigrant pupils is weak and largely limited to learning the RO language. Its integration strategies are missing political participation and a clear path to citizenship for ordinary immigrants and RO-born or -educated children. RO is the most restrictive in denying all political rights to its small number of non-EU citizens, despite above-average majorities of RO citizens in favour of immigrants’ rights and contributions.

More ambitious integration policies in RO can learn from other countries and international trends: reforming long-term residence (IT, PT, SI) and citizenship (PL, CZ, PT) from an integration perspective, implementing intercultural education (PT, Western Europe) and opening political opportunities (SI, IE, PT, ES). To make policies more effective, RO needs to collect missing data on integration indicators (EU Zaragoza indicators), discrimination cases/complaints and the policy experiences of different types of immigrants, such as humanitarian migrants, students, families and MD citizens.
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY
Rank: 20 of 38
Score: 57

FAMILY REUNION
Rank: 11 of 38
Score: 67

EDUCATION
Rank: 30 of 38
Score: 20

HEALTH
Rank: 19 of 38
Score: 45

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 0%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 3

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Rank: 38 of 38
Score: 

PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Rank: 22 of 38
Score: 

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY
Rank: 27 of 38
Score: 

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
Rank: 9 of 38
Score: 

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 71%

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 5%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 12949

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 35%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 0%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 21%
SLOVAKIA

Rank: 34 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 37

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 21
Family Reunion: 56
Education: 24
Health: 31
Political Participation: 16
Permanent Residence: 54
Access To Nationality: 25
Anti-discrimination: 72
Changes in context

- Very small country of net immigration (mostly non-EU) only since 2000s, driven by pre-crisis economic conditions and future demographic trends
- More anti-immigrant sentiment in SK than on average in EU (e.g. in 2012, only 37% thought that immigrants enrich the country economically and culturally)
- Relatively low employment rates (65%) and decelerating GDP growth
- Decrease in number of newcomers with SK’s short but strong recession in 2009 and rise in unemployment
- Alternating coalitions from left/nationalist (2006-2010) to centre-right (2010-2012) to left-leaning (2012-today)

Key Common Statistics

<table>
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<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

SK is one of the last EU Member States to adopt even a ‘concept’ of integration in 2009 and eventually a policy in 2014. It has not made any major progress on promoting integration since 2007, other than strengthening the anti-discrimination laws. In fact, the 2007 Citizenship Act significantly restricted the path to citizenship. Only 1 of the 18 changes on immigration policy since 2010 improved SK’s MIPEX score, but this amendment was both introduced and removed in the same year.

Conclusions and recommendations

SK’s integration policies raise major doubts about their effectiveness. Integration is weak from the very beginning, with weaker rights for labour migrants and reuniting families in SK than in most countries. School and health
practitioners receive hardly any guidance when they have to serve SK's very small number of immigrant pupils and patients, since education and health are largely missing from SK's integration strategies. Most non-EU citizens are allowed to vote, but excluded from democratic life, despite the benefits that immigrant leaders and volunteering can bring to SK society. The lowest and most inequitable naturalisation rates in Europe keep most non-EU citizens in a relatively insecure status, with potentially negative side-effects on their integration outcomes. SK's anti-discrimination law is its one strength for integration, but too few people know about discrimination and their rights to take even the first step towards justice. Little else is known about these policies' effects on immigrants and their integration, as data and evaluations are also missing in SK.

Policy Recommendations from Institute for Public Affairs

- Beyond formal concepts and action plans, make real reforms improving laws and developing new programmes
- Recognise real examples of migrants' positive contributions to economy, culture, education and society and use these to make reforms
- Guarantee equal treatment and eliminate administrative discretion in different areas and procedures for foreigners and integration, including access to the labour market
- Increase the number and support of local and regional authorities' integration policies
- Address specific needs of high- and low-skilled non-EU immigrants through new targeted programmes and evaluate their impact
- Raise immigrants' awareness of discrimination and make it easier for them to report complaints and access justice
- Remove barriers and create new structures for the political participation of non-EU citizens
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY
Rank: 37 of 38
Score: 21

FAMILY REUNION
Rank: 26 of 38
Score: 56

EDUCATION
Rank: 27 of 38
Score: 24

HEALTH
Rank: 29 of 38
Score: 31

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 1%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 6

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Rank: 31 of 38
Score: 16

PERMANENT RESIDENCE
Rank: 25 of 38
Score: 54

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY
Rank: 35 of 38
Score: 25

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
Rank: 15 of 38
Score: 72

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 5%

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 81%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 64%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 1%
SLOVENIA

**Rank:** 27 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 44

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 38
- Family Reunion: 80
- Education: 26
- Health: 18
- Political Participation: 23
- Permanent Residence: 61
- Access To Nationality: 41
- Anti-discrimination: 67
Changes in context

- Very sharp decline in employment rates and immigration rates since the economic crisis
- Nearly all immigrants still coming from Western Balkan neighbours, with hardly any from developing countries
- Compared to other countries, very few non-EU citizens in SI have university degrees
- Public opinion improved on immigrants from 2007-2012, though only 61% think SI is a welcoming country

Key Common Statistics

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

During the economic crisis, many migrant workers were the first ones fired and left the country. By 2010 SI transformed from a country of largely seasonal migration to a country of family migration and settlement. This story is similar to other new labour migration destinations in Southern Europe (IT, PT, ES). During this time, SI cut several targeted employment programmes and scholarships for non-EU citizens, improved general procedures to recognise work-related skills and briefly facilitated family reunion for recent arrivals. The 2008 Decree on Integration of Foreigners has provided for more continuous support for basic language/integration courses and info points/websites. Other than that, SI’s new policies since 2007, whether quickly implementing EU law or producing general strategy documents, are unlikely to improve the integration situation on the ground. Migration and integration is rarely a topic of public or policy debate.

Conclusions and recommendations

Slovenia’s integration policies still create slightly more obstacles than opportunities for immigrants to fully...
participate in society. While its policies are more favourable than most Central European countries, the country has fallen in the MIPEX international ranking as other new countries of immigration passed liberal reforms, some major (CZ), some minor (GR, HU, RO). The country’s integration policy clearly has its strengths and weaknesses. Non-EU families are likely to reunite in SI through its clear and quick procedure, but without the immediate right to work, which can create economic dependency. The equally clear path to permanent residence has enabled most immigrants after 5 years’ stay to enjoy a secure residence and more equal rights in most areas of life. Compared to most other MIPEX countries, SI significantly delays labour market integration and naturalisation for eligible non-EU citizens, which can produce negative side-effects for their long-term integration in several areas of life. Like other countries with rather new and small settled communities, SI has made little effort to open up health services, schools, civic life or anti-discrimination support—four key missing areas in SI’s integration policies.

Policy Recommendations

- Open up access to labour market for family migrants and new measures to decrease overqualification among migrant workers
- Increase access and targeted support within the education system for all immigrant pupils, students and adults
- Guarantee universal healthcare for all migrants and SI citizens and increase support measures for migrant patients
- Enable dual citizenship and speed up naturalisation for migrants meeting the requirements after 5-7 years
- Increase reporting rates of discrimination cases and provide adequate victim support system
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 33 of 38
Score: 38

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 33%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 4%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 3 of 38
Score: 80

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU separated couples: 12%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 4

EDUCATION

Rank: 26 of 38
Score: 26

Potential Beneficiaries
15 y/o with immigrant background: 9%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 13%

HEALTH

Rank: 37 of 38
Score: 18

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 33%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 4%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 27 of 38
Score: 23

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 71%

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 75%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 18 of 38
Score: 61

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 71%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU with permanent residents: 63%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 22 of 38
Score: 41

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 45%

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU naturalisation: 2%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 16 of 38
Score: 67

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 2%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 3569
SOUTH KOREA

Rank: 18 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 53

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 71
Family Reunion: 63
Education: 57
Health: 36
Political Participation: 54
Permanent Residence: 54
Access To Nationality: 36
Anti-discrimination: 52
Changes in context

- Evolving from country of net emigration to net immigration, especially for labour and family migration
- Largest immigrant group are ethnic KRs from China who enter KR for temporary low-skilled work through the Working Visit System
- Around 1/5 of immigrants in KR make use of the Employment Permit System. This group consists mainly of people from Southeast Asia
- Increasing number of foreign family members of KR citizens have started to arrive since the late 1990s
- Attitudes towards immigrants slowly improving over time in KR and JP (around 2/3 with positive attitudes in 2012)

Changes in policy

KR lost 1 point on the MIPEX scale in 2014, due to restrictions on family reunion (-4 points) and permanent residence (-1 point). With some important exceptions, transnational couples cannot reunite if the foreign spouse does not start learning KR from abroad and the KR spouse does not earn 120% of the minimum cost of living. In addition, applicants for permanent residence can be rejected on vague grounds of social welfare and national interests. Few countries impose a language requirement for family reunion (only 7 other MIPEX countries) or so many vague grounds for permanent residence (15 others). With the aim to fight fraud, these restrictions run the risk of being disproportionate obstacles for vulnerable groups and ineffective for improving integration outcomes in practice.

Conclusions and recommendations

For the 1st time, KR’s efforts on integration can be directly compared to policies in all other developed countries of immigration, with MIPEX data from all countries from December 2014. KR’s policies create only slightly more opportunities than obstacles for immigrants to fully participate in society. Compared to most other new countries of immigration, KR has very quickly improved its legal framework on integration, in a similar way as PT, ES or FI. As a result, KR is a leader among new countries of immigration around the world in areas such as labour market mobility, education and political participation. Its policies guarantee more equal rights, opportunities and support for immigrants than JP and most Central European countries.

Immigrants benefit from its slight strengths on labour market integration and family reunion, while they may be poorly served by its slight weakness on health and citizenship policy. In other areas, KR’s policies receive scores
between 52-to-58 points on the 100-point MIPEX scale. These scores are below the international averages on anti-discrimination and permanent residence and above the international average on education and political participation.

More specifically, KR's strengths include strong targeted employment support, school support, voting rights and support for immigrant associations. This strong targeted support emerged with the 2007 Multicultural Families Support Act, multicultural centers across the country and a budget today of 123.2 million won. These policies are relatively new and need to be fully evaluated as to their implementation and effectiveness. KR's weaknesses emerge across all 8 MIPEX areas, such as the implementation of intercultural education, the political liberties of foreigners, the restricted path to family reunion and permanent residence, the restriction of dual nationality, limited healthcare entitlements and weak discrimination definitions/mechanisms. KR could learn from the strengths in the traditional countries of immigration (AU/CA/NZ/US) as well as many Western European countries (e.g. Nordics and IT/PT/ES).
SPAIN

**Rank:** 11 out of 38  
**MIPEX Score:** 60

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Labour Market Mobility: 72
- Family Reunion: 90
- Education: 37
- Health: 53
- Political Participation: 54
- Permanent Residence: 74
- Access To Nationality: 48
- Anti-discrimination: 49
Changes in context

- Recent major destination country since 1990's, with 15% born-abroad but small numbers of 2nd generation
- With the crisis/austerity, ES has experienced one of the greatest declines and now lowest levels of employment in the EU
- 2011 saw conservatives replacing socialists in the national government
- Despite the crisis, public attitudes in ES are still very positive towards immigrants (84% of nationals think legal immigrants must have same rights than nationals, Eurobarometer 2012)
- Responding to the crisis, the number of new arrivals has decreased and shifted from non-EU labour to family reunion of children and spouses of former labour and regularised migrants settling long-term in ES or moving on to work elsewhere in the EU

Key Common Statistics

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of net migration since:</th>
<th>% Non-EU citizens</th>
<th>% Foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
<th>% from low or medium-developed (HDI) country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

- No change in the overall MIPEX score from 2010 to 2014 (+2 overall in 2009 with Immigration Law)
- +3 on Political participation: Ad hoc information campaigns by Electoral Census Office since 2011
- Strategic Plan of Citizenship and Integration 2012-2014 adopted in September 2011
- With crisis/austerity and change of government in November 2011, inaction on integration and divestment from ES national integration fund
- -3 on Political participation: Elimination of fund creates difficulties for immigrant civil society
- -5 on Education: less work to promote diversity in society with elimination of fund, due to austerity, and ‘Education for Citizenship and Human Rights’, due to electoral promises
- Inaction on reform of anti-discrimination law and weak equality body
- Plan to speed up naturalisations, but now new bill with citizenship without the guaranteed courses to succeed
Conclusions and recommendations

Despite the crisis, many policies were maintained and benefited immigrants' social integration in tough times: the right to reunite with family, become long-term residents and, for those from countries with historic ties, to rapidly integrate to the ES democratic community as full citizens. In any case, inaction and set-backs during crisis may have undone some basic achievements to guarantee equal protections for all vulnerable groups in ES society without adequate replacements (e.g. labour market integration for non-EU citizens not in employment, health entitlements, National Integration Fund, consistent support in and outside school for pupils, Education for Citizenship and Human Rights). Also data and evaluations are still under-development in ES so difficult to say more about the effectiveness of many of its integration policies.

Many necessary actions would have been low-cost and ES authorities wasted some time and delayed/discouraged integration for many: e.g. equal and clear access to citizenship for all immigrants (instead created a backlog in an excessively bureaucratic procedure), voting rights and stronger consultation bodies to dialogue with affected immigrant groups and local communities, strengthening the anti-discrimination law and equality body (instead very few complaints) a bridging legal status for those exhausting unemployment benefits (instead those who involuntarily lose their jobs also involuntarily lose their legal status).

Policy Recommendations from CIDOB

- Spain must face its greatest weakness: education. Reinforce with budget and human resources the educational system would meet the specific needs of children
- The high degree of discretion and differences of origin established in the access to the naturalization creates a feeling of rejection among immigrants for the process. It is necessary to agree a fair, equitable and neutral regime for the country
- The approval of the long-awaited anti-discrimination law would provide a legal framework from which effective policy may be drawn
- The municipalities are the first level of attention to the integration of immigrants. A strategy for this level of government is essential to meet the needs of immigrants
- Coordination and cooperation between levels of government would entail a more effective and far-reaching policy for the integration of immigrants. In this sense also the effective involvement of civil society is needed
### LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

**Rank:** 10 of 38  
**Score:** 72

#### Potential Beneficiaries
- Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 38%

#### Real Beneficiaries
- Non-EU in lifelong learning: 11%

### FAMILY REUNION

**Rank:** 1 of 38  
**Score:** 90

#### Potential Beneficiaries
- Non-EU separated couples: 7%

### EDUCATION

**Rank:** 20 of 38  
**Score:** 37

#### Potential Beneficiaries
- 15y/o with immigrant background: 10%

### HEALTH

**Rank:** 12 of 38  
**Score:** 53

### POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

**Rank:** 15 of 38  
**Score:** 54

#### Real Beneficiaries
- Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 24%

### PERMANENT RESIDENCE

**Rank:** 3 of 38  
**Score:** 74

#### Potential Beneficiaries
- Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 87%

### ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

**Rank:** 21 of 38  
**Score:** 48

#### Potential Beneficiaries
- Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 46%

### ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

**Rank:** 29 of 38  
**Score:** 49

#### Potential Beneficiaries
- Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 3%
SWEDEN

Rank: 1 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 78

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 98
Family Reunion: 78
Education: 77
Health: 62
Political Participation: 71
Permanent Residence: 79
Access To Nationality: 73
Anti-discrimination: 85
Changes in context

- Country of immigration since 1950's, with around 15% of the population foreign-born and 75,000-100,000 newcomers every year
- Increasing numbers of family migrants (50% children) and humanitarian migrants (nearly 50% from SY in 2013)
- Small but increasing number of migrant workers since 2008 (around 1/4 high-skilled, 1/4 seasonal, 1/2 general workers) but 50% decline in number of international students since 2011
- 2014 saw centre-right minority replaced by centre-left minority government, with cross-party 'December Agreement' in opposition to far-right Swedish Democrats
- Overall employment rate barely affected by crisis and remains at 80%, one of the highest in developed world
- SE public have the most positive attitudes towards immigrants like other Nordic countries and traditional countries of immigration: >80% think that SE is right to give immigrants equal rights as SE citizens, enriched culturally and economically and a good place to live for immigrants

Key Common Statistics

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<th>% Non-EU of foreign-born</th>
<th>% Non-EU university-educated</th>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;1950s</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Changes in policy

- Since 2010, no major change overall in SE's ambitious integration policies, with focus on implementing the 2009 Introduction Act and Discrimination Act to reach all those in need, measure impact and make it more effective
- SE set new high standards for labour market integration with 2009 Act replicated in FI and discussed across Europe (+3 points on labour market mobility policies since 2010)
- New income/housing requirements for family reunion, with favourable exemptions for long-settled and vulnerable groups (-2 points on family reunion since 2010)
- Children arriving with undocumented parents can pursue their education up through secondary level under the Education Act (+4 on education since 2013)
- Under 2013 law, undocumented migrant patients now benefit from the same healthcare as asylum-seekers, though both based on individual decisions about what care 'cannot be postponed'
- 2009 Discrimination Act creates single comprehensive law and Equality Ombudsman for more effective access to justice and active measures
Conclusions and recommendations

Putting SE in a global perspective, its integration policies tend to be more responsive and evidence-based, more ambitious, better supported and more effective in many areas of life. The needs of non-EU newcomers in SE are similar to those in other Northern European countries. Ranked 1st out of 38, SE’s policies aim to respond to these needs by strictly scrutinising any obstacles in laws or in policies, offering targeted solutions to specific needs and getting mainstream services to better serve a diverse public. Newcomers and all residents of disadvantaged areas should be able to use their rights and invest in their skills in order to take up equal opportunities in all areas of life. Policymakers are constantly looking for quicker and more cost effective solutions and include more hard-to-reach groups. Similar top-scoring MIPEX countries aim just as high (e.g. FI, NO, CA, NZ). These high expectations are also shared by the public and a general political consensus in SE and the other top-scoring countries, where overwhelming majorities think that immigrants should benefit from the same rights as citizens.

SE’s comparative high bar for success is both a key factor improving integration and a source of frustration for the SE public, who have come to expect such high standards of living, equality, education and active citizenship. Newcomers have yet to benefit from these high standards and their lives do improve over time in SE, but larger gaps may be expected between immigrants and the native-born in SE than in less developed or equitable societies. Certain inequalities persist over time and require greater attention, especially for women, early school leavers and disadvantaged areas with many newcomers. SE should not forget that integration policies are just one – and sometimes not the major – factor influencing the integration process.

Still, compared to other European countries, SE’s ambitious policies seem to be more effective than other countries at reaching most immigrant residents in need. Immigrants and their children are more likely to invest in their skills than elsewhere in Europe. Nearly all non-EU immigrants are guaranteed in law and in practice the same rights as SE citizens in economic, social, family and democratic life. Residents in SE are most likely to reunite together and become permanent residents, voters and citizens. More people in SE are informed of their rights as potential victims of discrimination and using these rights to take the 1st steps to access justice.

The challenge for SE and other top-scoring countries is to expand access to the most effective programmes for all newcomers and disadvantaged residents. Like SE, the top-scoring countries are also among the very few with integration policies based more on evidence than on politics, thanks to the use of pilots, experiments and impact evaluations to test and improve policies. In recent years, SE has also been targeting its investments in policies and programmes proving themselves in evaluations to be effective for boosting integration outcomes. So far, mainstream politics and society has maintained its consensus and commitment to constantly improve integration in practice.
Policy Recommendations from the Swedish Red Cross

- Ensure access to health care for all migrants nationwide, including specialized treatment for persons suffering from trauma linked to conflict, torture and harsh migration routes. This requires a better coordination between regional health authorities and other actors.
- Expand access and create more effective integration programs for vulnerable groups. The programs need to be better adapted to individual needs, linked to level of education, health and social situation.
- Expand access to procedures to recognize skills and foreign qualifications, Swedish language courses and work placements, including asylum seekers.
- Support local communities and civil society organizations working with integration activities locally and enable local adaptations of national programs.
- Safeguard the right to family reunification. Ensure prompt and effective application procedures including access to information, legal aid and introduction programs for reunited family members. Special attention must be given to the families of unaccompanied minors.
- Uphold the policy of granting permanent residence permits as a rule to ensure equal rights and a secure and efficient integration-process.
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 1 of 38
Score: 98

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 23%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 43%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 5 of 38
Score: 78

Outcome Indicators
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 11

EDUCATION

Rank: 1 of 38
Score: 77

Potential Beneficiaries
15y/o with immigrant background: 15%

Real Beneficiaries
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 78%

HEALTH

Rank: 9 of 38
Score: 62

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 23%

Real Beneficiaries
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 43%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 7 of 38
Score: 71

Real Beneficiaries
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 71%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 2 of 38
Score: 79

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 50%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 83%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 2 of 38
Score: 73

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 50%

Real Beneficiaries
Enfranchised non-EU adults: 83%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 5 of 38
Score: 85

Potential Beneficiaries
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 2%

Outcome Indicators
Access to justice (# complaints per potential victims): 235
SWITZERLAND

Rank: 21 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 49

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 59
Family Reunion: 48
Education: 42
Health: 70
Political Participation: 58
Permanent Residence: 51
Access To Nationality: 31
Anti-discrimination: 31
Changes in context

- Large and long-established country of net immigration, with large 2nd generation born & raised in CH
- Nearly 2/3 of foreign-born are EU citizens
- Equal numbers of low, medium, and high-educated non-EU immigrants
- Highest employment rate in Europe for decades (alongside IS)
- Since 1959, Grand Coalition in Federal Council of major ‘government parties’; Since 2003, stronger right-wing majority among the 5 parties, including CH People's Party
- Levels of anti-immigrant sentiment appear average for Europe and slightly decreasing over time

Key Common Statistics

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<tr>
<td>&lt;1950s</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Changes in policy

Immigrants may benefit from more funding for integration courses and advice services, while certain children may benefit from greater access and support at school, thanks to the HarmoS agreement signed by 15 cantons.

The 2011 system for encouraging integration assigned responsibilities for integration to mainstream services at local and cantonal level and pooled together funding and support through the cantonal integration programmes 2014-2017.

Federal reforms has been a slow process in the areas related to integration. Certain issues – like a comprehensive anti-discrimination law or voting rights – remain off the political agenda or fail in popular initiatives. Despite the 2008 introduction of integration agreements, cantons still differ in how they define integration in their conditions for family reunion, long-term residence and nationality. The total revision of the Nationality Law, announced in 2009, finally led in 2014 to minor improvements and some restrictions. Reform of the Foreigners and Integration Act was delayed by the results of the so-called referendum ‘against massive immigration’ on 9 February 2014. Since the referendum puts priority on access to the labour market for residents, the government is considering to facilitate integration measures and labour market access for beneficiaries of provisional admission.
Conclusions and recommendations

Scoring 49/100 overall, most CH federal and cantonal policies create an almost equal number of opportunities and obstacles for non-EU immigrants to fully participate in CH society. Obstacles emerge throughout the legal framework. Victims of discrimination are less protected and supported in CH than anywhere else on the continent. CH policies on non-EU citizens are demanding but not strongly encouraging their integration, with often new, weak and uneven support across the country. Faced with some of the most restrictive policies in Western Europe, non-EU citizens in CH are less likely to reunite with their family, enjoy a secure status or become a full citizen.

Opportunities mostly emerge through trends in cantons' integration practices. The innovations in major CH cantons' healthcare systems were classified as world-leading. Cantonal policies on labour market mobility and political participation come close to what's average in Western Europe. Depending on the canton, non-EU immigrants have very different options for the labour market, public life, education and training and health services. These differences between cantons are well monitored by academic and policy research (CFM).

Integration policymakers have started to monitor integration through commonly agreed indicators and evaluate their own success at integration policy through cantons' use of integration funds.

Policy Recommendations from the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies

- Increase uptake of adult education and training for all groups, including migrants
- Increase recognition of foreign academic and professional qualifications
- Increase uptake of bridging courses and work placements for both low- and high-educated
- Support immigrants' participation in civil society
- Increase uptake of mainstream support services through training on transcultural competence, greater flexibility for workers and young parents & solutions for financing translation and interpretation
POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 18 of 38  
Score: 59

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 26%

Real Beneficiaries  
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 21%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 33 of 38  
Score: 48

Potential Beneficiaries  
15 y/o with immigrant background: 24%

Real Beneficiaries  
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 2

EDUCATION

Rank: 18 of 38  
Score: 42

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 21%

Real Beneficiaries  
15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 46%

HEALTH

Rank: 2 of 38  
Score: 70

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 26%

Political Participation

Rank: 12 of 38  
Score: 58

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 78%

Real Beneficiaries  
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 36%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 31 of 38  
Score: 51

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 61%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 31 of 38  
Score: 31

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU naturalisation: 3%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 35 of 38  
Score: 31
Turkey, 2014

Rank: 38 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 25

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 15
Family Reunion: 49
Education: 5
Health: 32
Political Participation: 11
Permanent Residence: 27
Access To Nationality: 34
Anti-discrimination: 26
Changes in context

- Country with long history of emigration and immigration and today a major hub for mixed flows of asylum-seekers, irregular migrants, and migrant workers
- The number of foreign citizens recorded in TU rose from 100,000 in 2008 to 275,000 in 2013 according to statistics reported by TU to Eurostat
- The number of registered SY refugees rose according to UNHCR from 175,000 in Jan. 2013 to 560,000 in Jan. 2014 to >1.5 million in Jan. 2015 (50% women, >50% children, ≈4% aged 60+); Halfway through 2015, UNHCR only received 17% of its 2015 funding appeal ($500 million gap)
- Lowest overall employment rate among MIPEX countries (53% in 2014, similar to GR)
- Like GR, the majority of TU citizens are increasingly negative towards immigrants linked to the refugee crisis, due to perceived effects on wages and rents

Changes in policy

Reform of TU's asylum and migration policies is now less about relations and accession to the EU and more about the future of the now 1.7 million registered SY refugees living in TU, projected to reach 2.5 by end 2015. TU is now the largest host country of refugees in the world, with just 250,000 in 25 refugee camps and the rest in cities across the country. TU is currently the only one of the 38 MIPEX countries that signed and ratified the 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of their Families.

After years of discussion, Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection was passed by the Turkish Parliament in 2013 and welcomed by the UN and EU. Maintaining the geographical limitation, the law does create basic procedures for international protection, work permits, and residence permits. TU is one of the few countries in the world maintaining the geographical limitation of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees to only European asylum seekers.

Under Law 6458's Article 96, the mutual ‘adaptation’ of immigrants and society is supposed to be facilitated through courses and information campaigns, depending on available funds and stakeholders’ recommendations. A Migration Policies Board within the Interior Ministry is supposed to draft new migration strategies, determine and monitor implementation, and carry out mutual adaptation activities.
Conclusions and recommendations

Even after passage of the Law 6458 (only +1 point in MIPEX), TU's legal framework is unfavourable for integration and ranks below the other MIPEX countries, scoring only 25-out-of-100 points. Immigrant workers and their families have restricted rights and little-to-no state support. The policies are unfavourable for labour market mobility, education, and political participation, even compared to other new countries of immigration in Central and Southeastern Europe. TU also has the weakest protections against discrimination because a dedicated anti-discrimination law and agency are still lacking and pending approval by Parliament. The country's relative strength, family reunion, is still incompatible with EU law and weak compared to laws in most MIPEX countries. Settled immigrants face not only a slightly unfavourable path to citizenship, as in several new countries of immigration, but also one of the least favourable paths to simply a long-term residence permit, far below EU standards. While Law 6458 improved transparency and the rule-of-law, the new family reunion and long-term residence statuses generally formalised existing practices, including new rights, but also new requirements. The new Migration Policies Board still has to create national adaptation strategies and programmes and determine the conditions for long-term residence.
UNITED KINGDOM

Rank: 15 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 57

KEY FINDINGS

Labour Market Mobility: 56
Family Reunion: 33
Education: 57
Health: 64
Political Participation: 51
Permanent Residence: 51
Access To Nationality: 60
Anti-discrimination: 85
Changes in context

- Foreign-born population (12.5% in 2014) similar to other Western European countries (e.g. FR, DE, NL)
- Mostly work and study in UK (like IE, CH, CY, MT): Slight majority (=60% in 2013) of non-EU newcomers come with permits to work or study
- Along with IE, UK benefits from one of most high-educated non-EU citizen populations in the EU (from 1/4 to 1/2 from 2006 to 2014), similar to immigrants in AU/CA/NZ
- Labour government replaced by conservative-liberal democrat coalition in 2010 elections and now conservative majority in 2015 elections
- Beyond the debates on net migration, the majority of people in the UK are just as positive about immigrants and integration as others in Northern Europe

Key Common Statistics

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Changes in policy

- From 2011 to 2014, regular changes to the rules significantly restricted the opportunities for families to reunite and the path to settlement and UK citizenship
- The UK’s integration policies dropped 6 points, the 2nd largest restrictions in recent years (alongside GR and NL)
- Separated families now face the least ‘family-friendly’ immigration policies in the developed world: the longest delays and highest income, language and fee levels, one of the few countries with language test abroad and restricted access to benefits
- One of the most restrictive and expensive paths to settle permanently and become UK citizens, with few free EN and citizenship courses for immigrants to succeed
- UK stopping its weak targeted measures for labour market integration at the very time when most in Northern Europe and settlement countries are expanding their support
- Following the comprehensive 2010 Equality Act, UK’s commitment to equality slipped since 2011/2 with 55% budget cuts for EHRC and end of mandatory equality impact assessments
- After mainstreaming Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant, schools are no longer required to spend and report on the needs of bilingual and underachieving ethnic minority pupils
- The NHS is well-prepared to deal with diversity but government is now restricting migrants’ eligibility and access more so than the large majority of countries (including AU and NZ)
Conclusions and recommendations

These major restrictions were mostly motivated by the government's pledge to cap migration at the tens of thousands and to pursue austerity and localism. Now non-EU residents in the UK who want to invest in their integration will face greater hardship and costs than almost anywhere else in the developed world to reunite with their spouses and children, settle permanently or become citizens. Cuts to funding and monitoring may be undermining the UK's traditional international strengths on anti-discrimination and equality laws and education support for minority pupils, with the UK falling behind other EN-speaking countries. These cuts and restrictions rarely subject to the types of pilots and evaluation that would evaluate their reach and impact on local communities and various integration outcomes.

The government's February 2012 integration strategy assigns greater responsibility for integration to society and local authorities. The national policies and funding to support this process focus on five key factors: common values, mutual commitments and obligations, social mobility, local civic participation and tackling intolerance and extremism. While local and regional authorities are taking a lead in certain issues and parts of the UK (e.g. London, Scotland, Northern Ireland), they may not have the data (apart from the census), guidance, resources, migrant forums or willingness to respond effectively to newcomers and reverse inequalities for long-settled communities. Other countries better support local and regional authorities by adopting a comprehensive national integration strategy, where these authorities come together with civil society and immigrant communities to make their own commitments and agree on common measurable targets (e.g. AU, DE, NO, PT, SE, recently US).

Policy Recommendations from the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS)

- Measure the impact of restricting the right to family reunion
- Provide areas of new migration with targeted support for migrant children's education
- Assess the impact of scaling back the enforcement of equality law, in particular on migrant and minority employment
- Ensure that access to English language support is at the centre of the integration debate, with clarity about the costs and benefits of strengthening support
- Encourage local government and city governments to consider the local impact of new migrations and prepare strategies to facilitate migrant integration
MIPEX 2015
United Kingdom

POLICIES - SUMMARY

LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

Rank: 21 of 38  
Score: 56

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU not in employment, education, training: 24%

Real Beneficiaries  
Non-EU in lifelong learning: 29%

FAMILY REUNION

Rank: 38 of 38  
Score: 33

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU separated couples: 1%

Outcome Indicators  
Non-EU family reunion rate (# family members per 100 non-EU residents): 3

EDUCATION

Rank: 11 of 38  
Score: 57

Potential Beneficiaries  
15y/o with immigrant background: 13%

Real Beneficiaries  
Non-EU naturalisation: 7%

HEALTH

Rank: 7 of 38  
Score: 64

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 7%

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Rank: 19 of 38  
Score: 51

Real Beneficiaries  
Naturalised non-EU-born adults: 54%

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Rank: 31 of 38  
Score: 51

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU eligible for permanent residence: 63%

ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

Rank: 13 of 38  
Score: 60

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU eligible for naturalisation: 62%

Outcome Indicators  
Non-EU with permanent residents: 67%

Outcome Indicators  
Non-EU naturalisation: 7%

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Rank: 5 of 38  
Score: 85

Potential Beneficiaries  
Non-EU experiencing discrimination: 7%
USA

Rank: 9 out of 38
MIPEX Score: 63

KEY FINDINGS
Labour Market Mobility: 67
Family Reunion: 66
Education: 60
Health: 69
Political Participation: 36
Permanent Residence: 54
Access To Nationality: 61
Anti-discrimination: 90
Changes in context

- 80 million or 25% of US population are 1st or 2nd generation (41 million foreign-born or 13%)
- 2012/3 estimates of 19.3m naturalised citizens, 13.3m lawful permanent residents (LPR or Green Card), 11.4m undocumented and 1.9m temporary visa-holders (e.g. workers, students)
- Family immigration remains most important channel for permanent legal immigration (2/3 of newcomers in 2011-3)
- LPR granted to around 1 million every year between 2005-2013 (in recent years, 45% of new LPRs are new arrivals and 55% adjusted their status while in US)
- High employment rate slightly declined from 2007 to 2010 and started to recover since 2012
- Democrat president since 2008 and Democrat-controlled congress in only 1st two years
- Most positive general attitudes towards immigrants in US alongside other English-speaking countries and Nordics

Changes in policy

Despite congressional inaction on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, a few immigrants will benefit from better opportunities to participate in society in the US, rising +1 out of 100 points from 2012 to 2014. A significant minority of undocumented immigrants, through the administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Executive Action programs, enjoy slightly favourable opportunities on the US labour market. More generally, immigrants should benefit from more work-related English and training programs approved by Congress. Another important policy change, this time initiated by a Supreme Court decision, allows same-sex couples to sponsor spouses for immigration status in the same manner as heterosexual couples. This has allowed same-sex couples to reunite in the United States, and ensures equal treatment under US immigration laws.

Conclusions and recommendations

Without comprehensive immigration reform, US policies only score 63/100, creating a slightly favourable path for some immigrants to fully participate in society and become US citizens. First and foremost, strong anti-discrimination laws protect all residents. Immigrants who obtain a legal status have good opportunities to live
with their family and find a job, but not as good as those Americans enjoy. Still, the path to citizenship, even for legal immigrants, is not as easy as many think. Disproportionate fees, limited family visas, long backlogs, and insecure rights defer many from the American dream of citizenship, a secure family, and a good job. These symptoms of the so-called ‘broken’ immigration system may be eroding the United States’ traditional gift for integration. Averaged together, these obstacles put the US at just 9th, compared to 38 countries. Clinching higher spots on the ranking, AU, CA, NZ and a few Western countries (Nordics and PT) outperform the US on issues such as reuniting families, encouraging workers and students to settle, facilitating the requirements for naturalization and working to recognize immigrants’ credentials. The weak federal role on integration may improve in the future. In 2015, the White House’s Task Force for New Americans agreed a Federal Strategic Action Plan on Immigrant & Refugee Integration, entitled “Strengthening communities by welcoming all residents.” This new proposals, plus the 2016 presidential campaign debates, may lead to more ambitious and effective immigration and integration policies.

### POLICIES - SUMMARY

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<tr>
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<td>LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAMILY REUNION</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ACCESS TO NATIONALITY</td>
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<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTI-DISCRIMINATION</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Potential Beneficiaries**
- 15y/o with immigrant background: 22%

**Real Beneficiaries**
- 15 y/o immigrants in extra literacy courses: 66%

**Outcome Indicators**
- Non-EU naturalisation: 4%
ANNEX:
LIST OF INDICATORS

1. LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY

1.1 ACCESS
1. Immediate access to labour market; 2. Access to private sector; 3. Access to public sector; 4. Immediate access to self employment; 5. Access to self employment

1.2 ACCESS TO GENERAL SUPPORT

1.3 TARGETED SUPPORT

1.4 WORKERS’ RIGHTS

2. FAMILY REUNION FOR FOREIGN CITIZENS

2.1 ELIGIBILITY

2.2 CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS

2.3 SECURITY OF STATUS
33. Maximum duration of procedure; 34. Duration of validity of permit; 35. Grounds for rejection, withdrawal, refusal; 36. Personal circumstances considered; 37. Legal protection

2.4 RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS
38. Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children; 39. Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death or violence; 40. Access to education and training; 41. Access to employment and self-employment; 42. Access to social benefits; 43. Access to housing

3. EDUCATION

3.1 ACCESS
44. Access to pre-primary education and compulsory education; 45. Compulsory education as a legal right; 46. Assessment of prior learning; 47. Access to non-compulsory education; 48. Access to vocational training; 49. Access to higher education

3.2 TARGETING NEEDS
50. Educational guidance at all levels; 51. Provision of support to learn language of instruction; 52. Migrant pupil monitoring; 53. Measures to address educational situation of migrant groups; 54. Teacher training to reflect migrants’ learning needs

3.3 NEW OPPORTUNITIES
55. Support for teaching immigrant languages; 56. Support for teaching immigrant cultures; 57. Measures to counter segregation of migrant pupils and promote integration; 58. Measures to support migrant parents and communities; 59. Measures to bring migrants into the teacher workforce

3.4 INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION FOR ALL
60. School curriculum to reflect diversity; 61. State supported information initiatives; 62. Adapting curriculum to reflect diversity; 63. Adapting daily school life to reflect diversity; 64. Teacher training to reflect diversity
4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

4.1 ELECTORAL RIGHTS
65. Right to vote in national elections; 66. Right to vote in regional elections; 67. Right to vote in local elections; 68. Right to stand in local elections

4.2 POLITICAL LIBERTIES
69. Right to association; 70. Membership in political parties

4.3 CONSULTATIVE BODIES
71. Strength of national consultative body; 72. Strength of regional consultative body; 73. Strength of capital consultative body; 74. Strength of other local consultative body (average)

4.4 IMPLEMENTATION POLICIES
75. Active information policy; 76. Public funding/support for national immigrant bodies; 77. Public funding/support for regional immigrant bodies; 78. Public funding/support for immigrant bodies at local level in capital city; 79. Public funding/support for immigrant bodies in other city with largest migrant population

5. PERMANENT RESIDENCE

5.1 ELIGIBILITY
80. Residence period; 81. Permits considered; 82. Time counted as pupil/student; 83. Periods of prior-absence allowed

5.2 CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION OF STATUS
84. LTR Language requirement; 85. Economic resources; 86. Costs of application

5.3 SECURITY OF STATUS
87. Maximum duration of procedure; 88. Duration of validity of permit; 89. Renewable permit; 90. Periods of absence allowed; 91. Grounds for rejection, withdrawal, refusal; 92. Personal circumstances considered before expulsion; 93. Expulsion precluded; 94. Legal protection

5.4 RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS
95. Access to employment; 96. Access to social security and assistance; 97. Access to housing

6. ACCESS TO NATIONALITY

6.1 ELIGIBILITY
98. Residence period; 99. Permits considered; 100. Periods of prior-absence allowed; 101. Requirements for spouses and partners; 102. Birth-right citizenship for second generation; 103. Birth-right citizenship for third generation

6.2 CONDITIONS FOR ACQUISITION

6.3 SECURITY OF STATUS
110. Maximum duration of procedure; 111. Additional grounds for refusal; 112. Discretionary powers in refusal; 113. Legal protection; 114. Protection against withdrawal of citizenship

6.4 DUAL NATIONALITY
115. Dual nationality for first generation; 116. Dual nationality for second/third generation

7. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

7.1 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
117. Law covers direct/indirect discrimination, harassment, instruction; 118. Law covers discrimination by association & on the basis of assumed characteristics; 119. Law applies to natural& legal persons; 120. Law applies to public sector; 121. Prohibitions in law; 122. Law covers multiple discrimination

7.2 FIELDS OF APPLICATION
123. Employment & vocational training; 124. Education; 125. Social protection; 126. Access to and supply of public goods and services, including housing; 127. Access to and supply of public goods and services, including health
7.3 ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Note: For discrimination on grounds of race/ethnicity, religion/belief and/or nationality 28. Procedures available for victims; 129. Shift in burden of proof in procedures; 130. Law accepts situation testing & statistical data; 131. Protection against victimisation; 132. State assistance for victims; 133. Role of legal entities in proceedings; 134. Range of legal actions; 35. Range of sanctions

7.4 EQUALITY POLICIES
Note: For discrimination on grounds of race/ethnicity, religion/belief and/or nationality 136. Mandate of specialised equality body; 137. Powers to assist victims; 138. Powers as quasi-judicial body; 139. Legal standing in procedures; 140. Powers to instigate proceedings and enforce findings; 141. Active information policy and dialogue; 142. Ensuring compliance of mainstream legislation; 143. Public bodies obliged to promote equality; 144. Law covers positive action measures

8. HEALTH

8.1 ENTITLEMENT TO HEALTH SERVICES
145. Health entitlements for legal migrants; 146. Health entitlements for asylum-seekers; 147. Health entitlements for undocumented migrants; 148. Administrative discretion and documentation for legal migrants; 149. Administrative discretion and documentation for asylum-seekers; 150. Administrative discretion and documentation for undocumented migrants

8.2 POLICIES TO FACILITATE ACCESS
151. Information for service providers about migrants’ entitlements; 152. Information for migrants concerning entitlements and use of health services; 153. Information for migrants concerning health education and promotion; 154. Provision of ‘cultural mediators’ or ‘patient navigators’ to facilitate access for migrants; 155. Obligation and sanctions for assisting undocumented migrants

8.3 RESPONSIVE HEALTH SERVICES
156. Availability of qualified interpretation services; 157. Requirement for ‘culturally competent’ or ‘diversity-sensitive’ services; 158. Training and education of health service staff; 159. Involvement of migrants in information provision, service design and delivery; 160. Encouraging diversity in the health service workforce; 161. Development of capacity and methods

8.4 MEASURES TO ACHIEVE CHANGE
162. Collection of data on migrant health; 163. Support for research on migrant health; 164. Health in all policies” approach; 165. Whole organisation approach; 166. Leadership by government; 167. Involvement of migrants and stakeholders
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